Narrative:

This article supports and encourages several dangerous practices: a) encouraging controller to 'assume' he knows more about operation of an aircraft in an emergency situation than the PIC. B) encouraging controller to issue a clearance which results in a conflict of traffic. C) encouraging controller to assume rdp display is accurate beyond certified limits, ie, to discontinue vertical separation. Note that normal rules do not permit discontinuation of vertical separation between opposite direction aircraft have passed and are observed 5 NM apart! D) misleading controllers to believe such practice will 'most nearly conform' to established procedure. In fact, this does not conform at all to the established procedure and is a dangerous and ignorant misinterp which is completely opposed to established procedure and safety practices. East) instills a totally false attitude expressed as '...I would not concern myself about a loss of separation...'. This article must be publicly retracted to reduce the damage already done. The author should be removed from any responsibility for writings affecting aviation safety. The originating office and responsible official should be restr by a system of stringent review and censorship! After the fact: emergency, mayday, pan, sos...these are all symbols or phrases that we understand to mean an imminent situation or danger. But, what about when we hear something like, '...ah center/tower/radio, ah, I think we might have ah, a little problem, here, ah...'? Sometimes being able to effectively handle a situation like this is listening to what isn't said and knowing the right questions to ask. Then, there are other cases where a pilot makes it very clear what the problem is, and yet a controller's handling is questionable. Let's look further: an incident happened recently when a jet lost 3 of its 4 engines and requested a descent. The exchange went as follows: aircraft: '...ah, center, air carrier X we request descent immediately into the XXX airport'. Center: 'air carrier X I'm unable sir, you have traffic 12 O'clock 5 mi sebound FL280. I'm unable descent'. Aircraft: 'okay, we're losing engines, we need descent immediately, we need descent immediately!' center: 'ok sir, I cannot approve a descent. You can exercise your emergency priority and if you need to turn, I recommend that you turn to the north'. Alright, what's wrong with this picture? What could the controller at zxx center have done differently, if anything? Paragraph 9-1d of the point six five says, 'when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual'. To say that quote gives a controller quite a bit of latitude would be an understatement! Having said that, let's look at what is happening to the jet. At altitude, the difference between a stall, and the speed at which the aerodynamic buffet which announced the sound barrier shock wave occurs can be as little as 15 KTS! The size of this 'window' between stall and buffet will be a function of a number of factors which include the aircraft weight and performance. In any case, that aircraft will be coming down! The only difference is will the aircraft be flying because the pilot has lowered the nose to maintain airspeed, or stalled out and falling because he/she was trying to maintain altitude? I won't belabor the issue and insult your intelligence by stating which is preferable. At this point you may be asking yourself, why didn't the pilot take some sort of positive action? Good question. At the risk of making excuses, you should know that all instrument rated pilots are taught at birth not to do anything without clearing it with, or at least advising ATC. In any case, the flight crew had their hands full just trying to determine what was wrong with their aircraft. What they wanted was assistance, 'we request descent immediately into xyz airport!' the most correct answer, 'roger, turn right/left heading ...'. Granted, in the first transmission, the pilot did not really give us quite enough information on which we could base further action. However, when he/she said, 'ok, we're losing engines...we need descent immediately!' there should have been no doubt about what we should do next. Since we know air carrier X's traffic was at 12 O'clock and 5 mi, with a closure rate of 1200 mph, and since we have turned the aircraft, and since they are initially separated by 1000 ft, the next course of action is to approve aircraft's descent. Of course I would be monitoring the altitudes and the proximity of the targets, but I would not concern myself about a loss of separation since paragraph 9-1d gives me the latitude to, 'pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this (faah 7110.65) manual. Of course it is so much easier after-the-fact to re-hash what actions we might have taken had this happened to any one of us. But isn't that the whole idea of quality assurance? To review in the light of day that which has transpired? To find ways in which we might improve the manner in which we provide service to the flying public?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X EMER DSCNT NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC. SITUATION: POORLY WRITTEN SAFETY PUBLICATION.

