Narrative:

We took off in heavy rain -- typhoon conditions. Approaching kagis, we got our first (of many) EICAS caution message. It indicated a bleed or nacelle overheat on #1 engine. It was followed by more messages in rapid succession. I was flying the airplane. First officer was in the right seat and handled all ATC communications, emergency checklists, etc. Extra captain sat behind me and did most of the PA's and communication with flight attendants, as well as helping with all phases of the emergency. Extra first officer was in the right hand jumpseat. He handled company calls, helped first officer go through the procedures, and assisted each of us in many aspects of the emergency. Maximum altitude attained was about FL260, where I leveled off, then began to descend as we were losing the cabin, had a possible in-flight reversal of #1 engine, and also possibly had some leading edge flaps partially extended. I did not notice any unusual yaw or vibration to verify these indications. The stick shaker activated several times as the high speed and low speed red lines came together and merged into 1 solid red line. (It stayed like this for much of the flight.) I tried to maintain what I thought was a reasonable airspeed for the conditions. With the cabin climbing fairly rapidly, I increased descent rate with idle thrust and speed brakes, also, donning my oxygen mask. I believe the cabin altitude reached 13000 ft before we caught it on the way down to 10000 ft. We declared an emergency then return to nrt and land. Dumping took about 40 mins. A total of about 160000 pounds of fuel. I decided not to shut down the engine as it was running ok and we would lose #1 hydraulic system if we shut it down. I kept trying the autoplt every so often to see if it would work for me, and eventually it did. We completed the dumping procedure and flew the approach on autoplt. Flaps were extended early to check for proper operation. Trailing edge flaps were normal, but leading edge display was still incomplete. Automatic brakes 4 had been selected and seemed to work. Full reverse was used on 2 and 3 and about half on #4. #1 reverse was not used because of malfunction indications. Immediately after we stopped, the tower informed us that we had a fire in our #1 engine. While we were fighting that fire, the tower called again to say there was a fire on our right wing. Door 3R was not used as an exit for this reason. Then tower called again to say #2 engine was on fire. The tower called again to say we should evacuate/evacuation passenger out the right side. We had come to that same conclusion, and the order was given by extra captain on the PA. The word came from downstairs that the flight attendants couldn't get the doors open -- we were still pressurized. I attempted to open the outflow valves manually, but I wasn't sure if we still had power to them with all the engines shut down. We had lost control of the valves before landing. I believe we landed with a cabin altitude of -400 ft. We were counting on the cabin to depressurize on touchdown, but it did not. While we were busy now trying to depressurize, we looked out the right side and observed passenger running away from the aircraft, so we knew they had managed to open the doors. We completed the evacuate/evacuation checklist, doublechked that everything was done and secure, took our flashlights, and proceeded to the cabin. I was the last one downstairs, and when I arrived in the