Narrative:

While towing on the taxiway the man in the cockpit told me, the tower said to expedite our move. I accelerated down the taxiway then turned onto the ramp. When the airplane was clear of the taxiway I began to apply the brakes intermittently to slow down that mass (the airplane). As I did this, I looked back to the right and the left to make sure my wing tips were clear. As I looked back I could see the expression of terror on the face of the mechanic riding on the back of the tractor. After I parked the airplane at the gate, I asked him what was wrong? He said every time you applied the brakes the weight and the inertia of the airplane wanted to push the tractor and the tow bar was jack-knifing; you could have damaged the airplane, why did you go so fast? I replied that ground control told me to expedite our move, and I did. I might add, in damp, foggy, or wet WX throw the words 'expedite your move' out of your vocabulary. The reason for this is that the ramps and taxiways are covered with a thin film of oil from the jet exhaust and they are very slippery when wet. We have little or no breaking action. We can't expedite or moves in the alleys because we have to watch our wing tip clearance. Incident #2: a deviation from the normal. When the controller gives push-back clearance there should be no elaboration. It should be, 'cleared for push-back advise when ready to taxi or tow.' a while back a male controller gave us push-back clearance and said to watch for a widebody transport that might be coming up in the alley at the international terminal. I acknowledged that I had received the transmission and that I would watch the widebody transport. I interpreted the controller to mean that if the widebody transport was not in the way, I was clear to tow to the hangar. She asked, 'who gave you permission to tow to the hangar?' and I blurted out that I didn't get direct clearance, but it was implied. Then in her normal controller voice said, ok. I later learned that she was breaking in a new controller and he screwed up, and she understood. Incident #3: APU inoperative. Two mechanics were needed to push a widebody transport off of gate zat the international terminal. When we arrived at the gate we were told that the APU was inoperative. A few mins before departure time #4 engine was started with a ground power unit. I began the push-out and just as I went into the turn to push the airplane into the alley, I could feel the tractor beginning to labor. I thought this rather strange, but then I heard #4 engine coming up to power. To start the other 3 engines, #4 had to be brought up to at least 80 percent of power. I never found out what the communication was between the mechanic on the headset and the cockpit. But as I was making the turn into the alley the blast from #4 engine blew all the baggage cart, pods and everything else that wasn't tied down all over the ramp in the area of gate X and Y. As I see it, the answer to this problem on the south side of the international terminal would be to tow the airplane south of the bradley terminal facing east and have the engines started there. It would be wise to alert traffic coming up on taxiway 49 as to what is going on. Incident #4: a lack of professionalism in aircraft maintenance. My first experience talking to ground control was several decades ago when a number of us were hired by the airlines. Every chance we had we would listen to ground control to get used to their jargon and fast talk. At times the new hires would discuss the fast talk. We were all in agreement that one had to listen intently as changes take place very fast. One senior mechanic said he had no problem with the fast talk. Once he got his clearance