Narrative:

The flight was an instrument training flight conducted on an IFR flight plan filed under the cfii's name. Communications were being handled alternately between myself and the instructor as my workload permitted. We had gone missed approach at paine field, changed from tower to center frequency and were on a vector and level altitude. Anticipating an approach to boeing field, I changed what I thought was the unusual radio to ATIS. After copying ATIS, the radio was deselected at which time the instructor realized that the radio I had used was the one on which we had been communicating with center. As a result, we had not monitored the center frequency for approximately 3-4 mins. Neither the instructor nor I had written the center frequency down and neither of us were sure of the proper frequency to reestablish contact. I suggested we contact paine tower for the frequency which the instructor was reluctant to do. One attempt was made to contact paine tower but the instructor elected not to continue to attempt to reestablish contact and decided instead to go lost communication and squawk 7600. I disagreed with this procedure but the instructor was adamant about making no further attempt to reestablish communications. We continued on to bfi under VFR conditions and called boeing tower. They questioned our transponder code at which time we advised we were VFR. We reset our code to 1200 and landed without further incident. In my opinion, and the opinion of other instructors consulted after the fact, this was 1) probably an improper declaration of lost communications, and 2) if communication is lost there should be more of an attempt to reestablish. Some factors which contributed to this problem and could have prevented it are as follows: 1) crew duties should be clearly defined, especially on a training flight, if radio procedures had been clearly divided and stated, this probably would not have happened. 2) copy all radio frequencys down. In this case the lost frequency was not written down by either pilot. 3) back up radio changes by comparing frequencys set in radios to written notes, xchking by looking at the radio select switch if more than 1 radio is carried and advise other crew members of actions being taken. 4) when a mistake is made, take correction action until it is resolved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA ON IFR TRAINING FLT LOST COM WITH ZSE WHEN STUDENT PLT CHANGED FREQ FOR ATIS THEN BOTH FORGOT ZSE FREQ.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS AN INST TRAINING FLT CONDUCTED ON AN IFR FLT PLAN FILED UNDER THE CFII'S NAME. COMS WERE BEING HANDLED ALTERNATELY BTWN MYSELF AND THE INSTRUCTOR AS MY WORKLOAD PERMITTED. WE HAD GONE MISSED APCH AT PAINE FIELD, CHANGED FROM TWR TO CENTER FREQ AND WERE ON A VECTOR AND LEVEL ALT. ANTICIPATING AN APCH TO BOEING FIELD, I CHANGED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE UNUSUAL RADIO TO ATIS. AFTER COPYING ATIS, THE RADIO WAS DESELECTED AT WHICH TIME THE INSTRUCTOR REALIZED THAT THE RADIO I HAD USED WAS THE ONE ON WHICH WE HAD BEEN COMMUNICATING WITH CENTER. AS A RESULT, WE HAD NOT MONITORED THE CENTER FREQ FOR APPROX 3-4 MINS. NEITHER THE INSTRUCTOR NOR I HAD WRITTEN THE CENTER FREQ DOWN AND NEITHER OF US WERE SURE OF THE PROPER FREQ TO REESTABLISH CONTACT. I SUGGESTED WE CONTACT PAINE TWR FOR THE FREQ WHICH THE INSTRUCTOR WAS RELUCTANT TO DO. ONE ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT PAINE TWR BUT THE INSTRUCTOR ELECTED NOT TO CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH CONTACT AND DECIDED INSTEAD TO GO LOST COM AND SQUAWK 7600. I DISAGREED WITH THIS PROC BUT THE INSTRUCTOR WAS ADAMANT ABOUT MAKING NO FURTHER ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH COMS. WE CONTINUED ON TO BFI UNDER VFR CONDITIONS AND CALLED BOEING TWR. THEY QUESTIONED OUR TRANSPONDER CODE AT WHICH TIME WE ADVISED WE WERE VFR. WE RESET OUR CODE TO 1200 AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN MY OPINION, AND THE OPINION OF OTHER INSTRUCTORS CONSULTED AFTER THE FACT, THIS WAS 1) PROBABLY AN IMPROPER DECLARATION OF LOST COMS, AND 2) IF COM IS LOST THERE SHOULD BE MORE OF AN ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH. SOME FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PROBLEM AND COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) CREW DUTIES SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED, ESPECIALLY ON A TRAINING FLT, IF RADIO PROCS HAD BEEN CLEARLY DIVIDED AND STATED, THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. 2) COPY ALL RADIO FREQS DOWN. IN THIS CASE THE LOST FREQ WAS NOT WRITTEN DOWN BY EITHER PLT. 3) BACK UP RADIO CHANGES BY COMPARING FREQS SET IN RADIOS TO WRITTEN NOTES, XCHKING BY LOOKING AT THE RADIO SELECT SWITCH IF MORE THAN 1 RADIO IS CARRIED AND ADVISE OTHER CREW MEMBERS OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. 4) WHEN A MISTAKE IS MADE, TAKE CORRECTION ACTION UNTIL IT IS RESOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.