Narrative:

Approximately 40-45 mi prior to dom VORTAC ATC gave descent instruction of, 'descend and maintain FL250, cross dom VORTAC at or below FL280.' as we descended I got INS wind readout of a tailwind of 70 KTS and mentioned it to the captain. I also said to him that we were evidently not going to be able to make the crossing restriction. I believe he replied that we would make it. As we continued the captain instructed me to tell ATC that we had a tailwind and might only be able to cross the VORTAC at or below FL320. I complied and I believe ATC mainly just acknowledged it; no further instructions. The very relevant fact is that I believe we were only about 15 mi prior to the VORTAC when captain instructed me to tell the above to ATC, and up until then the captain had not used any speed brakes to expedite the descent, nor had he lowered the nose/pitch any further to accomplish same. At last he deployed some speed brakes as we approached the VOR. Almost over the VORTAC we were given a frequency change, I acknowledged and also told the frequency we were leaving that we were passing the VOR descending through about FL290 or 295, I can't remember exactly. I accomplished frequency change then shortly thereafter ATC informed us that we had overshot our turn to new arwy required at VOR by about 15 mi and gave us a correcting vector. I found out later on the ground that the low altitude chart had the rather unusual instructions of starting turns reference this VORTAC and some other nearby ones about 8-10 mi prior to fix to prevent overshoots since there are several arwys and vortacs in vicinity. I, as first officer, PNF, allowed the distrs of the altitude problem and frequency change to divert my attention from monitoring the turn; also in future I'll have more charts out. The captain's nonchalance or lack of concern with the missed crossing restriction alarmed me greatly. It was evident well prior to the VOR that we would provbably utilize speed brakes or lower the nose. My concern was deepened by the fact that the last I flew with this captain he missed a crossing restriction by 700' high, approximately, for which I submitted my last NASA safety report. At that time also he showed no concern. Consequently I thought deeply, and after engine shutdown with just the flight crew (captain, second officer and myself) present I told that captain that, 'I was uncomfortable with the missed crossing restriction and he could have either killed us, or that we might get violated.' he replied, 'you are right.' then a few moments later he started to say that the altitude restrictions weren't that important for the handoff to the next controller. I immediately responded with, 'no, I disagree. You could have killed us, and we still might all get violated.' he said 'you are right.' (incidently, I have never before in 12 yrs with airlines ever had to assert myself so I am most glad I did). I also said that he could have applied the speed brakes much sooner and lowered the nose and we could have made it (the altitude), but he didn't. I believe a contributing factor was the perception of some pilots that speed brake use admits error or is poor technique. I obviously disagree. My hope is that by my unequivocal expression of my grave concern over this incident that this captain will get commited regarding dscnts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MISSES CROSSING RESTRICTION AND TURN ON COURSE.

Narrative: APPROX 40-45 MI PRIOR TO DOM VORTAC ATC GAVE DSNT INSTRUCTION OF, 'DSND AND MAINTAIN FL250, CROSS DOM VORTAC AT OR BELOW FL280.' AS WE DSNDED I GOT INS WIND READOUT OF A TAILWIND OF 70 KTS AND MENTIONED IT TO THE CAPT. I ALSO SAID TO HIM THAT WE WERE EVIDENTLY NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION. I BELIEVE HE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD MAKE IT. AS WE CONTINUED THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO TELL ATC THAT WE HAD A TAILWIND AND MIGHT ONLY BE ABLE TO CROSS THE VORTAC AT OR BELOW FL320. I COMPLIED AND I BELIEVE ATC MAINLY JUST ACKNOWLEDGED IT; NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. THE VERY RELEVANT FACT IS THAT I BELIEVE WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 15 MI PRIOR TO THE VORTAC WHEN CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO TELL THE ABOVE TO ATC, AND UP UNTIL THEN THE CAPT HAD NOT USED ANY SPD BRAKES TO EXPEDITE THE DSNT, NOR HAD HE LOWERED THE NOSE/PITCH ANY FURTHER TO ACCOMPLISH SAME. AT LAST HE DEPLOYED SOME SPD BRAKES AS WE APCHED THE VOR. ALMOST OVER THE VORTAC WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE, I ACKNOWLEDGED AND ALSO TOLD THE FREQ WE WERE LEAVING THAT WE WERE PASSING THE VOR DSNDING THROUGH ABOUT FL290 OR 295, I CAN'T REMEMBER EXACTLY. I ACCOMPLISHED FREQ CHANGE THEN SHORTLY THEREAFTER ATC INFORMED US THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT OUR TURN TO NEW ARWY REQUIRED AT VOR BY ABOUT 15 MI AND GAVE US A CORRECTING VECTOR. I FOUND OUT LATER ON THE GND THAT THE LOW ALT CHART HAD THE RATHER UNUSUAL INSTRUCTIONS OF STARTING TURNS REFERENCE THIS VORTAC AND SOME OTHER NEARBY ONES ABOUT 8-10 MI PRIOR TO FIX TO PREVENT OVERSHOOTS SINCE THERE ARE SEVERAL ARWYS AND VORTACS IN VICINITY. I, AS F/O, PNF, ALLOWED THE DISTRS OF THE ALT PROB AND FREQ CHANGE TO DIVERT MY ATTN FROM MONITORING THE TURN; ALSO IN FUTURE I'LL HAVE MORE CHARTS OUT. THE CAPT'S NONCHALANCE OR LACK OF CONCERN WITH THE MISSED XING RESTRICTION ALARMED ME GREATLY. IT WAS EVIDENT WELL PRIOR TO THE VOR THAT WE WOULD PROVBABLY UTILIZE SPD BRAKES OR LOWER THE NOSE. MY CONCERN WAS DEEPENED BY THE FACT THAT THE LAST I FLEW WITH THIS CAPT HE MISSED A XING RESTRICTION BY 700' HIGH, APPROX, FOR WHICH I SUBMITTED MY LAST NASA SAFETY RPT. AT THAT TIME ALSO HE SHOWED NO CONCERN. CONSEQUENTLY I THOUGHT DEEPLY, AND AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN WITH JUST THE FLT CREW (CAPT, S/O AND MYSELF) PRESENT I TOLD THAT CAPT THAT, 'I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE MISSED XING RESTRICTION AND HE COULD HAVE EITHER KILLED US, OR THAT WE MIGHT GET VIOLATED.' HE REPLIED, 'YOU ARE RIGHT.' THEN A FEW MOMENTS LATER HE STARTED TO SAY THAT THE ALT RESTRICTIONS WEREN'T THAT IMPORTANT FOR THE HDOF TO THE NEXT CTLR. I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED WITH, 'NO, I DISAGREE. YOU COULD HAVE KILLED US, AND WE STILL MIGHT ALL GET VIOLATED.' HE SAID 'YOU ARE RIGHT.' (INCIDENTLY, I HAVE NEVER BEFORE IN 12 YRS WITH AIRLINES EVER HAD TO ASSERT MYSELF SO I AM MOST GLAD I DID). I ALSO SAID THAT HE COULD HAVE APPLIED THE SPD BRAKES MUCH SOONER AND LOWERED THE NOSE AND WE COULD HAVE MADE IT (THE ALT), BUT HE DIDN'T. I BELIEVE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE PERCEPTION OF SOME PLTS THAT SPD BRAKE USE ADMITS ERROR OR IS POOR TECHNIQUE. I OBVIOUSLY DISAGREE. MY HOPE IS THAT BY MY UNEQUIVOCAL EXPRESSION OF MY GRAVE CONCERN OVER THIS INCIDENT THAT THIS CAPT WILL GET COMMITED REGARDING DSCNTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.