Narrative:

Landing ILS 31R, visual approachs 31L, arrival push. Training developmental on local control. Air carrier large transport X checks in, 15 mi final, says he was issued visual to 31L, when he was issued an ILS to 31R. He is moving past ILS 31R approach course and closing on company aircraft Y on visual approach to 31L. Large transport X asks, 'where is this aircraft Y going'? I took the frequency from the trainee, established visual separation between the aircraft (I was not talking to aircraft Y for 31L) and had large transport X begin a missed approach (heading 270). After coordination with approach control, large transport X was issued 270 heading, 7000 ft and a frequency for resequencing. Approach attempted to bring him back in immediately resulting in X being in conflict with yet another company large transport Z. Visual separation was established by approach and all aircraft landed safety. Suggestions: pay attention to readbacks, especially when training someone else. Approach control was also training. 31L saves this air carrier considerable taxi time, and the pilots have come to expect it. It is important for them to realize that it is not always available, and they should also pay more attention to instructions and readbacks. Supplemental information from acn 187948: when the crew tuned the final controller's frequency, they found the frequency very congested and the controller issuing a non- stop barrage of instructions to many different aircraft. His spiel was continually interrupted by the squeal of simultaneous transmissions. For about 2 mins the crew could not break in, but finally the controller called the aircraft and gave a heading change to 060 degree and instructed the crew to look for an adv tech at 12 O'clock and follow that aircraft to the airport. The runway to be used was not specified, nor was the assigned altitude and speed changed. The first officer was flying and the captain was working the radio. As the captain looked at 12 O'clock he saw an adv tech widebody transport about 5 mi ahead in a right turn. It was visible in the haze only because both its wings and fuselage were exposed. The captain acknowledged visual contact with the widebody transport and the first officer began to slow the aircraft. At this point, neither the airport, nor the south shore of long island were visible yet, so visual operations were being conducted in what was essentially an IFR environment. As the aircraft slowed through 220 KTS, the captain noticed the ILS course bar move rapidly from the side to the center of the course instrument, indicating that the aircraft was crossing the 31L localizer. The captain immediately called the controller and asked if they were being 'taken through', as the crew was still 'instrument-approach' oriented. The controller replied, 'turn left 290 degree, maintain 2000 until established, cleared for approach, contact tower 119.1'. Again the runway was not specified, although the crew was now led to believe they had been cleared to intercept the 31L ILS. As the aircraft rolled out on final with the airport still not in sight the captain realized that he could not see the widebody transport he was supposed to follow, but he saw emerging from the haze to the left another aircraft Y in a left turn to join the localizer. This new aircraft was only about 1 1/2 mi ahead and at the same altitude. It was obvious something was wrong! The captain called jfk tower and asked where the aircraft just ahead was going. The tower responded by asking if the widebody transport was in sight. The captain said, 'no, but we have an large transport aircraft Y just ahead'. The tower then asked what runway the crew was making their approach to, and the captain replied '31L'. The tower then said the aircraft Y ahead was a visual to 31L and gave instructions to fly 270 degree and maintain 2000 ft. Only at this point did the crew realize their error. They had assumed they were cleared for an approach to 31L when they had been in fact vectored for 31R. The controller erred by not specifying the runway to be used. And the captain erred by acknowledging contact with the widebody transport which to the controller implied the ability to complete a visual approach and the assumption of aircraft separation obligations. But the underlying fault which contributed to these errors was the chaos of the communications frequency. When a frequency is saturated and more and more instructions have to be issued to more and more aircraft, the tendency is to omit required transmissions, shorten phrases, omit readbacks and make assumptions about pilots' and controllers' intentions. These communication discipline lapses lead to incidents. Luckily, this incident resulted in no near miss, no evasive action, and no discomfort to the passenger on either plane. Small screw-ups like this happen all day long in the new york TCA. But any one of those incidents can start a snowball reaction which can quickly overwhelm the system's capability to cope, since communication-wise, it's already overloaded. In this day and age, aircraft need data link like ACARS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV IN THIS WRONG RWY APCH.

