Narrative:

The conditions just prior to taxi were reported by ground and tower control, which were on the same frequency at that hour reported zero/zero with RVR fluctuating between 800 and 1600' with clear skies above the fog. We were cleared to runway 4 which is on the other side of our airport, and the primary IFR runway as it has centerline lights and a RVR meter. We were additionally instructed to hold short of runway 12R and call reaching that point. As the tower could not see us taxi. We called reaching that point, and the tower instructed us to cross all runways and proceed to runway 4. We had moved a few yds when the tower asked us if we would accept runway 12R as the wind was calm. Runway 12R would save us taxi time plus waiting time, as we knew we would be at least number 3 for departure because airliners were holding at runway 4 waiting for RVR to improve. We accepted runway 12R, and was instructed to proceed via a red line which is also taxiway echo to runway 12R. We looked for the red line, but had already passed it and informed the tower that we would stay on taxiway delta to runway 12R. The tower cleared us into position, and to call ready for takeoff. Runway 12R has a displaced threshold 1000' from taxiway delta. Taxiway delta is also the junction of runway 17 and 35. In this mass of concrete I made my largest error. After the distraction of looking for the red line and assuming I had passed the left edge of runway 12R, I then lined up on the first line we came to. This proved to be the runway left edge line. I told the copilot we must be very careful because of the conditions, so we took extra time with the line up checklist. We both agreed that we were in the center of the runway and x-chked our heading as at least 6 other crews had made mistakes in this area in the past couple of yrs, including major airline pilots. We were cleared for takeoff and old to turn left to 360 degrees after departure. I checked again to make sure there was plenty of concrete on my left and right, and applied power. My total concentration was on the white line, the copilot's being on the engine instruments. Of course after a few hundred ft and at about 45-50 mph, we ran out of hard surface and were to my great shock and embarrassment hub deep in mud. There are many mistakes I made that are obvious to me now: feeling comfortable on my home airport in absolutely lousy conditions. Not continuing to the primary IFR runway which has centerline lights, and we were mentally prepared to use. Accepting a runway with no centerline lights. Not continuing to taxi up to the runway threshold (green lights). Allowing myself to be distraction by looking for a red line that would only get us out of the way of following traffic. Not being as familiar with runway markings as we should be.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF LTT CPR ACFT STRADDLED LEFT SIDE RWY LINE THINKING THEY WERE ON CENTERLINE IN HEAVY FOG. LEFT GEAR SUNK INTO SOFT GND ON TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: THE CONDITIONS JUST PRIOR TO TAXI WERE RPTED BY GND AND TWR CTL, WHICH WERE ON THE SAME FREQ AT THAT HR RPTED ZERO/ZERO WITH RVR FLUCTUATING BTWN 800 AND 1600' WITH CLR SKIES ABOVE THE FOG. WE WERE CLRED TO RWY 4 WHICH IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF OUR ARPT, AND THE PRIMARY IFR RWY AS IT HAS CTRLINE LIGHTS AND A RVR METER. WE WERE ADDITIONALLY INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12R AND CALL REACHING THAT POINT. AS THE TWR COULD NOT SEE US TAXI. WE CALLED REACHING THAT POINT, AND THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS ALL RWYS AND PROCEED TO RWY 4. WE HAD MOVED A FEW YDS WHEN THE TWR ASKED US IF WE WOULD ACCEPT RWY 12R AS THE WIND WAS CALM. RWY 12R WOULD SAVE US TAXI TIME PLUS WAITING TIME, AS WE KNEW WE WOULD BE AT LEAST NUMBER 3 FOR DEP BECAUSE AIRLINERS WERE HOLDING AT RWY 4 WAITING FOR RVR TO IMPROVE. WE ACCEPTED RWY 12R, AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED VIA A RED LINE WHICH IS ALSO TXWY ECHO TO RWY 12R. WE LOOKED FOR THE RED LINE, BUT HAD ALREADY PASSED IT AND INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD STAY ON TXWY DELTA TO RWY 12R. THE TWR CLRED US INTO POS, AND TO CALL READY FOR TKOF. RWY 12R HAS A DISPLACED THRESHOLD 1000' FROM TXWY DELTA. TXWY DELTA IS ALSO THE JUNCTION OF RWY 17 AND 35. IN THIS MASS OF CONCRETE I MADE MY LARGEST ERROR. AFTER THE DISTR OF LOOKING FOR THE RED LINE AND ASSUMING I HAD PASSED THE L EDGE OF RWY 12R, I THEN LINED UP ON THE FIRST LINE WE CAME TO. THIS PROVED TO BE THE RWY L EDGE LINE. I TOLD THE COPLT WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS, SO WE TOOK EXTRA TIME WITH THE LINE UP CHKLIST. WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE WERE IN THE CTR OF THE RWY AND X-CHKED OUR HDG AS AT LEAST 6 OTHER CREWS HAD MADE MISTAKES IN THIS AREA IN THE PAST COUPLE OF YRS, INCLUDING MAJOR AIRLINE PLTS. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND OLD TO TURN L TO 360 DEGS AFTER DEP. I CHKED AGAIN TO MAKE SURE THERE WAS PLENTY OF CONCRETE ON MY L AND R, AND APPLIED PWR. MY TOTAL CONCENTRATION WAS ON THE WHITE LINE, THE COPLT'S BEING ON THE ENG INSTRUMENTS. OF COURSE AFTER A FEW HUNDRED FT AND AT ABOUT 45-50 MPH, WE RAN OUT OF HARD SURFACE AND WERE TO MY GREAT SHOCK AND EMBARRASSMENT HUB DEEP IN MUD. THERE ARE MANY MISTAKES I MADE THAT ARE OBVIOUS TO ME NOW: FEELING COMFORTABLE ON MY HOME ARPT IN ABSOLUTELY LOUSY CONDITIONS. NOT CONTINUING TO THE PRIMARY IFR RWY WHICH HAS CTRLINE LIGHTS, AND WE WERE MENTALLY PREPARED TO USE. ACCEPTING A RWY WITH NO CTRLINE LIGHTS. NOT CONTINUING TO TAXI UP TO THE RWY THRESHOLD (GREEN LIGHTS). ALLOWING MYSELF TO BE DISTR BY LOOKING FOR A RED LINE THAT WOULD ONLY GET US OUT OF THE WAY OF FOLLOWING TFC. NOT BEING AS FAMILIAR WITH RWY MARKINGS AS WE SHOULD BE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.