Narrative:

Prior to departing emt, the current WX conditions at smo were 'measured ceiling 500 overcast, 7 mi, ...altimeter 29.95.' (as the field elevation at smo is 175 ft MSL, this meant that the reported ceiling was 675 ft MSL). I elected to depart emt for a 'look-see' of the actual conditions towards smo from the vicinity of the los angeles civic center. Though the control zone at smo would not be in effect at the time of my call up to la approach, my intentions were to call up la approach on 125.2 just west of the civic center at 1300 ft MSL, advise them of the observed conditions, and to arrange a SVFR-like arrival into the smo. I departed emt at about xx:15 pm. I arrived at a point about 8 NM east of smo (2 NM west of la civic center) at approximately xx:25 pm and observed a thin layer of stratus overlying the coastline area and extending inland to about 4 statute mi east of smo. I decided to call up los angeles approach on 125.2 with a 'request' to get a clearance clear of clouds into smo. Within the span of about 5 mins I called up 3 times, but each time was told by the controller working that sector to 'stand-by'. As I was getting nowhere with la approach, I decided to try burbank approach on 135.05 to find out if any instrument apches were being conducted into smo at that time. My altitude, however, precluded communications with bur as the santa monica mountains separated my position and that of the traffic control facilities at bur. As the VOR-a final approach course was clearly visible above the stratus, I decided to move closer to smo along and slightly to the north of the santa monica freeway in order to ascertain whether or not the airport would become visible outside of the bounds of the air traffic area and control zone. I suppose that at this point I was probably experiencing what is commonly called 'get-home- itis.' though I am instrument rated and the airplane which I was flying was IFR equipped, I somehow rationalized the proceeding to the field below the clouds (if it was found to be visible from outside the air traffic area/control zone limits) was just as safe and more efficient than climbing toa higher altitude over the area to the north of the la TCA and east of the bur arsa, requesting the VOR-a approach, and flying the approach into smo. I figured that as long as I could maintain a clear view of the smo VOR-a approach course from along the santa monica freeway, I could maintain adequate separation from any aircraft I observed on that course and take corrective action if required. As it was getting late in the evening and I had been flying for approximately 4.5 hours up to that time that day, my judgement was not what it should have been, and I proceeded toward the airport. At approximately xx:35 pm, while flying west along and just north of the santa monica freeway, the rotating beacon at smo became visible at the mid-wilshire district (about 6 mi east of smo). At about this same time I noticed a faster airplane on the VOR-a approach into smo above and to the north of my position. I decided that if I monitored that airplane's progress and slowed my progress that I could maintain adequate sep from it and slip into the airport just behind it. I announced my position and intentions on 120.1, the smo CTAF, and started to descend to an altitude that would allow me to be below the cloud cover while moving toward the airport. As I descended to 800 ft MSL and below the clouds to the south of century city I began to realize my folly. I momentarily (for about 15-20 seconds) lost sight of the airplane on the VOR-a approach as it descended through the clouds, yet I announced my position as being just south of century city