main cabin, all the passenger had been evacuate/evacuationed. This was approximately 2 mins after parking. Only a few crew members remained. Lead flight attendant and I checked throughout the cabin to make sure everyone was off, then she and I exited through door 1R. We were the last 2 people off the aircraft. I was immediately impressed, as I went down the chute, with the slipperiness of the slide and the speed of my descent. Nothing was slowing me down, and I shot right by the 2 firemen trying to catch me and ended up sitting in a puddle of water and foam on the taxiway. All crew members experienced the same fast ride down the slides, and I'm sure this contributed to passenger injuries. The slides were wet from the rain and the foam from the fire trucks. In addition to the many passenger injured, we had 2 injuries amongst the crew. The entire ground handling of the post- evacuate/evacuation emergency scene seemed poorly handled and disorganized except for the fire trucks, which were on us immediately. No one seemed to be in charge of the rescue operation. One would think that airport authorities would have contingency plans in place to deal with such an emergency, but there didn't seem to be much of a plan. I would commend the entire flight crew for doing an excellent job of handling this potentially disastrous emergency situation. Company procedures were followed to the greatest extent possible. Despite the high technology, 2 pilot glass cockpit design of the widebody transport, 2 pilots could not adequately deal with this particular scenario. It took the maximum effort of 4 pilots here to successfully handle the situation. Despite the sophistication of the EICAS, it was giving us all the wrong indications. It was telling us everything except what the real problem was! Supplemental information from acn 188985: normal takeoff and climb through about 25000 ft. Then we got 3 pages of EICAS caution and advisory messages, the most serious included #1 nacelle overheat, left bleed duct leak, and cabin altitude automatic, but also got indications of #1 engine reverser in transit, a #1 starter cutout message and a start valve open light on the #1 starter switch, loss of #1 oil pressure indication, low oil quantity of #1, #1 oil filter message, flaps drive message, with left outboard and midspan leading edge flaps showing loss of signal, right inboard and midspan leading edges showing in transit. There were others, but I can't remember them all. The captain disengaged the autoplt to level off and took off automatic throttles also. In the confusion, he flew into stick shaker twice and full stall at least once. We got the cabin under control while the captain descended to 10000 ft and turned back to tokyo. We dumped to maximum landing weight (took about 45 mins) and landed in heavy rain. After landing a fire broke out on the left wing. The airplane was evacuate/evacuationed and over 40 injuries occurred going down the wet chutes. It could have been much worse because we were still pressurized when we landed. Days later we learned there was a fire in the wing forward of the forward spar inboard of #2 engine, caused by a fuel leak. The fire melted and shorted numerous wires giving all our EICAS messages. We never got a fire indication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB HAD A DUCT FIRE FORWARD OF THE L WING SPAR THAT WAS NOT DETECTED BY EICAS SYS. SYS GAVE ERRONEOUS WARNING MESSAGES AND THE FIRE WAS NOT DETECTED UNTIL AFTER RETURN LAND.