to his destination he switched frequency. Effectively, he turned ground control off. The new hires were appalled at the lack of professionalism in aircraft maintenance. Fortunately, I heard that only once. Information: the moving crew. It takes 3 people to move an airplane. They're called the 'moving' crew. One man will ride in the cockpit. He will set up the radio, fuel, hydraulic and pneumatic panels. In reference to the radios we normally use VHF #1 to talk to ground control and push int button to communication with the man on the headset. The second man will push the airplane off of the gate and he will be onthe headset. The third man will be the wing walker on the push out. The man in the cockpit listens very closely to ground control and when he detects the slightest pause he will blurt in his request for push-back clearance. When he gets the clearance for push-back he pushes the int button on the radio and tells the man on the headset we're cleared for push-back. As soon as the man on the headset gets the message the cockpit switched back to VHF #1. On most airplanes except for the 4 engine mdt both ground control and the man on the headset can talk and both voices will be heard in the cockpit. We have accepted this. It has become a conditioned response. When the company bought the 2 engine widebody transport the moving crew got a pleasant surprise. On this airplane when the man in the cockpit calls ground control the reply is heard both in the cockpit and on the headset. That design has relieved a lot of stress for both the mechanic in the cockpit and the one on the headset. On a 3 engine widebody transport called for and received push-back clearance. I relayed the message to the man on the headset. As I conversed with the man on the headset about this, ground control called me to return to the gate, the push out was cancelled for some reason. I stayed in contact with the man on the headset and told him to return to the gate which he did. Then I called ground control and told him I was back at the gate. He let me know that he was highly annoyed because I didn't reply immediately. Here again, stress for both of us. If the 3 engine widebody transport communication system was wired the sameway as the 2 engine widebody transport is wired that stressful situation would not have happened. I had 2 horrible experiences towing the 4 engine mdt and everything was going along fine. (I had VHF #1 button pushed). As we were chattering, we came to an intersecting taxiway with a widebody transport approaching. The man on the tractor asked if we should hold for him? I replied ground control hasn't said anything so keep going, but use common sense. As I pushed the VHF #1 button to call ground control I head the clear screaming at me! He yelled, I called you 3 times and you didn't answer. When one pushed the int button to talk to the man on the headset VHF #1 is turned off. Well, I couldn't believe such a condition existed, but in reality it does. When I got the the hangar I called the FAA, and we discussed the situation with the 4 engine mdt. He was very understanding, but he had no solution to the problem. A few days later a mechanic gave me the answer to the problem: use VHF #1 to communication with ground control and the coplts radio to communication with the man on the headset. Here is a simple solution to the problem. In conclusion, I would like to say that to relieve the stress on the controllers and mechanics, it should be mandatory that formal training be given to the mechanics on the airplanes that they move. Also, the controllers and the mechanics should know something about each others job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR, AN ACR CGP MECH, TELLS TALES OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RADIO COM PROBLEMS AND GND FLC COORD PROBLEMS DURING RAMP OPERATION TOW OUT.