for a straight-in to smo and continued on. When the airplane on the VOR-a approach became visible again he was only approximately 1 mi ahead and, as it turned out, slowing rapidly to land. By this time I was to the south and slightly east of the may co (2 mi from smo) with probably less than 3/4 of a mi of separation from the traffic. I immediately executed a left 360 degree turn to provide more spacing between the preceding airplane and my own and again announced my position, action, and intentions. At this time, I realized the gravity of the situation in which I'd placed myself, but figuredthat by this time (at 1 mi final) I was already in 'hot water', so I went ahead, descended, and landed. In retrospect, it is apparent that by my actions I jeopardized the safety of both myself and those in the other aircraft, and potentially others that might have been following on the approach into smo. In addition, my preoccupation with getting home lured me into a situation in which, while I was maintaining 'clear of clouds', I was not 500 ft below the clouds cover at all times. And, finally, I've come to the realization that I did not take advantage of all the options available to me to get a clearance into smo; my position near la civic center would have easily allowed me to communication with hawhtorne FSS, with whom I could have arranged the clearance I sought or from whom I could have received alternative instructions. This action was neither the result of a discrepancy in the system nor in the navigation charts that I was using. It was simply the result of poor pilot planning and a state of mind which allowed bad judgement to get the better of me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT ATTEMPTS A 'SELF GRANTED' SVFR INTO SMO WHILE TWR IS CLOSED AND HE FAILS TO MAINTAIN 500 FT FROM CLOUDS. RESULTS IN UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE, THE CTL ZONE AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT LTSS WITH AN ACFT ON VOR APCH.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEPARTING EMT, THE CURRENT WX CONDITIONS AT SMO WERE 'MEASURED CEILING 500 OVCST, 7 MI, ...ALTIMETER 29.95.' (AS THE FIELD ELEVATION AT SMO IS 175 FT MSL, THIS MEANT THAT THE RPTED CEILING WAS 675 FT MSL). I ELECTED TO DEPART EMT FOR A 'LOOK-SEE' OF THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS TOWARDS SMO FROM THE VICINITY OF THE LOS ANGELES CIVIC CENTER. THOUGH THE CTL ZONE AT SMO WOULD NOT BE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF MY CALL UP TO LA APCH, MY INTENTIONS WERE TO CALL UP LA APCH ON 125.2 JUST W OF THE CIVIC CENTER AT 1300 FT MSL, ADVISE THEM OF THE OBSERVED CONDITIONS, AND TO ARRANGE A SVFR-LIKE ARR INTO THE SMO. I DEPARTED EMT AT ABOUT XX:15 PM. I ARRIVED AT A POINT ABOUT 8 NM E OF SMO (2 NM W OF LA CIVIC CENTER) AT APPROX XX:25 PM AND OBSERVED A THIN LAYER OF STRATUS OVERLYING THE COASTLINE AREA AND EXTENDING INLAND TO ABOUT 4 STATUTE MI E OF SMO. I DECIDED TO CALL UP LOS ANGELES APCH ON 125.2 WITH A 'REQUEST' TO GET A CLRNC CLR OF CLOUDS INTO SMO. WITHIN THE SPAN OF ABOUT 5 MINS I CALLED UP 3 TIMES, BUT EACH TIME WAS TOLD BY THE CTLR WORKING THAT SECTOR TO 'STAND-BY'. AS I WAS GETTING NOWHERE WITH LA APCH, I DECIDED TO TRY BURBANK APCH ON 135.05 TO FIND OUT IF ANY INSTR APCHES WERE BEING CONDUCTED INTO SMO AT THAT TIME. MY ALT, HOWEVER, PRECLUDED COMS WITH BUR AS THE SANTA MONICA MOUNTAINS SEPARATED MY POS AND THAT OF THE TFC CTL FACILITIES AT BUR. AS THE VOR-A FINAL APCH COURSE WAS CLRLY VISIBLE ABOVE THE STRATUS, I DECIDED TO MOVE CLOSER TO SMO ALONG AND SLIGHTLY TO THE N OF THE SANTA MONICA FREEWAY IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE ARPT WOULD BECOME VISIBLE OUTSIDE