Narrative: WE TOOK OFF IN HVY RAIN -- TYPHOON CONDITIONS. APCHING KAGIS, WE GOT OUR FIRST (OF MANY) EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE. IT INDICATED A BLEED OR NACELLE OVERHEAT ON #1 ENG. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY MORE MESSAGES IN RAPID SUCCESSION. I WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE. FO WAS IN THE R SEAT AND HANDLED ALL ATC COMS, EMER CHKLISTS, ETC. EXTRA CAPT SAT BEHIND ME AND DID MOST OF THE PA'S AND COM WITH FLT ATTENDANTS, AS WELL AS HELPING WITH ALL PHASES OF THE EMER. EXTRA FO WAS IN THE R HAND JUMPSEAT. HE HANDLED COMPANY CALLS, HELPED FO GO THROUGH THE PROCS, AND ASSISTED EACH OF US IN MANY ASPECTS OF THE EMER. MAX ALT ATTAINED WAS ABOUT FL260, WHERE I LEVELED OFF, THEN BEGAN TO DSND AS WE WERE LOSING THE CABIN, HAD A POSSIBLE INFLT REVERSAL OF #1 ENG, AND ALSO POSSIBLY HAD SOME LEADING EDGE FLAPS PARTIALLY EXTENDED. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY UNUSUAL YAW OR VIBRATION TO VERIFY THESE INDICATIONS. THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED SEVERAL TIMES AS THE HIGH SPD AND LOW SPD RED LINES CAME TOGETHER AND MERGED INTO 1 SOLID RED LINE. (IT STAYED LIKE THIS FOR MUCH OF THE FLT.) I TRIED TO MAINTAIN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A REASONABLE AIRSPD FOR THE CONDITIONS. WITH THE CABIN CLBING FAIRLY RAPIDLY, I INCREASED DSCNT RATE WITH IDLE THRUST AND SPD BRAKES, ALSO, DONNING MY OXYGEN MASK. I BELIEVE THE CABIN ALT REACHED 13000 FT BEFORE WE CAUGHT IT ON THE WAY DOWN TO 10000 FT. WE DECLARED AN EMER THEN RETURN TO NRT AND LAND. DUMPING TOOK ABOUT 40 MINS. A TOTAL OF ABOUT 160000 POUNDS OF FUEL. I DECIDED NOT TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG AS IT WAS RUNNING OK AND WE WOULD LOSE #1 HYD SYS IF WE SHUT IT DOWN. I KEPT TRYING THE AUTOPLT EVERY SO OFTEN TO SEE IF IT WOULD WORK FOR ME, AND EVENTUALLY IT DID. WE COMPLETED THE DUMPING PROC AND FLEW THE APCH ON AUTOPLT. FLAPS WERE EXTENDED EARLY TO CHK FOR PROPER OP. TRAILING EDGE FLAPS WERE NORMAL, BUT LEADING EDGE DISPLAY WAS STILL INCOMPLETE. AUTO BRAKES 4 HAD BEEN SELECTED AND SEEMED TO WORK. FULL REVERSE WAS USED ON 2 AND 3 AND ABOUT HALF ON #4. #1 REVERSE WAS NOT USED BECAUSE OF MALFUNCTION INDICATIONS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE STOPPED, THE TWR INFORMED US THAT WE HAD A FIRE IN OUR #1 ENG. WHILE WE WERE FIGHTING THAT FIRE, THE TWR CALLED AGAIN TO SAY THERE WAS A FIRE ON OUR R WING. DOOR 3R WAS NOT USED AS AN EXIT FOR THIS REASON. THEN TWR CALLED AGAIN TO SAY #2 ENG WAS ON FIRE. THE TWR CALLED AGAIN TO SAY WE SHOULD EVAC PAX OUT THE R SIDE. WE HAD COME TO THAT SAME CONCLUSION, AND THE ORDER WAS GIVEN BY EXTRA CAPT ON THE PA. THE WORD CAME FROM DOWNSTAIRS THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULDN'T GET THE DOORS OPEN -- WE WERE STILL PRESSURIZED. I ATTEMPTED TO OPEN THE OUTFLOW VALVES MANUALLY, BUT I WASN'T SURE IF WE STILL HAD PWR TO THEM WITH ALL THE ENGS SHUT DOWN. WE HAD LOST CTL OF THE VALVES BEFORE LNDG. I BELIEVE WE LANDED WITH A CABIN ALT OF -400 FT. WE WERE COUNTING ON THE CABIN TO DEPRESSURIZE ON TOUCHDOWN, BUT IT DID NOT. WHILE WE WERE BUSY NOW TRYING TO DEPRESSURIZE, WE LOOKED OUT THE R SIDE AND OBSERVED PAX RUNNING AWAY FROM THE ACFT, SO WE KNEW THEY HAD MANAGED TO OPEN THE DOORS. WE COMPLETED THE EVAC CHKLIST, DOUBLECHKED THAT EVERYTHING WAS DONE AND SECURE, TOOK OUR FLASHLIGHTS, AND PROCEEDED TO THE CABIN. I WAS