Narrative: WHILE TOWING ON THE TAXIWAY THE MAN IN THE COCKPIT TOLD ME, THE TWR SAID TO EXPEDITE OUR MOVE. I ACCELERATED DOWN THE TAXIWAY THEN TURNED ONTO THE RAMP. WHEN THE AIRPLANE WAS CLR OF THE TAXIWAY I BEGAN TO APPLY THE BRAKES INTERMITTENTLY TO SLOW DOWN THAT MASS (THE AIRPLANE). AS I DID THIS, I LOOKED BACK TO THE R AND THE L TO MAKE SURE MY WING TIPS WERE CLR. AS I LOOKED BACK I COULD SEE THE EXPRESSION OF TERROR ON THE FACE OF THE MECH RIDING ON THE BACK OF THE TRACTOR. AFTER I PARKED THE AIRPLANE AT THE GATE, I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS WRONG? HE SAID EVERY TIME YOU APPLIED THE BRAKES THE WT AND THE INERTIA OF THE AIRPLANE WANTED TO PUSH THE TRACTOR AND THE TOW BAR WAS JACK-KNIFING; YOU COULD HAVE DAMAGED THE AIRPLANE, WHY DID YOU GO SO FAST? I REPLIED THAT GND CTL TOLD ME TO EXPEDITE OUR MOVE, AND I DID. I MIGHT ADD, IN DAMP, FOGGY, OR WET WX THROW THE WORDS 'EXPEDITE YOUR MOVE' OUT OF YOUR VOCABULARY. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE RAMPS AND TAXIWAYS ARE COVERED WITH A THIN FILM OF OIL FROM THE JET EXHAUST AND THEY ARE VERY SLIPPERY WHEN WET. WE HAVE LITTLE OR NO BREAKING ACTION. WE CAN'T EXPEDITE OR MOVES IN THE ALLEYS BECAUSE WE HAVE TO WATCH OUR WING TIP CLRNC. INCIDENT #2: A DEV FROM THE NORMAL. WHEN THE CTLR GIVES PUSH-BACK CLRNC THERE SHOULD BE NO ELABORATION. IT SHOULD BE, 'CLRED FOR PUSH-BACK ADVISE WHEN READY TO TAXI OR TOW.' A WHILE BACK A MALE CTLR GAVE US PUSH-BACK CLRNC AND SAID TO WATCH FOR A WDB THAT MIGHT BE COMING UP IN THE ALLEY AT THE INTL TERMINAL. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I HAD RECEIVED THE XMISSION AND THAT I WOULD WATCH THE WDB. I INTERPRETED THE CTLR TO MEAN THAT IF THE WDB WAS NOT IN THE WAY, I WAS CLR TO TOW TO THE HANGAR. SHE ASKED, 'WHO GAVE YOU PERMISSION TO TOW TO THE HANGAR?' AND I BLURTED OUT THAT I DIDN'T GET DIRECT CLRNC, BUT IT WAS IMPLIED. THEN IN HER NORMAL CTLR VOICE SAID, OK. I LATER LEARNED THAT SHE WAS BREAKING IN A NEW CTLR AND HE SCREWED UP, AND SHE UNDERSTOOD. INCIDENT #3: APU INOP. TWO MECHS WERE NEEDED TO PUSH A WDB OFF OF GATE ZAT THE INTL TERMINAL. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE WE WERE TOLD THAT THE APU WAS INOP. A FEW MINS BEFORE DEP TIME #4 ENG WAS STARTED WITH A GND PWR UNIT. I BEGAN THE PUSH-OUT AND JUST AS I WENT INTO THE TURN TO PUSH THE AIRPLANE INTO THE ALLEY, I COULD FEEL THE TRACTOR BEGINNING TO LABOR. I THOUGHT THIS RATHER STRANGE, BUT THEN I HEARD #4 ENG COMING UP TO PWR. TO START THE OTHER 3 ENGS, #4 HAD TO BE BROUGHT UP TO AT LEAST 80 PERCENT OF PWR. I NEVER FOUND OUT WHAT THE COM WAS BTWN THE MECH ON THE HEADSET AND THE COCKPIT. BUT AS I WAS MAKING THE TURN INTO THE ALLEY THE BLAST FROM #4 ENG BLEW ALL THE BAGGAGE CART, PODS AND EVERYTHING ELSE THAT WASN'T TIED DOWN ALL OVER THE RAMP IN THE AREA OF GATE X AND Y. AS I SEE IT, THE ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM ON THE S SIDE OF THE INTL TERMINAL WOULD BE TO TOW THE AIRPLANE S OF THE BRADLEY TERMINAL FACING E AND HAVE THE ENGS STARTED THERE. IT WOULD BE WISE TO ALERT TFC COMING UP ON TAXIWAY 49 AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON. INCIDENT #4: A LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM IN ACFT MAINT. MY FIRST EXPERIENCE TALKING TO GND CTL WAS SEVERAL DECADES AGO WHEN A NUMBER OF US WERE HIRED BY THE AIRLINES. EVERY CHANCE WE HAD WE WOULD LISTEN TO GND CTL TO GET USED TO THEIR JARGON AND FAST TALK. AT TIMES THE NEW HIRES WOULD DISCUSS THE FAST TALK. WE WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT THAT ONE HAD TO LISTEN INTENTLY AS CHANGES