Narrative:

Within 20 mi of ord at 6000 ft and 250 kiad we were given a 360 degree heading and descend to 5000 ft clearance. I told the first officer to prepare for a 'slam dunk' approach. We were then issued traffic to follow and traffic on 27R, I acknowledged visual on both. We were then given 320 degree to intercept 27L, slow to 170 KIAS, cross adame at 4000 ft or above, cleared for visual approach. All in quick order. The first officer was flying and was programming the flight guidance system to do everything. But the aircraft was slow to decelerate. On the short intercept leg we had slats extended and flaps at 11 degree, throttles closed, aircraft decelerating through 210 KIAS, level 5000 ft and 27L ILS tuned (both navs) and FMA showing 'localizer' armed. My attention then scanned outside to our traffic. I felt the aircraft start descending and visually noticed us just south of the 27L centerline. I looked inside and saw our airspeed at 220 KIAS increasing and the 'localizer' had been disarmed and my localizer raw data began to move toward center. I immediately took control, disconnected both the autoplt and autothrottles. I rolled to maximum practical turn to intercept and began a shallow climb to bleed off speed and recover to 5000 ft until established inbound. During this turn I lost sight of the 27R traffic. TCAS issued a resolution alert to climb (referencing this aircraft) so I followed the RA through completion while advising ATC that we had a 'RA alert.' I reintercepted the localizer and began a descent for our approach. I then gave the aircraft back to the first officer who completed our approach and landing. I feel my actions (given the time constraints and events) were correct and consistant with PIC/PNF duties. Once again I have witnessed the results of training total reliance on automation. The first officer was allowed to become target fixed on airspeed control because 'the autoplt was programmed and would do everything else.' in doing so, he removed himself from the duties of the PF and became a task master to speed control. A pilot's scan is everything is instrument flight. It must be disciplined and practiced. A pilot's confidence in his ability to hand fly can only be proven by doing it. There is a strong tendency for new first officer's not to turn off the automation even when by it's design limits/anomalies or misprogramming it is causing a bigger problem. I would like to see pilots be introduced to any new equipment. By first getting comfortable with their own abilities and confidence before seeing how well the autoplt does.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TRACK DEV WHEN FO IS SLOW TO REACT AND CORRECT AUTO APCH ANOMALY.

Narrative: WITHIN 20 MI OF ORD AT 6000 FT AND 250 KIAD WE WERE GIVEN A 360 DEG HDG AND DSND TO 5000 FT CLRNC. I TOLD THE FO TO PREPARE FOR A 'SLAM DUNK' APCH. WE WERE THEN ISSUED TFC TO FOLLOW AND TFC ON 27R, I ACKNOWLEDGED VISUAL ON BOTH. WE WERE THEN GIVEN 320 DEG TO INTERCEPT 27L, SLOW TO 170 KIAS, CROSS ADAME AT 4000 FT OR ABOVE, CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH. ALL IN QUICK ORDER. THE FO WAS FLYING AND WAS PROGRAMMING THE FLT GUIDANCE SYS TO DO EVERYTHING. BUT THE ACFT WAS SLOW TO DECELERATE. ON THE SHORT INTERCEPT LEG WE HAD SLATS EXTENDED AND FLAPS AT 11 DEG, THROTTLES CLOSED, ACFT DECELERATING THROUGH 210 KIAS, LEVEL 5000 FT AND 27L ILS TUNED (BOTH NAVS) AND FMA SHOWING 'LOC' ARMED. MY ATTN THEN SCANNED OUTSIDE TO OUR TFC. I FELT THE ACFT START DSNDING AND VISUALLY NOTICED US JUST S OF THE 27L CENTERLINE. I LOOKED INSIDE AND SAW OUR AIRSPD AT 220 KIAS INCREASING AND THE 'LOC' HAD BEEN DISARMED AND MY LOC RAW DATA BEGAN TO MOVE TOWARD CENTER. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL, DISCONNECTED BOTH THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES. I ROLLED TO MAX PRACTICAL TURN TO INTERCEPT AND BEGAN A SHALLOW CLB TO BLEED OFF SPD AND RECOVER TO 5000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED INBOUND. DURING THIS TURN I LOST SIGHT OF THE 27R TFC. TCAS ISSUED A RESOLUTION ALERT TO CLB (REFERENCING THIS ACFT) SO I FOLLOWED THE RA THROUGH COMPLETION WHILE ADVISING ATC THAT WE HAD A 'RA ALERT.' I REINTERCEPTED THE LOC AND BEGAN A DSCNT FOR OUR APCH. I THEN GAVE THE ACFT BACK TO THE FO WHO COMPLETED OUR APCH AND LNDG. I FEEL MY ACTIONS (GIVEN THE TIME CONSTRAINTS AND EVENTS) WERE CORRECT AND CONSISTANT WITH PIC/PNF DUTIES. ONCE AGAIN I HAVE WITNESSED THE RESULTS OF TRAINING TOTAL RELIANCE ON AUTOMATION. THE FO WAS ALLOWED TO BECOME TARGET FIXED ON AIRSPD CTL BECAUSE 'THE AUTOPLT WAS PROGRAMMED AND WOULD DO EVERYTHING ELSE.' IN DOING SO, HE REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE DUTIES OF THE PF AND BECAME A TASK MASTER TO SPD CTL. A PLT'S SCAN IS EVERYTHING IS INST FLT. IT MUST BE DISCIPLINED AND PRACTICED. A PLT'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO HAND FLY CAN ONLY BE PROVEN BY DOING IT. THERE IS A STRONG TENDENCY FOR NEW FO'S NOT TO TURN OFF THE AUTOMATION EVEN WHEN BY IT'S DESIGN LIMITS/ANOMALIES OR MISPROGRAMMING IT IS CAUSING A BIGGER PROBLEM. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE PLTS BE INTRODUCED TO ANY NEW EQUIP. BY FIRST GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH THEIR OWN ABILITIES AND CONFIDENCE BEFORE SEEING HOW WELL THE AUTOPLT DOES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.