Narrative: LNDG ILS 31R, VISUAL APCHS 31L, ARR PUSH. TRAINING DEVELOPMENTAL ON LCL CTL. ACR LGT X CHKS IN, 15 MI FINAL, SAYS HE WAS ISSUED VISUAL TO 31L, WHEN HE WAS ISSUED AN ILS TO 31R. HE IS MOVING PAST ILS 31R APCH COURSE AND CLOSING ON COMPANY ACFT Y ON VISUAL APCH TO 31L. LGT X ASKS, 'WHERE IS THIS ACFT Y GOING'? I TOOK THE FREQ FROM THE TRAINEE, ESTABLISHED VISUAL SEPARATION BTWN THE ACFT (I WAS NOT TALKING TO ACFT Y FOR 31L) AND HAD LGT X BEGIN A MISSED APCH (HDG 270). AFTER COORD WITH APCH CTL, LGT X WAS ISSUED 270 HDG, 7000 FT AND A FREQ FOR RESEQUENCING. APCH ATTEMPTED TO BRING HIM BACK IN IMMEDIATELY RESULTING IN X BEING IN CONFLICT WITH YET ANOTHER COMPANY LGT Z. VISUAL SEPARATION WAS ESTABLISHED BY APCH AND ALL ACFT LANDED SAFETY. SUGGESTIONS: PAY ATTN TO READBACKS, ESPECIALLY WHEN TRAINING SOMEONE ELSE. APCH CTL WAS ALSO TRAINING. 31L SAVES THIS ACR CONSIDERABLE TAXI TIME, AND THE PLTS HAVE COME TO EXPECT IT. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THEM TO REALIZE THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE, AND THEY SHOULD ALSO PAY MORE ATTN TO INSTRUCTIONS AND READBACKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 187948: WHEN THE CREW TUNED THE FINAL CTLR'S FREQ, THEY FOUND THE FREQ VERY CONGESTED AND THE CTLR ISSUING A NON- STOP BARRAGE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MANY DIFFERENT ACFT. HIS SPIEL WAS CONTINUALLY INTERRUPTED BY THE SQUEAL OF SIMULTANEOUS TRANSMISSIONS. FOR ABOUT 2 MINS THE CREW COULD NOT BREAK IN, BUT FINALLY THE CTLR CALLED THE ACFT AND GAVE A HDG CHANGE TO 060 DEG AND INSTRUCTED THE CREW TO LOOK FOR AN ADV TECH AT 12 O'CLOCK AND FOLLOW THAT ACFT TO THE ARPT. THE RWY TO BE USED WAS NOT SPECIFIED, NOR WAS THE ASSIGNED ALT AND SPD CHANGED. THE FO WAS FLYING AND THE CAPT WAS WORKING THE RADIO. AS THE CAPT LOOKED AT 12 O'CLOCK HE SAW AN ADV TECH WDB ABOUT 5 MI AHEAD IN A R TURN. IT WAS VISIBLE IN THE HAZE ONLY BECAUSE BOTH ITS WINGS AND FUSELAGE WERE EXPOSED. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE WDB AND THE FO BEGAN TO SLOW THE ACFT. AT THIS POINT, NEITHER THE ARPT, NOR THE S SHORE OF LONG ISLAND WERE VISIBLE YET, SO VISUAL OPS WERE BEING CONDUCTED IN WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY AN IFR ENVIRONMENT. AS THE ACFT SLOWED THROUGH 220 KTS, THE CAPT NOTICED THE ILS COURSE BAR MOVE RAPIDLY FROM THE SIDE TO THE CENTER OF THE COURSE INST, INDICATING THAT THE ACFT WAS XING THE 31L LOC. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE CTLR AND ASKED IF THEY WERE BEING 'TAKEN THROUGH', AS THE CREW WAS STILL 'INST-APCH' ORIENTED. THE CTLR REPLIED, 'TURN L 290 DEG, MAINTAIN 2000 UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED FOR APCH, CONTACT TWR 119.1'. AGAIN THE RWY WAS NOT SPECIFIED, ALTHOUGH THE CREW WAS NOW LED TO BELIEVE THEY HAD BEEN CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE 31L ILS. AS THE ACFT ROLLED OUT ON FINAL WITH THE ARPT STILL NOT IN SIGHT THE CAPT REALIZED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THE WDB HE WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW, BUT HE SAW EMERGING FROM THE HAZE TO THE L ANOTHER ACFT Y IN A L TURN TO JOIN THE LOC. THIS NEW ACFT WAS ONLY ABOUT 1 1/2 MI AHEAD AND AT THE SAME ALT. IT WAS OBVIOUS SOMETHING WAS WRONG! THE CAPT CALLED JFK TWR AND ASKED WHERE THE ACFT JUST AHEAD WAS GOING. THE TWR RESPONDED BY ASKING IF THE WDB WAS IN SIGHT. THE CAPT SAID, 'NO, BUT WE HAVE AN LGT ACFT Y JUST AHEAD'. THE TWR THEN ASKED WHAT RWY THE CREW WAS MAKING THEIR APCH TO, AND THE CAPT REPLIED '31L'. THE TWR THEN SAID THE ACFT Y AHEAD WAS A VISUAL TO 31L AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FLY 270 DEG AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT. ONLY AT THIS POINT DID THE CREW REALIZE THEIR ERROR. THEY HAD ASSUMED THEY WERE CLRED FOR AN APCH TO 31L WHEN THEY HAD BEEN IN FACT VECTORED FOR 31R. THE CTLR ERRED BY NOT SPECIFYING THE RWY TO BE USED. AND THE CAPT ERRED BY ACKNOWLEDGING CONTACT WITH THE WDB WHICH TO THE CTLR IMPLIED THE ABILITY TO COMPLETE A VISUAL APCH AND THE ASSUMPTION OF ACFT SEPARATION OBLIGATIONS. BUT THE UNDERLYING FAULT WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THESE ERRORS WAS THE CHAOS OF THE COMS FREQ. WHEN A FREQ IS SATURATED AND MORE AND MORE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE TO BE ISSUED TO MORE AND MORE ACFT, THE TENDENCY IS TO OMIT REQUIRED TRANSMISSIONS, SHORTEN PHRASES, OMIT READBACKS AND MAKE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PLTS' AND CTLRS' INTENTIONS. THESE COM DISCIPLINE LAPSES LEAD TO INCIDENTS. LUCKILY, THIS INCIDENT RESULTED IN NO NEAR MISS, NO EVASIVE ACTION, AND NO DISCOMFORT TO THE PAX ON EITHER PLANE. SMALL SCREW-UPS LIKE THIS HAPPEN ALL DAY LONG IN THE NEW YORK TCA. BUT ANY ONE OF THOSE INCIDENTS CAN START A SNOWBALL REACTION WHICH CAN QUICKLY OVERWHELM THE SYS'S CAPABILITY TO COPE, SINCE COM-WISE, IT'S ALREADY OVERLOADED. IN THIS DAY AND AGE, ACFT NEED DATA LINK LIKE ACARS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.