TAKE PLACE VERY FAST. ONE SENIOR MECH SAID HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE FAST TALK. ONCE HE GOT HIS CLRNC TO HIS DEST HE SWITCHED FREQ. EFFECTIVELY, HE TURNED GND CTL OFF. THE NEW HIRES WERE APPALLED AT THE LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM IN ACFT MAINT. FORTUNATELY, I HEARD THAT ONLY ONCE. INFO: THE MOVING CREW. IT TAKES 3 PEOPLE TO MOVE AN AIRPLANE. THEY'RE CALLED THE 'MOVING' CREW. ONE MAN WILL RIDE IN THE COCKPIT. HE WILL SET UP THE RADIO, FUEL, HYD AND PNEUMATIC PANELS. IN REFERENCE TO THE RADIOS WE NORMALLY USE VHF #1 TO TALK TO GND CTL AND PUSH INT BUTTON TO COM WITH THE MAN ON THE HEADSET. THE SECOND MAN WILL PUSH THE AIRPLANE OFF OF THE GATE AND HE WILL BE ONTHE HEADSET. THE THIRD MAN WILL BE THE WING WALKER ON THE PUSH OUT. THE MAN IN THE COCKPIT LISTENS VERY CLOSELY TO GND CTL AND WHEN HE DETECTS THE SLIGHTEST PAUSE HE WILL BLURT IN HIS REQUEST FOR PUSH-BACK CLRNC. WHEN HE GETS THE CLRNC FOR PUSH-BACK HE PUSHES THE INT BUTTON ON THE RADIO AND TELLS THE MAN ON THE HEADSET WE'RE CLRED FOR PUSH-BACK. AS SOON AS THE MAN ON THE HEADSET GETS THE MESSAGE THE COCKPIT SWITCHED BACK TO VHF #1. ON MOST AIRPLANES EXCEPT FOR THE 4 ENG MDT BOTH GND CTL AND THE MAN ON THE HEADSET CAN TALK AND BOTH VOICES WILL BE HEARD IN THE COCKPIT. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THIS. IT HAS BECOME A CONDITIONED RESPONSE. WHEN THE COMPANY BOUGHT THE 2 ENG WDB THE MOVING CREW GOT A PLEASANT SURPRISE. ON THIS AIRPLANE WHEN THE MAN IN THE COCKPIT CALLS GND CTL THE REPLY IS HEARD BOTH IN THE COCKPIT AND ON THE HEADSET. THAT DESIGN HAS RELIEVED A LOT OF STRESS FOR BOTH THE MECH IN THE COCKPIT AND THE ONE ON THE HEADSET. ON A 3 ENG WDB CALLED FOR AND RECEIVED PUSH-BACK CLRNC. I RELAYED THE MESSAGE TO THE MAN ON THE HEADSET. AS I CONVERSED WITH THE MAN ON THE HEADSET ABOUT THIS, GND CTL CALLED ME TO RETURN TO THE GATE, THE PUSH OUT WAS CANCELLED FOR SOME REASON. I STAYED IN CONTACT WITH THE MAN ON THE HEADSET AND TOLD HIM TO RETURN TO THE GATE WHICH HE DID. THEN I CALLED GND CTL AND TOLD HIM I WAS BACK AT THE GATE. HE LET ME KNOW THAT HE WAS HIGHLY ANNOYED BECAUSE I DIDN'T REPLY IMMEDIATELY. HERE AGAIN, STRESS FOR BOTH OF US. IF THE 3 ENG WDB COM SYS WAS WIRED THE SAMEWAY AS THE 2 ENG WDB IS WIRED THAT STRESSFUL SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. I HAD 2 HORRIBLE EXPERIENCES TOWING THE 4 ENG MDT AND EVERYTHING WAS GOING ALONG FINE. (I HAD VHF #1 BUTTON PUSHED). AS WE WERE CHATTERING, WE CAME TO AN INTERSECTING TAXIWAY WITH A WDB APCHING. THE MAN ON THE TRACTOR ASKED IF WE SHOULD HOLD FOR HIM? I REPLIED GND CTL HASN'T SAID ANYTHING SO KEEP GOING, BUT USE COMMON SENSE. AS I PUSHED THE VHF #1 BUTTON TO CALL GND CTL I HEAD THE CLR SCREAMING AT ME! HE YELLED, I CALLED YOU 3 TIMES AND YOU DIDN'T ANSWER. WHEN ONE PUSHED THE INT BUTTON TO TALK TO THE MAN ON THE HEADSET VHF #1 IS TURNED OFF. WELL, I COULDN'T BELIEVE SUCH A CONDITION EXISTED, BUT IN REALITY IT DOES. WHEN I GOT THE THE HANGAR I CALLED THE FAA, AND WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH THE 4 ENG MDT. HE WAS VERY UNDERSTANDING, BUT HE HAD NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. A FEW DAYS LATER A MECH GAVE ME THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM: USE VHF #1 TO COM WITH GND CTL AND THE COPLTS RADIO TO COM WITH THE MAN ON THE HEADSET. HERE IS A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT TO RELIEVE THE STRESS ON THE CTLRS AND MECHS, IT SHOULD BE MANDATORY THAT FORMAL TRAINING BE GIVEN TO THE MECHS ON THE AIRPLANES THAT THEY MOVE. ALSO, THE CTLRS AND THE MECHS SHOULD KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT EACH OTHERS JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.