Narrative:

A long and fast landing on a wet runway resulted in stopping beyond the runway end and into the paved overrun. Backgnd and description of events. The captain permitted the international relief officers (international relief officer) to fly the last leg of 3 days of international flying by the same crew. I was the designated first officer and occupied an observers seat behind and between the capts and first officer seats. During approach to kelt, the international relief officer failed to initiate a timely descent crossing the FAF and intervention by the captain was not adequate to correct a high and fast approach. When the aircraft had not yet touched down after passing approximately 40 percent of the runway, the captain pulled the spdbrake and a firm touchdown resulted on runway 23 about half way between the romeo and bravo intxns. Maximum effort braking and reverse thrust stopped the aircraft in the paved overrun. No aircraft damage occurred. Analysis and opinion: at our airline the international relief officer receives the same initial training as the captain/first officer but does not maintain landing currency in line operations. He merely fills in during en route operations. I question the value of this 'in-flight relief' when normal procedural familiarity is not maintained. The decision to permit the international relief officer to fly was a mistake, in hindsight. Crew room scuttlebut had made the practice of international relief officer flying known to me so the decision to give the international relief officer the last leg did not arouse any objections on my part. The international relief officer's performance in earlier portions of the flight was a little sluggish although his flying was normal; this minor sluggishness, however, gave early warning that special care would be required during approach. The presence of passing rain showers and wet runways raised another flag. The assignment of runway 23 with its backcourse approach (no GS), down slope, and modest length presented additional approach considerations. Ultimately, the final factor in this uncomfortable situation was the failure to execute a go around when the approach remained well outside the bounds of a normal approach profile. I do not fully understand why I did not yell 'go around!'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB LNDG OVERSHOOT AND RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: A LONG AND FAST LNDG ON A WET RWY RESULTED IN STOPPING BEYOND THE RWY END AND INTO THE PAVED OVERRUN. BACKGND AND DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS. THE CAPT PERMITTED THE INTL RELIEF OFFICERS (IRO) TO FLY THE LAST LEG OF 3 DAYS OF INTL FLYING BY THE SAME CREW. I WAS THE DESIGNATED FO AND OCCUPIED AN OBSERVERS SEAT BEHIND AND BTWN THE CAPTS AND FO SEATS. DURING APCH TO KELT, THE IRO FAILED TO INITIATE A TIMELY DSCNT XING THE FAF AND INTERVENTION BY THE CAPT WAS NOT ADEQUATE TO CORRECT A HIGH AND FAST APCH. WHEN THE ACFT HAD NOT YET TOUCHED DOWN AFTER PASSING APPROX 40 PERCENT OF THE RWY, THE CAPT PULLED THE SPDBRAKE AND A FIRM TOUCHDOWN RESULTED ON RWY 23 ABOUT HALF WAY BTWN THE ROMEO AND BRAVO INTXNS. MAX EFFORT BRAKING AND REVERSE THRUST STOPPED THE ACFT IN THE PAVED OVERRUN. NO ACFT DAMAGE OCCURRED. ANALYSIS AND OPINION: AT OUR AIRLINE THE IRO RECEIVES THE SAME INITIAL TRAINING AS THE CAPT/FO BUT DOES NOT MAINTAIN LNDG CURRENCY IN LINE OPS. HE MERELY FILLS IN DURING ENRTE OPS. I QUESTION THE VALUE OF THIS 'INFLT RELIEF' WHEN NORMAL PROCEDURAL FAMILIARITY IS NOT MAINTAINED. THE DECISION TO PERMIT THE IRO TO FLY WAS A MISTAKE, IN HINDSIGHT. CREW ROOM SCUTTLEBUT HAD MADE THE PRACTICE OF IRO FLYING KNOWN TO ME SO THE DECISION TO GIVE THE IRO THE LAST LEG DID NOT AROUSE ANY OBJECTIONS ON MY PART. THE IRO'S PERFORMANCE IN EARLIER PORTIONS OF THE FLT WAS A LITTLE SLUGGISH ALTHOUGH HIS FLYING WAS NORMAL; THIS MINOR SLUGGISHNESS, HOWEVER, GAVE EARLY WARNING THAT SPECIAL CARE WOULD BE REQUIRED DURING APCH. THE PRESENCE OF PASSING RAIN SHOWERS AND WET RWYS RAISED ANOTHER FLAG. THE ASSIGNMENT OF RWY 23 WITH ITS BACKCOURSE APCH (NO GS), DOWN SLOPE, AND MODEST LENGTH PRESENTED ADDITIONAL APCH CONSIDERATIONS. ULTIMATELY, THE FINAL FACTOR IN THIS UNCOMFORTABLE SITUATION WAS THE FAILURE TO EXECUTE A GAR WHEN THE APCH REMAINED WELL OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF A NORMAL APCH PROFILE. I DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND WHY I DID NOT YELL 'GAR!'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.