Narrative: THIS ARTICLE SUPPORTS AND ENCOURAGES SEVERAL DANGEROUS PRACTICES: A) ENCOURAGING CTLR TO 'ASSUME' HE KNOWS MORE ABOUT OP OF AN ACFT IN AN EMER SITUATION THAN THE PIC. B) ENCOURAGING CTLR TO ISSUE A CLRNC WHICH RESULTS IN A CONFLICT OF TFC. C) ENCOURAGING CTLR TO ASSUME RDP DISPLAY IS ACCURATE BEYOND CERTIFIED LIMITS, IE, TO DISCONTINUE VERT SEPARATION. NOTE THAT NORMAL RULES DO NOT PERMIT DISCONTINUATION OF VERT SEPARATION BTWN OPPOSITE DIRECTION ACFT HAVE PASSED AND ARE OBSERVED 5 NM APART! D) MISLEADING CTLRS TO BELIEVE SUCH PRACTICE WILL 'MOST NEARLY CONFORM' TO ESTABLISHED PROC. IN FACT, THIS DOES NOT CONFORM AT ALL TO THE ESTABLISHED PROC AND IS A DANGEROUS AND IGNORANT MISINTERP WHICH IS COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO ESTABLISHED PROC AND SAFETY PRACTICES. E) INSTILLS A TOTALLY FALSE ATTITUDE EXPRESSED AS '...I WOULD NOT CONCERN MYSELF ABOUT A LOSS OF SEPARATION...'. THIS ARTICLE MUST BE PUBLICLY RETRACTED TO REDUCE THE DAMAGE ALREADY DONE. THE AUTHOR SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRITINGS AFFECTING AVIATION SAFETY. THE ORIGINATING OFFICE AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL SHOULD BE RESTR BY A SYSTEM OF STRINGENT REVIEW AND CENSORSHIP! AFTER THE FACT: EMER, MAYDAY, PAN, SOS...THESE ARE ALL SYMBOLS OR PHRASES THAT WE UNDERSTAND TO MEAN AN IMMINENT SITUATION OR DANGER. BUT, WHAT ABOUT WHEN WE HEAR SOMETHING LIKE, '...AH CENTER/TWR/RADIO, AH, I THINK WE MIGHT HAVE AH, A LITTLE PROBLEM, HERE, AH...'? SOMETIMES BEING ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY HANDLE A SITUATION LIKE THIS IS LISTENING TO WHAT ISN'T SAID AND KNOWING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO ASK. THEN, THERE ARE OTHER CASES WHERE A PLT MAKES IT VERY CLR WHAT THE PROBLEM IS, AND YET A CTLR'S HANDLING IS QUESTIONABLE. LET'S LOOK FURTHER: AN INCIDENT HAPPENED RECENTLY WHEN A JET LOST 3 OF ITS 4 ENGS AND REQUESTED A DSCNT. THE EXCHANGE WENT AS FOLLOWS: ACFT: '...AH, CENTER, ACR X WE REQUEST DSCNT IMMEDIATELY INTO THE XXX ARPT'. CENTER: 'ACR X I'M UNABLE SIR, YOU HAVE TFC 12 O'CLOCK 5 MI SEBOUND FL280. I'M UNABLE DSCNT'. ACFT: 'OKAY, WE'RE LOSING ENGS, WE NEED DSCNT IMMEDIATELY, WE NEED DSCNT IMMEDIATELY!' CENTER: 'OK SIR, I CANNOT APPROVE A DSCNT. YOU CAN EXERCISE YOUR EMER PRIORITY AND IF YOU NEED TO TURN, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU TURN TO THE N'. ALRIGHT, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? WHAT COULD THE CTLR AT ZXX CENTER HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY, IF ANYTHING? PARAGRAPH 9-1D OF THE POINT SIX FIVE SAYS, 'WHEN YOU BELIEVE AN EMER EXISTS OR IS IMMINENT, SELECT AND PURSUE A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH APPEARS TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHICH MOST NEARLY CONFORMS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS MANUAL'. TO SAY THAT QUOTE GIVES A CTLR QUITE A BIT OF LATITUDE WOULD BE AN UNDERSTATEMENT! HAVING SAID THAT, LET'S LOOK AT WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JET. AT ALT, THE DIFFERENCE BTWN A STALL, AND THE SPEED AT WHICH THE AERODYNAMIC BUFFET WHICH ANNOUNCED THE SOUND BARRIER SHOCK WAVE OCCURS CAN BE AS LITTLE AS 15 KTS! THE SIZE OF THIS 'WINDOW' BTWN STALL AND BUFFET WILL BE A FUNCTION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH INCLUDE THE ACFT WT AND PERFORMANCE. IN ANY CASE, THAT ACFT WILL BE COMING DOWN! THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS WILL THE ACFT BE FLYING BECAUSE THE PLT HAS LOWERED THE NOSE TO MAINTAIN AIRSPEED, OR STALLED OUT AND FALLING BECAUSE HE/SHE WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN ALT? I WON'T BELABOR THE ISSUE AND INSULT YOUR INTELLIGENCE BY STATING WHICH IS PREFERABLE. AT THIS POINT YOU MAY BE ASKING YOURSELF, WHY DIDN'T THE PLT TAKE SOME SORT OF POSITIVE ACTION? GOOD QUESTION. AT THE RISK OF MAKING EXCUSES, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ALL INSTRUMENT RATED PLTS ARE TAUGHT AT BIRTH NOT TO DO ANYTHING WITHOUT CLRING IT WITH, OR AT LEAST ADVISING ATC. IN ANY CASE, THE FLC HAD THEIR HANDS FULL JUST TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THEIR ACFT. WHAT THEY WANTED WAS ASSISTANCE, 'WE REQUEST DSCNT IMMEDIATELY INTO XYZ ARPT!' THE MOST CORRECT ANSWER, 'ROGER, TURN R/L HDG ...'. GRANTED, IN THE FIRST XMISSION, THE PLT DID NOT REALLY GIVE US QUITE ENOUGH INFO ON WHICH WE COULD BASE FURTHER ACTION. HOWEVER, WHEN HE/SHE SAID, 'OK, WE'RE LOSING ENGINES...WE NEED DSCNT IMMEDIATELY!' THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT. SINCE WE KNOW ACR X'S TFC WAS AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 5 MI, WITH A CLOSURE RATE OF 1200 MPH, AND SINCE WE HAVE TURNED THE ACFT, AND SINCE THEY ARE INITIALLY SEPARATED BY 1000 FT, THE NEXT COURSE OF ACTION IS TO APPROVE ACFT'S DSCNT. OF COURSE I WOULD BE MONITORING THE ALTS AND THE PROX OF THE TARGETS, BUT I WOULD NOT CONCERN MYSELF ABOUT A LOSS OF SEPARATION SINCE PARAGRAPH 9-1D GIVES ME THE LATITUDE TO, 'PURSUE A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH APPEARS TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHICH MOST NEARLY CONFORMS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS (FAAH 7110.65) MANUAL. OF COURSE IT IS SO MUCH EASIER AFTER-THE-FACT TO RE-HASH WHAT ACTIONS WE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN HAD THIS HAPPENED TO ANY ONE OF US. BUT ISN'T THAT THE WHOLE IDEA OF QUALITY ASSURANCE? TO REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF DAY THAT WHICH HAS TRANSPIRED? TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT IMPROVE THE MANNER IN WHICH WE PROVIDE SERVICE TO THE FLYING PUBLIC?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.