THE LAST ONE DOWNSTAIRS, AND WHEN I ARRIVED IN THE MAIN CABIN, ALL THE PAX HAD BEEN EVACED. THIS WAS APPROX 2 MINS AFTER PARKING. ONLY A FEW CREW MEMBERS REMAINED. LEAD FLT ATTENDANT AND I CHKED THROUGHOUT THE CABIN TO MAKE SURE EVERYONE WAS OFF, THEN SHE AND I EXITED THROUGH DOOR 1R. WE WERE THE LAST 2 PEOPLE OFF THE ACFT. I WAS IMMEDIATELY IMPRESSED, AS I WENT DOWN THE CHUTE, WITH THE SLIPPERINESS OF THE SLIDE AND THE SPD OF MY DSCNT. NOTHING WAS SLOWING ME DOWN, AND I SHOT RIGHT BY THE 2 FIREMEN TRYING TO CATCH ME AND ENDED UP SITTING IN A PUDDLE OF WATER AND FOAM ON THE TAXIWAY. ALL CREW MEMBERS EXPERIENCED THE SAME FAST RIDE DOWN THE SLIDES, AND I'M SURE THIS CONTRIBUTED TO PAX INJURIES. THE SLIDES WERE WET FROM THE RAIN AND THE FOAM FROM THE FIRE TRUCKS. IN ADDITION TO THE MANY PAX INJURED, WE HAD 2 INJURIES AMONGST THE CREW. THE ENTIRE GND HANDLING OF THE POST- EVAC EMER SCENE SEEMED POORLY HANDLED AND DISORGANIZED EXCEPT FOR THE FIRE TRUCKS, WHICH WERE ON US IMMEDIATELY. NO ONE SEEMED TO BE IN CHARGE OF THE RESCUE OP. ONE WOULD THINK THAT ARPT AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH SUCH AN EMER, BUT THERE DIDN'T SEEM TO BE MUCH OF A PLAN. I WOULD COMMEND THE ENTIRE FLC FOR DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB OF HANDLING THIS POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS EMER SITUATION. COMPANY PROCS WERE FOLLOWED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. DESPITE THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY, 2 PLT GLASS COCKPIT DESIGN OF THE WDB, 2 PLTS COULD NOT ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH THIS PARTICULAR SCENARIO. IT TOOK THE MAX EFFORT OF 4 PLTS HERE TO SUCCESSFULLY HANDLE THE SITUATION. DESPITE THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE EICAS, IT WAS GIVING US ALL THE WRONG INDICATIONS. IT WAS TELLING US EVERYTHING EXCEPT WHAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 188985: NORMAL TKOF AND CLB THROUGH ABOUT 25000 FT. THEN WE GOT 3 PAGES OF EICAS CAUTION AND ADVISORY MESSAGES, THE MOST SERIOUS INCLUDED #1 NACELLE OVERHEAT, L BLEED DUCT LEAK, AND CABIN ALT AUTO, BUT ALSO GOT INDICATIONS OF #1 ENG REVERSER IN TRANSIT, A #1 STARTER CUTOUT MESSAGE AND A START VALVE OPEN LIGHT ON THE #1 STARTER SWITCH, LOSS OF #1 OIL PRESSURE INDICATION, LOW OIL QUANTITY OF #1, #1 OIL FILTER MESSAGE, FLAPS DRIVE MESSAGE, WITH L OUTBOARD AND MIDSPAN LEADING EDGE FLAPS SHOWING LOSS OF SIGNAL, R INBOARD AND MIDSPAN LEADING EDGES SHOWING IN TRANSIT. THERE WERE OTHERS, BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER THEM ALL. THE CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT TO LEVEL OFF AND TOOK OFF AUTO THROTTLES ALSO. IN THE CONFUSION, HE FLEW INTO STICK SHAKER TWICE AND FULL STALL AT LEAST ONCE. WE GOT THE CABIN UNDER CTL WHILE THE CAPT DSNDED TO 10000 FT AND TURNED BACK TO TOKYO. WE DUMPED TO MAX LNDG WT (TOOK ABOUT 45 MINS) AND LANDED IN HVY RAIN. AFTER LNDG A FIRE BROKE OUT ON THE L WING. THE AIRPLANE WAS EVACED AND OVER 40 INJURIES OCCURRED GOING DOWN THE WET CHUTES. IT COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE BECAUSE WE WERE STILL PRESSURIZED WHEN WE LANDED. DAYS LATER WE LEARNED THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE WING FORWARD OF THE FORWARD SPAR INBOARD OF #2 ENG, CAUSED BY A FUEL LEAK. THE FIRE MELTED AND SHORTED NUMEROUS WIRES GIVING ALL OUR EICAS MESSAGES. WE NEVER GOT A FIRE INDICATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.