Narrative:

I was the first officer on flight on sep/thu/91. This was a scheduled passenger flight operating from tokyo (nrt) to jfk. This was a 4 engine widebody transport. I was receiving my initial operating experience (IOE) and was programmed to fly this leg. As we approached runway 34 I was taxiing the aircraft. The so reported the door warning light for door 3R had come on. We had the same experience 4 days earlier departing jfk in the same aircraft. The captain had sent the relief pilot down to check the door. He moved the handle and the light had gone out. We proceeded with no further occurrence. The captain again dispatched the relief pilot to check the door. Shortly thereafter, we were cleared into position. At about the same time the so announced that the door light had gone out. Either the so or the captain (I was monitoring ATC and was not in the conversational loop) called down to 3R and told the relief pilot to take a seat in the cabin that we would be cleared for takeoff momentarily. We were then cleared to go and we began the roll. At approximately 100 KTS, someone called out that the light had come on again. The captain took control of the aircraft and announced that he was aborting the takeoff. By this time we had accelerated to approximately 120 KTS. We were still well within the first half of the runway. The captain applied idle reverse and moderate braking. The aircraft began decelerating normally and was obvious we could easily stop on the remaining runway with no additional braking or reverse. The captain applied a bit more reverse, activating the automatic brake system to maximum braking. This caused a very rapid uncomfortable deceleration for several seconds until the captain disarmed the system. A turnoff the runway was made and we began taxiing north. At this time we received a call in the cockpit that the slide for 3R had deployed after we turned off the runway. The captain ordered the #3 engine shutdown and an assessment of our ability to continue taxiing. It was determined that we could so we continued to a remote spot. We warned the ground personnel of our hot brakes and the nose wheel was chocked. The brake temperature continued to climb and 9 of the fuse plugs melted and the tires deflated. My conclusions after reviewing the above events are that we need more information on the overwing doors and their relationship to operation with heavy fuel loads. I have been a widebody transport so and first officer and did not know of any prohibition against operating the door with heavy fuel loads. I also think the application of maximum braking when not needed causes more problems than it solves.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED AS DOOR WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATES ON TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON FLT ON SEP/THU/91. THIS WAS A SCHEDULED PAX FLT OPERATING FROM TOKYO (NRT) TO JFK. THIS WAS A 4 ENG WDB. I WAS RECEIVING MY INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE (IOE) AND WAS PROGRAMMED TO FLY THIS LEG. AS WE APCHED RWY 34 I WAS TAXIING THE ACFT. THE SO RPTED THE DOOR WARNING LIGHT FOR DOOR 3R HAD COME ON. WE HAD THE SAME EXPERIENCE 4 DAYS EARLIER DEPARTING JFK IN THE SAME ACFT. THE CAPT HAD SENT THE RELIEF PLT DOWN TO CHK THE DOOR. HE MOVED THE HANDLE AND THE LIGHT HAD GONE OUT. WE PROCEEDED WITH NO FURTHER OCCURRENCE. THE CAPT AGAIN DISPATCHED THE RELIEF PLT TO CHK THE DOOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE CLRED INTO POS. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE SO ANNOUNCED THAT THE DOOR LIGHT HAD GONE OUT. EITHER THE SO OR THE CAPT (I WAS MONITORING ATC AND WAS NOT IN THE CONVERSATIONAL LOOP) CALLED DOWN TO 3R AND TOLD THE RELIEF PLT TO TAKE A SEAT IN THE CABIN THAT WE WOULD BE CLRED FOR TKOF MOMENTARILY. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO GO AND WE BEGAN THE ROLL. AT APPROX 100 KTS, SOMEONE CALLED OUT THAT THE LIGHT HAD COME ON AGAIN. THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ABORTING THE TKOF. BY THIS TIME WE HAD ACCELERATED TO APPROX 120 KTS. WE WERE STILL WELL WITHIN THE FIRST HALF OF THE RWY. THE CAPT APPLIED IDLE REVERSE AND MODERATE BRAKING. THE ACFT BEGAN DECELERATING NORMALLY AND WAS OBVIOUS WE COULD EASILY STOP ON THE REMAINING RWY WITH NO ADDITIONAL BRAKING OR REVERSE. THE CAPT APPLIED A BIT MORE REVERSE, ACTIVATING THE AUTO BRAKE SYS TO MAX BRAKING. THIS CAUSED A VERY RAPID UNCOMFORTABLE DECELERATION FOR SEVERAL SECONDS UNTIL THE CAPT DISARMED THE SYS. A TURNOFF THE RWY WAS MADE AND WE BEGAN TAXIING N. AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A CALL IN THE COCKPIT THAT THE SLIDE FOR 3R HAD DEPLOYED AFTER WE TURNED OFF THE RWY. THE CAPT ORDERED THE #3 ENG SHUTDOWN AND AN ASSESSMENT OF OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE TAXIING. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE COULD SO WE CONTINUED TO A REMOTE SPOT. WE WARNED THE GND PERSONNEL OF OUR HOT BRAKES AND THE NOSE WHEEL WAS CHOCKED. THE BRAKE TEMP CONTINUED TO CLB AND 9 OF THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED AND THE TIRES DEFLATED. MY CONCLUSIONS AFTER REVIEWING THE ABOVE EVENTS ARE THAT WE NEED MORE INFO ON THE OVERWING DOORS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO OP WITH HVY FUEL LOADS. I HAVE BEEN A WDB SO AND FO AND DID NOT KNOW OF ANY PROHIBITION AGAINST OPERATING THE DOOR WITH HVY FUEL LOADS. I ALSO THINK THE APPLICATION OF MAX BRAKING WHEN NOT NEEDED CAUSES MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT SOLVES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.