Narrative:

Leg from clt to chs. Chs VOR OTS. Aircraft not omega equipped. ATC did not give us a descent out of FL230 until very late, only after crew queried how far out of chs we were. Captain flying. We were cleared out of FL230. We began slam dunk type descent. Several times controller asked if we would be able to get down. Captain said yes and first officer responded yes over radio. Upon finally seeing field, captain realized he could not get down west/O a 360 degree turn, or several s-turns, and informed controller. Controller said he preferred for us to do s-turns. Captain started to slow aircraft. As he was slowing, I selected 'PA' on the communication panel (to hear the bells) and began to give F/a's 3 bell signal, the 'take your seats for landing' signal. I saw in my peripheral vision the captain reaching over to lower his own landing gear. We were at or near maximum gear extend speed (270 KIAS) at the time. I noted speed at 270 KTS as gear was coming down. Captain later indicated he strongly believed he was at or below 270 KTS prior to dropping gear. It is possible that I had some parallax view error from my vantage point. All appeared normal from then to gate. As passenger deplaned, one passenger asked if an engine had been 'backfiring.' we had heard and seen nothing unusual in the cockpit. As I performed my walkaround for the return leg to clt, I noted metal damage to left main gear door and underside of wing. Further investigation revealed a broken bracket from gear strut to gear door, which allowed gear door to fly up and impact wing. Captain believes he found an area in the bracket which had sustained a previous fracture which would not have been readily discernable during normal preflight. Suspect that the backfiring sound was gear hitting the wing. Contract maintenance was called. Coordination was made with company maintenance control. Decision was made to remove gear door and aircraft was released for maintenance ferry to clt, which was accomplished uneventfully. I don't know for sure if I could have seen a previous hairline fracture of the bracket, even if I had known it was there, but I will be sure to look more closely at that bracket in the future. One other area which I have less control but at least an equal degree of interest is in promoting the use of cockpit resource management principles by everyone in the cockpit to better operate the aircraft using the resources of a multi-crew complement, instead of 1-M thought and action.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED GEAR DOOR UNHINGED AND HAD BEEN HITTING BOTTOM OF WING IN FLT ON DESCENT AND APCH.

Narrative: LEG FROM CLT TO CHS. CHS VOR OTS. ACFT NOT OMEGA EQUIPPED. ATC DID NOT GIVE US A DSNT OUT OF FL230 UNTIL VERY LATE, ONLY AFTER CREW QUERIED HOW FAR OUT OF CHS WE WERE. CAPT FLYING. WE WERE CLRED OUT OF FL230. WE BEGAN SLAM DUNK TYPE DSNT. SEVERAL TIMES CTLR ASKED IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET DOWN. CAPT SAID YES AND F/O RESPONDED YES OVER RADIO. UPON FINALLY SEEING FIELD, CAPT REALIZED HE COULD NOT GET DOWN W/O A 360 DEG TURN, OR SEVERAL S-TURNS, AND INFORMED CTLR. CTLR SAID HE PREFERRED FOR US TO DO S-TURNS. CAPT STARTED TO SLOW ACFT. AS HE WAS SLOWING, I SELECTED 'PA' ON THE COM PANEL (TO HEAR THE BELLS) AND BEGAN TO GIVE F/A'S 3 BELL SIGNAL, THE 'TAKE YOUR SEATS FOR LNDG' SIGNAL. I SAW IN MY PERIPHERAL VISION THE CAPT REACHING OVER TO LOWER HIS OWN LNDG GEAR. WE WERE AT OR NEAR MAX GEAR EXTEND SPD (270 KIAS) AT THE TIME. I NOTED SPD AT 270 KTS AS GEAR WAS COMING DOWN. CAPT LATER INDICATED HE STRONGLY BELIEVED HE WAS AT OR BELOW 270 KTS PRIOR TO DROPPING GEAR. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT I HAD SOME PARALLAX VIEW ERROR FROM MY VANTAGE POINT. ALL APPEARED NORMAL FROM THEN TO GATE. AS PAX DEPLANED, ONE PAX ASKED IF AN ENG HAD BEEN 'BACKFIRING.' WE HAD HEARD AND SEEN NOTHING UNUSUAL IN THE COCKPIT. AS I PERFORMED MY WALKAROUND FOR THE RETURN LEG TO CLT, I NOTED METAL DAMAGE TO LEFT MAIN GEAR DOOR AND UNDERSIDE OF WING. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED A BROKEN BRACKET FROM GEAR STRUT TO GEAR DOOR, WHICH ALLOWED GEAR DOOR TO FLY UP AND IMPACT WING. CAPT BELIEVES HE FOUND AN AREA IN THE BRACKET WHICH HAD SUSTAINED A PREVIOUS FRACTURE WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN READILY DISCERNABLE DURING NORMAL PREFLT. SUSPECT THAT THE BACKFIRING SOUND WAS GEAR HITTING THE WING. CONTRACT MAINT WAS CALLED. COORD WAS MADE WITH COMPANY MAINT CTL. DECISION WAS MADE TO REMOVE GEAR DOOR AND ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR MAINT FERRY TO CLT, WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNEVENTFULLY. I DON'T KNOW FOR SURE IF I COULD HAVE SEEN A PREVIOUS HAIRLINE FRACTURE OF THE BRACKET, EVEN IF I HAD KNOWN IT WAS THERE, BUT I WILL BE SURE TO LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THAT BRACKET IN THE FUTURE. ONE OTHER AREA WHICH I HAVE LESS CTL BUT AT LEAST AN EQUAL DEGREE OF INTEREST IS IN PROMOTING THE USE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PRINCIPLES BY EVERYONE IN THE COCKPIT TO BETTER OPERATE THE ACFT USING THE RESOURCES OF A MULTI-CREW COMPLEMENT, INSTEAD OF 1-M THOUGHT AND ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.