Narrative:

First of all, my presence in the cockpit for departure was not required since I was the relief pilot. However, generally speaking, most relief pilots situation in the cockpit for takeoff and landing. The captain had just come off of newly qualified status whereas the first officer was still newly qualified. Our flight had been cleared the kennedy 5 departure with a carnarsie climb which includes a maintain 5000 ft altitude. Just prior to takeoff the altitude was changed to 4000 ft. After takeoff I heard departure control issue a 90 degree heading. However, the soft-spoken and apparently slow to comprehend first officer read back 9000 ft and 90 degree (according to him) of which I only heard 90 degree. He subsequently reset the altitude alerter to 9000. During this period of time my attention was focused on the captain's flying since he was attempting to navigation to carnarsie VOR without the FMS being programmed in navigation or any specific heading selected. Consequently, I found myself distraction by looking outside to verify our ground track since the captain never really briefed how he was going to fly the departure to carnarsie VOR. Also, while the first officer was occupied with his slow response to departure control, I noticed the airspeed rapidly approaching the slat limit speed to which I called out 'slats'. Both captain and first officer seemed to be behind the airplane. I felt overwhelmed by the amount of xchking I was doing. Anyway, as we turned to the 90 degree heading, departure control called out traffic at 4500 ft which we saw, acknowledged and reckoned to be no factor. As we went through about 5000-6000 ft departure asked what altitude we were climbing to. When the first officer responded 9000 ft, we were told that 4000 ft was our cleared altitude, however, continue climb to 9000 ft. In hindsight, an obvious cause of this problem was the pairing of a captain with just over 100 hours and a first officer with less than 100 hours in an advanced/automated 2 pilot aircraft. More flight time in aircraft type should be required before such pairings are allowed. Also, changing the altitude of the SID just prior to departure to allow for TCA traffic at 500 ft intervals is asking for problems during this critical phase of flight. Such other traffic should have been cleared outside our window of 2500- 5000 ft on this departure and finally, if the captain had used all available navaids, more attention could have been given to other aspects of the departure by extra crew members.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEV ALT OVERSHOT.

Narrative: FIRST OF ALL, MY PRESENCE IN THE COCKPIT FOR DEP WAS NOT REQUIRED SINCE I WAS THE RELIEF PLT. HOWEVER, GENERALLY SPEAKING, MOST RELIEF PLTS SIT IN THE COCKPIT FOR TKOF AND LNDG. THE CAPT HAD JUST COME OFF OF NEWLY QUALIFIED STATUS WHEREAS THE FO WAS STILL NEWLY QUALIFIED. OUR FLT HAD BEEN CLRED THE KENNEDY 5 DEP WITH A CARNARSIE CLB WHICH INCLUDES A MAINTAIN 5000 FT ALT. JUST PRIOR TO TKOF THE ALT WAS CHANGED TO 4000 FT. AFTER TKOF I HEARD DEP CTL ISSUE A 90 DEG HDG. HOWEVER, THE SOFT-SPOKEN AND APPARENTLY SLOW TO COMPREHEND FO READ BACK 9000 FT AND 90 DEG (ACCORDING TO HIM) OF WHICH I ONLY HEARD 90 DEG. HE SUBSEQUENTLY RESET THE ALT ALERTER TO 9000. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON THE CAPT'S FLYING SINCE HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO NAV TO CARNARSIE VOR WITHOUT THE FMS BEING PROGRAMMED IN NAV OR ANY SPECIFIC HDG SELECTED. CONSEQUENTLY, I FOUND MYSELF DISTR BY LOOKING OUTSIDE TO VERIFY OUR GND TRACK SINCE THE CAPT NEVER REALLY BRIEFED HOW HE WAS GOING TO FLY THE DEP TO CARNARSIE VOR. ALSO, WHILE THE FO WAS OCCUPIED WITH HIS SLOW RESPONSE TO DEP CTL, I NOTICED THE AIRSPD RAPIDLY APCHING THE SLAT LIMIT SPD TO WHICH I CALLED OUT 'SLATS'. BOTH CAPT AND FO SEEMED TO BE BEHIND THE AIRPLANE. I FELT OVERWHELMED BY THE AMOUNT OF XCHKING I WAS DOING. ANYWAY, AS WE TURNED TO THE 90 DEG HDG, DEP CTL CALLED OUT TFC AT 4500 FT WHICH WE SAW, ACKNOWLEDGED AND RECKONED TO BE NO FACTOR. AS WE WENT THROUGH ABOUT 5000-6000 FT DEP ASKED WHAT ALT WE WERE CLBING TO. WHEN THE FO RESPONDED 9000 FT, WE WERE TOLD THAT 4000 FT WAS OUR CLRED ALT, HOWEVER, CONTINUE CLB TO 9000 FT. IN HINDSIGHT, AN OBVIOUS CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS THE PAIRING OF A CAPT WITH JUST OVER 100 HRS AND A FO WITH LESS THAN 100 HRS IN AN ADVANCED/AUTOMATED 2 PLT ACFT. MORE FLT TIME IN ACFT TYPE SHOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE SUCH PAIRINGS ARE ALLOWED. ALSO, CHANGING THE ALT OF THE SID JUST PRIOR TO DEP TO ALLOW FOR TCA TFC AT 500 FT INTERVALS IS ASKING FOR PROBLEMS DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. SUCH OTHER TFC SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLRED OUTSIDE OUR WINDOW OF 2500- 5000 FT ON THIS DEP AND FINALLY, IF THE CAPT HAD USED ALL AVAILABLE NAVAIDS, MORE ATTN COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DEP BY EXTRA CREW MEMBERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.