Narrative:

I departed ZZZ1 to return back to ZZZ from a solo xc flight as a student pilot. Before I departed ZZZ; I had experienced some issues with the onboard radios; so I called my CFI at ZZZ to get his input. Before takeoff; the issues resolved itself; but I had the chance to discuss weather with him and another CFI. Both agreed that I would return well before any weather was due to impact ZZZ; but that I should leave as soon as prudent and head straight back. After departing ZZZ; I received flight following from greensboro approach; who later passed me off to charlotte approach. About 20 nm northeast of ZZZ; I began my descent because I saw what I thought to be haze or possible clouds up ahead. I went from 4;500 ft. To 3;500 ft.; eventually skimming right below thicker layers of clouds. Conditions continued to deteriorate; so I tried descending even more to find better visibility. I tried leveling off at 2;500 ft. But realized I could not see ahead any better; so I descended further to 1;700 ft. The last thing I saw was crossing over route XXX; which is about 7 nm northeast of ZZZ; and then seconds later I found myself in total IMC with zero visibility in all directions. ATC then asked me if I had ZZZ in sight; and I responded with 'I don't and I'm having trouble seeing ahead.' charlotte approach told me that runway xx at ZZZ was 1 nm at my 12 o'clock; however; I ended up flying nearly directly over and past it; and never saw it. The controller saw that I had passed the runway and recommended that I turn left to a heading of 090. At that point; I felt like I was losing altitude so I made a climbing left turn and eventually made a full 360. At the end of the 360-degree turn; I caught sight of runway 5's lighted rabbit trail; thanks to my CFI telling the airport FBO to turn the lights on. I rapidly descended and turned towards the final approach course; before making a no-flap landing with a tail wind and landing safely. It was not until after landing; that I was told I had flown into a fast-moving; zero visibility snowstorm.what factors/perceptions/actions contributed to it? The fact that the storm was very fast-moving cannot be downplayed; and I think this had the largest part to play in it since multiple cfis said the system should have not arrived at ZZZ for another 1.5-2 hours later. I also believe there were a few human factors that played into this dangerous situation. Get-there-itis may have played a role; but I think my trust in the approach controller may have also led me towards continuing instead of turning around. When I was told the airport was only 1 nm ahead of me; it made me feel that the controller was telling me to continue; instead of realizing that I was still PIC.corrective actions:going forward; I will definitely make sure I receive more simulated and actual instrument training; but will also never hesitate to make an immediate 180 degree turn back towards clearer conditions if I ever end up in a similar situation again. This cannot be stressed enough to student pilots; and I feel that without the hood training I received only days prior; the results may have been different. All student pilots should be required to have all hood training complete before solo xc; discuss 180-degree standard rate turns under the hood; and also know how to request vectors; altitudes; contact approaches; etc. From approach facilities. Lastly; I should have [advised ATC]; and student pilots need to be told that that is always an option if they find themselves in a dire situation. Also; I think the controller at charlotte could have recommended to me to [advise ATC]; as he heard the fear in my voice and knew that I was a VFR pilot in IMC conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Student pilot on solo cross country reported a VFR into IMC encounter.

Narrative: I departed ZZZ1 to return back to ZZZ from a solo XC flight as a student pilot. Before I departed ZZZ; I had experienced some issues with the onboard radios; so I called my CFI at ZZZ to get his input. Before takeoff; the issues resolved itself; but I had the chance to discuss weather with him and another CFI. Both agreed that I would return well before any weather was due to impact ZZZ; but that I should leave as soon as prudent and head straight back. After departing ZZZ; I received flight following from Greensboro approach; who later passed me off to Charlotte approach. About 20 nm NE of ZZZ; I began my descent because I saw what I thought to be haze or possible clouds up ahead. I went from 4;500 ft. to 3;500 ft.; eventually skimming right below thicker layers of clouds. Conditions continued to deteriorate; so I tried descending even more to find better visibility. I tried leveling off at 2;500 ft. but realized I could not see ahead any better; so I descended further to 1;700 ft. The last thing I saw was crossing over route XXX; which is about 7 nm NE of ZZZ; and then seconds later I found myself in total IMC with zero visibility in all directions. ATC then asked me if I had ZZZ in sight; and I responded with 'I don't and I'm having trouble seeing ahead.' Charlotte approach told me that Runway XX at ZZZ was 1 nm at my 12 o'clock; however; I ended up flying nearly directly over and past it; and never saw it. The controller saw that I had passed the runway and recommended that I turn left to a heading of 090. At that point; I felt like I was losing altitude so I made a climbing left turn and eventually made a full 360. At the end of the 360-degree turn; I caught sight of Runway 5's lighted rabbit trail; thanks to my CFI telling the airport FBO to turn the lights on. I rapidly descended and turned towards the final approach course; before making a no-flap landing with a tail wind and landing safely. It was not until after landing; that I was told I had flown into a fast-moving; zero visibility snowstorm.What factors/perceptions/actions contributed to it? The fact that the storm was very fast-moving cannot be downplayed; and I think this had the largest part to play in it since multiple CFIs said the system should have not arrived at ZZZ for another 1.5-2 hours later. I also believe there were a few human factors that played into this dangerous situation. Get-there-itis may have played a role; but I think my trust in the approach controller may have also led me towards continuing instead of turning around. When I was told the airport was only 1 nm ahead of me; it made me feel that the controller was telling me to continue; instead of realizing that I was still PIC.Corrective actions:Going forward; I will definitely make sure I receive more simulated and actual instrument training; but will also never hesitate to make an immediate 180 degree turn back towards clearer conditions if I ever end up in a similar situation again. This cannot be stressed enough to student pilots; and I feel that without the hood training I received only days prior; the results may have been different. All student pilots should be required to have all hood training complete before solo XC; discuss 180-degree standard rate turns under the hood; and also know how to request vectors; altitudes; contact approaches; etc. from approach facilities. Lastly; I should have [advised ATC]; and student pilots need to be told that that is always an option if they find themselves in a dire situation. Also; I think the controller at Charlotte could have recommended to me to [advise ATC]; as he heard the fear in my voice and knew that I was a VFR pilot in IMC conditions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.