Narrative:

I was pilot flying on aircraft X from ZZZZ-ZZZ. The whole flight was uneventful and well within standards until the end of arrival/beginning of approach into ZZZ. There was a tfr that was lifted immediately before our arrival which I suspect complicated sequencing for ATC. We were instructed to expect a visual approach to xxl and to remain at 8;000 feet on a 290 heading over the southern foothills. This was expected to be a double-downwind type vector to aid in sequencing due to the vip departure minutes ago. On this heading; abeam the airport at 8;000 feet we were suddenly instructed to fly a heading of 030 and shortly thereafter were offered runway xy. As part of the in range briefing the captain and I decided that we would be willing and able to accept a late runway change as long as we could dial up the localizer in time and the conditions were generously VMC. This being the case; we accepted a clearance for a visual approach to runway xy. Being so high in such tight proximity to the airfield; I immediately selected 3;000 feet for the final approach fix; began a rapid descent and began vectoring us for a stable visual approach. It suddenly became clear that I would need to deploy the flight spoilers to aid in the descent and I did so. This was shortly followed by ib and ob spoilerons caution message. At this time we were on roughly a 10 mile left base for runway xy and the captain was programming the FMS for the ILS xy. I had the xy localizer tuned and verified; so additional guidance from the FMS would serve as an aid to situational awareness. As we recall; we were on approach frequency (xyz.a) at the time; and were told to contact north tower on xxb.C. In the task saturated environment; xxb.back course was tuned in error. I managed to get us set up for a stable approach well outside the final approach fix; but being so occupied in this task; I failed to recognize that the incorrect tower frequency was tuned. I disconnected the autopilot well outside the final approach fix as I deemed it necessary to practice hand flying skills. We continued with a stable approach to an uneventful landing. As we were vacating the runway I realized the frequency error and immediately tuned to xxb.C and notified the tower controller that we were vacating the runway. The controller replied with 'how do you hear this transmitter?' to which I replied 'loud and clear.' this error would have made the receipt of a landing clearance impossible; although we unanimously recalled that we were cleared to land. A classic example of expectation bias. We were then issued taxi instructions to the ramp. No phone number was issued and nothing was mentioned about any failure to receive a landing clearance or other inconveniences resulting thereof. We then taxied to the gate and shut down uneventfully. During these current times we (reserve pilots) are somewhat rusty and; as a result; less able to manage such a high level of task saturation that would otherwise be easily conquered. The factors that contributed to task saturation were: being left high and close to the airport with tight vectors; the runway change and subsequent FMS programming; ib/ob spoilerons caution message; and turbulent/windy surface conditions requiring a high degree of focus on hand flying a stable approach. I struggle to see a viable remedy for this problem besides just flying more; which the current situation may or may not allow soon. The only thing we could have done differently would be to refuse the visual approach to xy and rather continue to xxl as was programmed and briefed. However we both felt comfortable with and briefed that we would be willing to accept a late change to xy. Furthermore; an approach to xxl would have been even shorter; possibly even acting to worsen the task saturated condition. Expectation bias contributed to the possibility of landing without a clearance; it's as simple as that. We both agreed that we were cleared to land; so a review of the tapes would be required to determine the exact nature of the exchange. It seems to me that those of us who haven't been flying recently simply need to re-acquaint ourselves with a newly degraded level of proficiency; and should be increasingly alert of events that could lead to task saturation and the errors that can result.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance after dialing in the incorrect frequency.

Narrative: I was pilot flying on Aircraft X from ZZZZ-ZZZ. The whole flight was uneventful and well within standards until the end of arrival/beginning of approach into ZZZ. There was a TFR that was lifted immediately before our arrival which I suspect complicated sequencing for ATC. We were instructed to expect a visual approach to XXL and to remain at 8;000 feet on a 290 heading over the southern foothills. This was expected to be a double-downwind type vector to aid in sequencing due to the VIP departure minutes ago. On this heading; abeam the airport at 8;000 feet we were suddenly instructed to fly a heading of 030 and shortly thereafter were offered Runway XY. As part of the in range briefing the Captain and I decided that we would be willing and able to accept a late runway change as long as we could dial up the localizer in time and the conditions were generously VMC. This being the case; we accepted a clearance for a visual approach to Runway XY. Being so high in such tight proximity to the airfield; I immediately selected 3;000 feet for the final approach fix; began a rapid descent and began vectoring us for a stable visual approach. It suddenly became clear that I would need to deploy the flight spoilers to aid in the descent and I did so. This was shortly followed by IB and OB Spoilerons caution message. At this time we were on roughly a 10 mile left base for Runway XY and the Captain was programming the FMS for the ILS XY. I had the XY localizer tuned and verified; so additional guidance from the FMS would serve as an aid to situational awareness. As we recall; we were on approach frequency (XYZ.A) at the time; and were told to contact north Tower on XXB.C. In the task saturated environment; XXB.BC was tuned in error. I managed to get us set up for a stable approach well outside the final approach fix; but being so occupied in this task; I failed to recognize that the incorrect Tower frequency was tuned. I disconnected the autopilot well outside the final approach fix as I deemed it necessary to practice hand flying skills. We continued with a stable approach to an uneventful landing. As we were vacating the runway I realized the frequency error and immediately tuned to XXB.C and notified the Tower Controller that we were vacating the runway. The Controller replied with 'How do you hear this transmitter?' to which I replied 'Loud and clear.' This error would have made the receipt of a landing clearance impossible; although we unanimously recalled that we were cleared to land. A classic example of expectation bias. We were then issued taxi instructions to the ramp. No phone number was issued and nothing was mentioned about any failure to receive a landing clearance or other inconveniences resulting thereof. We then taxied to the gate and shut down uneventfully. During these current times we (reserve pilots) are somewhat rusty and; as a result; less able to manage such a high level of task saturation that would otherwise be easily conquered. The factors that contributed to task saturation were: Being left high and close to the airport with tight vectors; the runway change and subsequent FMS programming; IB/OB Spoilerons Caution message; and turbulent/windy surface conditions requiring a high degree of focus on hand flying a stable approach. I struggle to see a viable remedy for this problem besides just flying more; which the current situation may or may not allow soon. The only thing we could have done differently would be to refuse the visual approach to XY and rather continue to XXL as was programmed and briefed. However we both felt comfortable with and briefed that we would be willing to accept a late change to XY. Furthermore; an approach to XXL would have been even shorter; possibly even acting to worsen the task saturated condition. Expectation bias contributed to the possibility of landing without a clearance; it's as simple as that. We both agreed that we were cleared to land; so a review of the tapes would be required to determine the exact nature of the exchange. It seems to me that those of us who haven't been flying recently simply need to re-acquaint ourselves with a newly degraded level of proficiency; and should be increasingly alert of events that could lead to task saturation and the errors that can result.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.