Narrative:

Pilot departed VFR from 4b8 on a direct heading to keene VOR of 030 degree only 12 off final approach course of 018 degree. WX briefing reported ground fog at keene -- indefinite ceiling 1/4 to 1/2 mi, so pilot filed an IFR flight plan before departure to be picked up if needed with boston center on 123.75 at gardner VOR. Pilot flies several times a month into keene where ground fog is common in the morning, but above 1000 MSL conditions were cavu. About 20 mi south of keene VOR pilot was transferred from bradley approach (125.35) to boston center, requested IFR for approach into keene and began descent from 5500. About 10 mi south of keene, pilot was cleared for the approach and 3100. Location at that time was about the outer edge of procedure turn by '72-20.' now problem arose: pilot observed localizer centering on #1 navigation and elected to go straight in without performing procedure turn onto approach plate. Why? Contributing factors: pilot has become so accustomed to receiving radar vectors to final approach course and has flown to few full approachs in recent yrs, except for practice, that he considered it was an option to continue straight in. Pilot heard no other IFR traffic on this exclusive frequency handling keene, he expected to miss the approach, he never entered IMC, never descended below any published approach segment, confirmed position over LOM (swanz), was in ground contact until een VOR, and felt that abbreviating his time in the air, if approach could be completed, would lighten the workload of ATC which was busy with both regular peak morning traffic into boston and an unusual number of aircraft holding for ground fog (6 over lebanon). How it was discovered: inside swanz different, temperature, controller voice (male vs. Female) asked if I was on localizer to which response was affirmative. This made pilot begin to question the validity of action taken; ie, not flying procedure turn for full approach. Pilot missed first approach, held as published for 30 mins and successfully completed second approach flying full procedure from published hold. Corrective actions: think more about intermediate segments of approach instead of just getting established and then getting on the ground. Try to place less emphasis on the concepts learned in commercial training such as saving gas and air time to reduce expenses. Discuss situation with experienced cfii (done). In future ask controller for permission to deviate from published procedure to proceed straight in. Remember that not every approach is radar vectors to final.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMA ON APCH TO EEN ABBREVIATED THE APCH WITHOUT ADVISE TO CENTER CTLR.

Narrative: PLT DEPARTED VFR FROM 4B8 ON A DIRECT HDG TO KEENE VOR OF 030 DEG ONLY 12 OFF FINAL APCH COURSE OF 018 DEG. WX BRIEFING RPTED GND FOG AT KEENE -- INDEFINITE CEILING 1/4 TO 1/2 MI, SO PLT FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN BEFORE DEP TO BE PICKED UP IF NEEDED WITH BOSTON CENTER ON 123.75 AT GARDNER VOR. PLT FLIES SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH INTO KEENE WHERE GND FOG IS COMMON IN THE MORNING, BUT ABOVE 1000 MSL CONDITIONS WERE CAVU. ABOUT 20 MI S OF KEENE VOR PLT WAS TRANSFERRED FROM BRADLEY APCH (125.35) TO BOSTON CENTER, REQUESTED IFR FOR APCH INTO KEENE AND BEGAN DSCNT FROM 5500. ABOUT 10 MI S OF KEENE, PLT WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH AND 3100. LOCATION AT THAT TIME WAS ABOUT THE OUTER EDGE OF PROC TURN BY '72-20.' NOW PROBLEM AROSE: PLT OBSERVED LOC CENTERING ON #1 NAV AND ELECTED TO GO STRAIGHT IN WITHOUT PERFORMING PROC TURN ONTO APCH PLATE. WHY? CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: PLT HAS BECOME SO ACCUSTOMED TO RECEIVING RADAR VECTORS TO FINAL APCH COURSE AND HAS FLOWN TO FEW FULL APCHS IN RECENT YRS, EXCEPT FOR PRACTICE, THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WAS AN OPTION TO CONTINUE STRAIGHT IN. PLT HEARD NO OTHER IFR TFC ON THIS EXCLUSIVE FREQ HANDLING KEENE, HE EXPECTED TO MISS THE APCH, HE NEVER ENTERED IMC, NEVER DSNDED BELOW ANY PUBLISHED APCH SEGMENT, CONFIRMED POS OVER LOM (SWANZ), WAS IN GND CONTACT UNTIL EEN VOR, AND FELT THAT ABBREVIATING HIS TIME IN THE AIR, IF APCH COULD BE COMPLETED, WOULD LIGHTEN THE WORKLOAD OF ATC WHICH WAS BUSY WITH BOTH REGULAR PEAK MORNING TFC INTO BOSTON AND AN UNUSUAL NUMBER OF ACFT HOLDING FOR GND FOG (6 OVER LEBANON). HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: INSIDE SWANZ DIFFERENT, TEMP, CTLR VOICE (MALE VS. FEMALE) ASKED IF I WAS ON LOC TO WHICH RESPONSE WAS AFFIRMATIVE. THIS MADE PLT BEGIN TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF ACTION TAKEN; IE, NOT FLYING PROC TURN FOR FULL APCH. PLT MISSED FIRST APCH, HELD AS PUBLISHED FOR 30 MINS AND SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED SECOND APCH FLYING FULL PROC FROM PUBLISHED HOLD. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THINK MORE ABOUT INTERMEDIATE SEGMENTS OF APCH INSTEAD OF JUST GETTING ESTABLISHED AND THEN GETTING ON THE GND. TRY TO PLACE LESS EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPTS LEARNED IN COMMERCIAL TRAINING SUCH AS SAVING GAS AND AIR TIME TO REDUCE EXPENSES. DISCUSS SITUATION WITH EXPERIENCED CFII (DONE). IN FUTURE ASK CTLR FOR PERMISSION TO DEVIATE FROM PUBLISHED PROC TO PROCEED STRAIGHT IN. REMEMBER THAT NOT EVERY APCH IS RADAR VECTORS TO FINAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.