Narrative:

After 3 runway changes; we departed from runway xxr at ZZZ on the zzzzz departure. Takeoff and climb out was normal as I hand flew. I was following the flight director yet I was notified by ATC that we exceeded the 10;000 restriction at ZZZZZ1. ATC said that there was no issue but to be 'more careful next time.' the first officer was pm and responded that we were sorry.after being off for 3 months due to not being called on reserve and being paired with a first officer who was having his first trip off IOE; we both talked about the imposing threat of the combination of a captain not flying the line for 3 months plus the threat of a new freshly minted aircraft. We decided to take things slow as much as possible and speak up if somebody is in the yellow. Upon taxing out from ZZZ; we received 3 runway changes. The FMS was a very challenging issue for my first officer with respect to tps/takeoff performance changes. It seemed I had to teach him how to use the 'box'. I sensed that the first officer was quite eager and willing to learn to reinforce what he already knew. He told me he came from the aircraft and the box operation is completely different. He mentioned how the schoolhouse teaches the box 'one way' and he is taught it differently 'another' way when he got to IOE. After takeoff; I was hand flying the aircraft; yet I was following the flight director and I never received any indication to level off at 10;000 before ZZZZZ1.the combination of a captain with no recent line experience within 90 days and a newly minted first officer is an unsafe combination that may be more prevalent given the new 'normal' of reduced flying; short term leaves; and lackluster reserve usage. This is an unsafe environment. Despite briefing this issue and taking our time; we still found a way to circumvent some layers of procedural safety through human ignorance. This has given me great pause on how to conduct operations in the cockpit in the future. I have no idea why the flight director didn't keep me from busting that altitude; it was in VNAV path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported missing a crossing restriction during departure and referenced lack of flying as a contributing factor.

Narrative: After 3 runway changes; we departed from Runway XXR at ZZZ on the ZZZZZ departure. Takeoff and climb out was normal as I hand flew. I was following the flight director yet I was notified by ATC that we exceeded the 10;000 restriction at ZZZZZ1. ATC said that there was no issue but to be 'more careful next time.' The FO was PM and responded that we were sorry.After being off for 3 months due to not being called on reserve and being paired with a FO who was having his first trip off IOE; we both talked about the imposing threat of the combination of a Captain not flying the line for 3 months plus the threat of a new freshly minted aircraft. We decided to take things slow as much as possible and speak up if somebody is in the yellow. Upon taxing out from ZZZ; we received 3 runway changes. The FMS was a very challenging issue for my First Officer with respect to TPS/Takeoff performance changes. It seemed I had to teach him how to use the 'box'. I sensed that the First Officer was quite eager and willing to learn to reinforce what he already knew. He told me he came from the aircraft and the box operation is completely different. He mentioned how the schoolhouse teaches the box 'one way' and he is taught it differently 'another' way when he got to IOE. After takeoff; I was hand flying the aircraft; yet I was following the flight director and I never received any indication to level off at 10;000 before ZZZZZ1.The combination of a Captain with no recent line experience within 90 days and a newly minted FO is an unsafe combination that may be more prevalent given the new 'normal' of reduced flying; short term leaves; and lackluster reserve usage. This is an unsafe environment. Despite briefing this issue and taking our time; we still found a way to circumvent some layers of procedural safety through human ignorance. This has given me great pause on how to conduct operations in the cockpit in the future. I have no idea why the flight director didn't keep me from busting that altitude; it was in VNAV PATH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.