Narrative:

We had just set the brake parked at the gate when we felt a strong continuous vibration (#2 engine already shutdown). We thought it was the jetway hitting the aircraft. We were awaiting the ground crew to connect electrical power and the captain mentioned he smelled smoke when the vibration started again. The ground crew signaled the captain (which I couldn't see) to shutdown #1 engine. The captain directed me off the flight deck to see what was happening (forward door, 1L was open). I came back on deck as the first passenger were deplaning and told him we had ingested large amounts of air hose into the #1 engine. The captain had already shut the engine down (as indicated above) as was accomplishing the parking and securing checklist. The captain also notified ground of our problem, requesting fire equipment and directed the passenger off the aircraft quickly. I assisted the captain with the securing checklist as well as the emergency checklist. Better 'supervision' is needed to insure the engine safety zones are not violated while the engines are running. 'Extra caution' has to be exercised by ramp people when operating/working around running engines especially if the winds are gusty as they may have been this day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG INGESTS PART OF THE GND AIR CONDITIONING HOSE BEFORE ENG SHUTDOWN.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST SET THE BRAKE PARKED AT THE GATE WHEN WE FELT A STRONG CONTINUOUS VIBRATION (#2 ENG ALREADY SHUTDOWN). WE THOUGHT IT WAS THE JETWAY HITTING THE ACFT. WE WERE AWAITING THE GND CREW TO CONNECT ELECTRICAL PWR AND THE CAPT MENTIONED HE SMELLED SMOKE WHEN THE VIBRATION STARTED AGAIN. THE GND CREW SIGNALED THE CAPT (WHICH I COULDN'T SEE) TO SHUTDOWN #1 ENG. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME OFF THE FLT DECK TO SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING (FORWARD DOOR, 1L WAS OPEN). I CAME BACK ON DECK AS THE FIRST PAX WERE DEPLANING AND TOLD HIM WE HAD INGESTED LARGE AMOUNTS OF AIR HOSE INTO THE #1 ENG. THE CAPT HAD ALREADY SHUT THE ENG DOWN (AS INDICATED ABOVE) AS WAS ACCOMPLISHING THE PARKING AND SECURING CHKLIST. THE CAPT ALSO NOTIFIED GND OF OUR PROBLEM, REQUESTING FIRE EQUIP AND DIRECTED THE PAX OFF THE ACFT QUICKLY. I ASSISTED THE CAPT WITH THE SECURING CHKLIST AS WELL AS THE EMER CHKLIST. BETTER 'SUPERVISION' IS NEEDED TO INSURE THE ENG SAFETY ZONES ARE NOT VIOLATED WHILE THE ENGS ARE RUNNING. 'EXTRA CAUTION' HAS TO BE EXERCISED BY RAMP PEOPLE WHEN OPERATING/WORKING AROUND RUNNING ENGS ESPECIALLY IF THE WINDS ARE GUSTY AS THEY MAY HAVE BEEN THIS DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.