OF THE BOUNDS OF THE ATA AND CTL ZONE. I SUPPOSE THAT AT THIS POINT I WAS PROBABLY EXPERIENCING WHAT IS COMMONLY CALLED 'GET-HOME- ITIS.' THOUGH I AM INSTRUMENT RATED AND THE AIRPLANE WHICH I WAS FLYING WAS IFR EQUIPPED, I SOMEHOW RATIONALIZED THE PROCEEDING TO THE FIELD BELOW THE CLOUDS (IF IT WAS FOUND TO BE VISIBLE FROM OUTSIDE THE ATA/CTL ZONE LIMITS) WAS JUST AS SAFE AND MORE EFFICIENT THAN CLBING TOA HIGHER ALT OVER THE AREA TO THE N OF THE LA TCA AND E OF THE BUR ARSA, REQUESTING THE VOR-A APCH, AND FLYING THE APCH INTO SMO. I FIGURED THAT AS LONG AS I COULD MAINTAIN A CLR VIEW OF THE SMO VOR-A APCH COURSE FROM ALONG THE SANTA MONICA FREEWAY, I COULD MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEPARATION FROM ANY ACFT I OBSERVED ON THAT COURSE AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF REQUIRED. AS IT WAS GETTING LATE IN THE EVENING AND I HAD BEEN FLYING FOR APPROX 4.5 HRS UP TO THAT TIME THAT DAY, MY JUDGEMENT WAS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, AND I PROCEEDED TOWARD THE ARPT. AT APPROX XX:35 PM, WHILE FLYING W ALONG AND JUST N OF THE SANTA MONICA FREEWAY, THE ROTATING BEACON AT SMO BECAME VISIBLE AT THE MID-WILSHIRE DISTRICT (ABOUT 6 MI E OF SMO). AT ABOUT THIS SAME TIME I NOTICED A FASTER AIRPLANE ON THE VOR-A APCH INTO SMO ABOVE AND TO THE N OF MY POS. I DECIDED THAT IF I MONITORED THAT AIRPLANE'S PROGRESS AND SLOWED MY PROGRESS THAT I COULD MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEP FROM IT AND SLIP INTO THE ARPT JUST BEHIND IT. I ANNOUNCED MY POS AND INTENTIONS ON 120.1, THE SMO CTAF, AND STARTED TO DSND TO AN ALT THAT WOULD ALLOW ME TO BE BELOW THE CLOUD COVER WHILE MOVING TOWARD THE ARPT. AS I DSNDED TO 800 FT MSL AND BELOW THE CLOUDS TO THE S OF CENTURY CITY I BEGAN TO REALIZE MY FOLLY. I MOMENTARILY (FOR ABOUT 15-20 SECONDS) LOST SIGHT OF THE AIRPLANE ON THE VOR-A APCH AS IT DSNDED THROUGH THE CLOUDS, YET I ANNOUNCED MY POS AS BEING JUST S OF CENTURY CITY FOR A STRAIGHT-IN TO SMO AND CONTINUED ON. WHEN THE AIRPLANE ON THE VOR-A APCH BECAME VISIBLE AGAIN HE WAS ONLY APPROX 1 MI AHEAD AND, AS IT TURNED OUT, SLOWING RAPIDLY TO LAND. BY THIS TIME I WAS TO THE S AND SLIGHTLY E OF THE MAY CO (2 MI FROM SMO) WITH PROBABLY LESS THAN 3/4 OF A MI OF SEPARATION FROM THE TFC. I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED A L 360 DEG TURN TO PROVIDE MORE SPACING BTWN THE PRECEDING AIRPLANE AND MY OWN AND AGAIN ANNOUNCED MY POS, ACTION, AND INTENTIONS. AT THIS TIME, I REALIZED THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH I'D PLACED MYSELF, BUT FIGUREDTHAT BY THIS TIME (AT 1 MI FINAL) I WAS ALREADY IN 'HOT WATER', SO I WENT AHEAD, DSNDED, AND LANDED. IN RETROSPECT, IT IS APPARENT THAT BY MY ACTIONS I JEOPARDIZED THE SAFETY OF BOTH MYSELF AND THOSE IN THE OTHER ACFT, AND POTENTIALLY OTHERS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING ON THE APCH INTO SMO. IN ADDITION, MY PREOCCUPATION WITH GETTING HOME LURED ME INTO A SITUATION IN WHICH, WHILE I WAS MAINTAINING 'CLR OF CLOUDS', I WAS NOT 500 FT BELOW THE CLOUDS COVER AT ALL TIMES. AND, FINALLY, I'VE COME TO THE REALIZATION THAT I DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO ME TO GET A CLRNC INTO SMO; MY POS NEAR LA CIVIC CENTER WOULD HAVE EASILY ALLOWED ME TO COM WITH HAWHTORNE FSS, WITH WHOM I COULD HAVE ARRANGED THE CLRNC I SOUGHT OR FROM WHOM I COULD HAVE RECEIVED ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS. THIS ACTION WAS NEITHER THE RESULT OF A DISCREPANCY IN THE SYS NOR IN THE NAV CHARTS THAT I WAS USING. IT WAS SIMPLY THE RESULT OF POOR PLT PLANNING AND A STATE OF MIND WHICH ALLOWED BAD JUDGEMENT TO GET THE BETTER OF ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.