Narrative:

I was flying the ILS-25 approach (practice) to mt comfort airport (mqj), as an instrument student, wearing foggles. My instructor was in the right seat. We had just been handed off from indianapolis approach control on 127.15, cleared to change to advisory frequency at mt comfort. I was above the GS and right of courseline, trying to catch up. I had the advisory frequency already selected on my #2 radio, and switched to it. I transmitted '...on ILS-25 final approach...' but did not like the sound quality I heard in my headset when transmitting on #2, so I selected the advisory frequency on my #1 radio, then switched to my #1 radio. I transmitted again on advisory frequency. This time, an small aircraft Y (blue) broadcast '...departing runway 07, mt comfort...'. I immediately looked up, below my foggles, and saw the already airborne, above the runway. My instructor did not have visual on the aircraft, took the yoke, and began a right turn for collision avoidance. I continued to watch the small aircraft Y depart, and observed the small aircraft Y making a steep banking midfield left turn directly into our path, and slightly above. I applied forward pressure on the control yoke, to make sure we would remain below the climbing small aircraft Y, as we continued to descend while turning right. I informed the instructor that I had a visual on the small aircraft Y and he allowed me to take over and make a descending left turn back to the runway heading. No other broadcast came from the small aircraft Y which continued its left turnout, and departed the area. After passing the far end of the runway, I selected the indianapolis approach frequency, 127.15, declared missed approach, and obtained vectors for the next airport for another practice approach. Factors: 1) pilot delayed in making initial contact on advisory frequency to determine runway in use, though winds (220/8) favored runway 25. 2) quality of #2 radio caused further delay, although I believe that I would have heard any previous call by the departing small aircraft Y, had one been made. 3) I believe the departing small aircraft Y made no call indicating his intentions to depart, prior to his call while airborne after hearing our call on final. 4) under the circumstances, I believe that small aircraft Y should not have abruptly turned left after takeoff, but should have remained on runway heading, or turn right for collision avoidance, if he did not have a visual on us. 5) the departing small aircraft Y was taking off with the prevailing wind, as opposed to into it. In the future, I should be prepared and immediately contact advisory frequency as soon as cleared to do so by ATC. I can also better communicate my intentions to the departing aircraft. I can better communicate with my instructor. In this case, since he never saw the departing aircraft until we turned back onto the runway heading, I could have more assertively indicated the relative position and maintained our heading. This would have caused the small aircraft to pass well to our right and above. As it was, by the instructor taking the 'proper' evasive action of a climbing right turn, we were placed in a worse position than if we had remained on course on our descent, with visual contact with the departing aircraft at all times.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX GA SMA ON SIMULATED ILS APCH TO RWY 25 AT MQJ AND GA SMA ICB FROM RWY 7.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING THE ILS-25 APCH (PRACTICE) TO MT COMFORT ARPT (MQJ), AS AN INST STUDENT, WEARING FOGGLES. MY INSTRUCTOR WAS IN THE R SEAT. WE HAD JUST BEEN HANDED OFF FROM INDIANAPOLIS APCH CTL ON 127.15, CLRED TO CHANGE TO ADVISORY FREQ AT MT COMFORT. I WAS ABOVE THE GS AND R OF COURSELINE, TRYING TO CATCH UP. I HAD THE ADVISORY FREQ ALREADY SELECTED ON MY #2 RADIO, AND SWITCHED TO IT. I XMITTED '...ON ILS-25 FINAL APCH...' BUT DID NOT LIKE THE SOUND QUALITY I HEARD IN MY HEADSET WHEN XMITTING ON #2, SO I SELECTED THE ADVISORY FREQ ON MY #1 RADIO, THEN SWITCHED TO MY #1 RADIO. I XMITTED AGAIN ON ADVISORY FREQ. THIS TIME, AN SMA Y (BLUE) BROADCAST '...DEPARTING RWY 07, MT COMFORT...'. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED UP, BELOW MY FOGGLES, AND SAW THE ALREADY AIRBORNE, ABOVE THE RWY. MY INSTRUCTOR DID NOT HAVE VISUAL ON THE ACFT, TOOK THE YOKE, AND BEGAN A R TURN FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE. I CONTINUED TO WATCH THE SMA Y DEPART, AND OBSERVED THE SMA Y MAKING A STEEP BANKING MIDFIELD L TURN DIRECTLY INTO OUR PATH, AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE. I APPLIED FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE CTL YOKE, TO MAKE SURE WE WOULD REMAIN BELOW THE CLBING SMA Y, AS WE CONTINUED TO DSND WHILE TURNING R. I INFORMED THE INSTRUCTOR THAT I HAD A VISUAL ON THE SMA Y AND HE ALLOWED ME TO TAKE OVER AND MAKE A DSNDING L TURN BACK TO THE RWY HDG. NO OTHER BROADCAST CAME FROM THE SMA Y WHICH CONTINUED ITS L TURNOUT, AND DEPARTED THE AREA. AFTER PASSING THE FAR END OF THE RWY, I SELECTED THE INDIANAPOLIS APCH FREQ, 127.15, DECLARED MISSED APCH, AND OBTAINED VECTORS FOR THE NEXT ARPT FOR ANOTHER PRACTICE APCH. FACTORS: 1) PLT DELAYED IN MAKING INITIAL CONTACT ON ADVISORY FREQ TO DETERMINE RWY IN USE, THOUGH WINDS (220/8) FAVORED RWY 25. 2) QUALITY OF #2 RADIO CAUSED FURTHER DELAY, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE THAT I WOULD HAVE HEARD ANY PREVIOUS CALL BY THE DEPARTING SMA Y, HAD ONE BEEN MADE. 3) I BELIEVE THE DEPARTING SMA Y MADE NO CALL INDICATING HIS INTENTIONS TO DEPART, PRIOR TO HIS CALL WHILE AIRBORNE AFTER HEARING OUR CALL ON FINAL. 4) UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE THAT SMA Y SHOULD NOT HAVE ABRUPTLY TURNED L AFTER TKOF, BUT SHOULD HAVE REMAINED ON RWY HDG, OR TURN R FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE, IF HE DID NOT HAVE A VISUAL ON US. 5) THE DEPARTING SMA Y WAS TAKING OFF WITH THE PREVAILING WIND, AS OPPOSED TO INTO IT. IN THE FUTURE, I SHOULD BE PREPARED AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACT ADVISORY FREQ AS SOON AS CLRED TO DO SO BY ATC. I CAN ALSO BETTER COMMUNICATE MY INTENTIONS TO THE DEPARTING ACFT. I CAN BETTER COMMUNICATE WITH MY INSTRUCTOR. IN THIS CASE, SINCE HE NEVER SAW THE DEPARTING ACFT UNTIL WE TURNED BACK ONTO THE RWY HDG, I COULD HAVE MORE ASSERTIVELY INDICATED THE RELATIVE POS AND MAINTAINED OUR HDG. THIS WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE SMA TO PASS WELL TO OUR R AND ABOVE. AS IT WAS, BY THE INSTRUCTOR TAKING THE 'PROPER' EVASIVE ACTION OF A CLBING R TURN, WE WERE PLACED IN A WORSE POS THAN IF WE HAD REMAINED ON COURSE ON OUR DSCNT, WITH VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTING ACFT AT ALL TIMES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.