Narrative:

Small aircraft X reported 18 out on the 015 degree bearing from acv. Issued the aircraft an airport advisory, indicating favored runway was runway 32. Standard traffic pattern for runway 32 is left traffic. Pilot reported at 5500' MSL. I advised another aircraft inbound from the south that a scattered layer n-se was bldg and obscuring mountains to the north. Advised small aircraft X of mountain obscurement to the north. Pilot of small aircraft X advised he was east of the airport and planning a right base for runway 32. After being advised that clouds over the mountains east had bases of 700', pilot requested vectors to the localizer runway 32. Advised pilot to contact ZSE on 124.85. Pilot of small aircraft X advised that he was unable to reach ZSE. Pilot advised he was 8 out on the 090 degree bearing from acv, and requested a vector to the ILS localizer. Tuning the acv DF to 123.65, the airport advisory frequency, determined that the aircraft was still ese of the airport. Advised the pilot to turn to a heading of 150 degrees. Small aircraft X reported 11 out. Advised the pilot to turn to 310 degrees, stating that that should put him on the localizer, but actually turned him toward the acv DF site. I turned on the airport lights (high intensity runway lights, runway centerline lights, T/D zone lights, simplified short approach lights with runway alignment indicators), and asked if pilot had the airport in sight. Small aircraft X advised that he had the airport in sight, and advised that the bases were at 1200' MSL. Small aircraft X landed. During this entire event, the scattered layer at 700' was not present offshore, or in the downwind area of the pattern. This incident would have resolved itself more easily, had I advised that the conditions offshore were clear. When the pilot advised he was unable to contact ZSE, I should have advised the pilot to maintain VFR at all times and then contact ZSE by way of direct landline. After receiving a beacon code, the center controller could, if he had a radar return, issued a clearance for the pilot for vectors to the final approach course. When I gave the pilot the 2 headings, I did not advise the pilot that I was giving him a DF steer. The pilot could have assumed that he was being provided IFR service and failed to maintain VFR conditions. At no time, however, did I tell the pilot he was cleared for an INS approach. I unintentionally set up a situation that could have caused the pilot to enter IMC. The pilot, on the other hand, never did ask if the WX was better over the water, when there were at least 3 other aircraft that landed at acv while the pilot was flying to the east, 2 of the aircraft entered left downwind for landing. As the pilot was leaving acv after refueling, the pilot cut off another aircraft on 1/4 mi final, necessitating a go around by the landing aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA X MADE IFR ILS APCH WITHOUT CLRNC TO ACV. PLT DEVIATION.

Narrative: SMA X RPTED 18 OUT ON THE 015 DEG BEARING FROM ACV. ISSUED THE ACFT AN ARPT ADVISORY, INDICATING FAVORED RWY WAS RWY 32. STANDARD TFC PATTERN FOR RWY 32 IS LEFT TFC. PLT RPTED AT 5500' MSL. I ADVISED ANOTHER ACFT INBND FROM THE S THAT A SCATTERED LAYER N-SE WAS BLDG AND OBSCURING MOUNTAINS TO THE N. ADVISED SMA X OF MOUNTAIN OBSCUREMENT TO THE N. PLT OF SMA X ADVISED HE WAS E OF THE ARPT AND PLANNING A RIGHT BASE FOR RWY 32. AFTER BEING ADVISED THAT CLOUDS OVER THE MOUNTAINS E HAD BASES OF 700', PLT REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE LOC RWY 32. ADVISED PLT TO CONTACT ZSE ON 124.85. PLT OF SMA X ADVISED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO REACH ZSE. PLT ADVISED HE WAS 8 OUT ON THE 090 DEG BEARING FROM ACV, AND REQUESTED A VECTOR TO THE ILS LOC. TUNING THE ACV DF TO 123.65, THE ARPT ADVISORY FREQ, DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WAS STILL ESE OF THE ARPT. ADVISED THE PLT TO TURN TO A HDG OF 150 DEGS. SMA X RPTED 11 OUT. ADVISED THE PLT TO TURN TO 310 DEGS, STATING THAT THAT SHOULD PUT HIM ON THE LOC, BUT ACTUALLY TURNED HIM TOWARD THE ACV DF SITE. I TURNED ON THE ARPT LIGHTS (HIGH INTENSITY RWY LIGHTS, RWY CENTERLINE LIGHTS, T/D ZONE LIGHTS, SIMPLIFIED SHORT APCH LIGHTS WITH RWY ALIGNMENT INDICATORS), AND ASKED IF PLT HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. SMA X ADVISED THAT HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, AND ADVISED THAT THE BASES WERE AT 1200' MSL. SMA X LANDED. DURING THIS ENTIRE EVENT, THE SCATTERED LAYER AT 700' WAS NOT PRESENT OFFSHORE, OR IN THE DOWNWIND AREA OF THE PATTERN. THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED ITSELF MORE EASILY, HAD I ADVISED THAT THE CONDITIONS OFFSHORE WERE CLR. WHEN THE PLT ADVISED HE WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT ZSE, I SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE PLT TO MAINTAIN VFR AT ALL TIMES AND THEN CONTACT ZSE BY WAY OF DIRECT LANDLINE. AFTER RECEIVING A BEACON CODE, THE CENTER CTLR COULD, IF HE HAD A RADAR RETURN, ISSUED A CLRNC FOR THE PLT FOR VECTORS TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. WHEN I GAVE THE PLT THE 2 HDGS, I DID NOT ADVISE THE PLT THAT I WAS GIVING HIM A DF STEER. THE PLT COULD HAVE ASSUMED THAT HE WAS BEING PROVIDED IFR SVC AND FAILED TO MAINTAIN VFR CONDITIONS. AT NO TIME, HOWEVER, DID I TELL THE PLT HE WAS CLRED FOR AN INS APCH. I UNINTENTIONALLY SET UP A SITUATION THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE PLT TO ENTER IMC. THE PLT, ON THE OTHER HAND, NEVER DID ASK IF THE WX WAS BETTER OVER THE WATER, WHEN THERE WERE AT LEAST 3 OTHER ACFT THAT LANDED AT ACV WHILE THE PLT WAS FLYING TO THE E, 2 OF THE ACFT ENTERED LEFT DOWNWIND FOR LNDG. AS THE PLT WAS LEAVING ACV AFTER REFUELING, THE PLT CUT OFF ANOTHER ACFT ON 1/4 MI FINAL, NECESSITATING A GAR BY THE LNDG ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.