Narrative:

While taxiing for takeoff on runway 19R from the main terminal we crossed runway 14/32 without proper clearance. The contributing factors were a) the captain thought we were cleared to 1L, B) I thought he was taking a different route to 19R because of the bumps on taxiway cc, C) there was a rushed atmosphere in the cockpit. We left the gate and proceeded west on taxiway B. At this point I wondered why we didn't go west on the ramp to taxiway cc. A little backgnd is needed here. 2 days before we landed on 1L. We turned off and the taxi in on C was very bumpy. On taxi for takeoff taxiway D again was bumpy to the point that I had to lift myself off the seat because it was hurting my back. (In large transport X type aircraft the pilots situation right over the front wheels.) on this day we discussed the bumps and the captain said he would do better today. I asked him what he meant, and he said he would use a different route to the departure end. Now as we were wbound on B we passed cc. I thought this was odd and questioned the captain. He said ground cleared us to the runway with no restriction which meant we could cross all runways. (He still thought we were going to 1L.) I looked down at my airport chart to make sure I wasn't missing something. When I looked up we were still rolling and about to cross 14/32. At that point, out of habit, I looked to my right to make sure nothing was coming and said 'clear right.' as we crossed the runway, ground called us and said our clearance was to 19R. That's when the captain realized his mistake. By the time I saw what was happening it was too late to stop from crossing the runway. The other factor to all this was trying to keep on schedule. We were late getting there and everything was rushed to get us out on time. If I could suggest anything to prevent this from happening again, it would be this. Flcs should go over the route they will take from the ramp to the runway, just as they discuss the airborne rtes. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter participated in runway incursion structured callback study. Reporter says that he has had some cockpit resource management training and should have told captain to stop taxi until they could clarify runway assignment and taxi clearance.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTHORIZED RWY XING BY ACR.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING FOR TKOF ON RWY 19R FROM THE MAIN TERMINAL WE CROSSED RWY 14/32 WITHOUT PROPER CLRNC. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE A) THE CAPT THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO 1L, B) I THOUGHT HE WAS TAKING A DIFFERENT RTE TO 19R BECAUSE OF THE BUMPS ON TAXIWAY CC, C) THERE WAS A RUSHED ATMOSPHERE IN THE COCKPIT. WE LEFT THE GATE AND PROCEEDED W ON TAXIWAY B. AT THIS POINT I WONDERED WHY WE DIDN'T GO W ON THE RAMP TO TAXIWAY CC. A LITTLE BACKGND IS NEEDED HERE. 2 DAYS BEFORE WE LANDED ON 1L. WE TURNED OFF AND THE TAXI IN ON C WAS VERY BUMPY. ON TAXI FOR TKOF TAXIWAY D AGAIN WAS BUMPY TO THE POINT THAT I HAD TO LIFT MYSELF OFF THE SEAT BECAUSE IT WAS HURTING MY BACK. (IN LGT X TYPE ACFT THE PLTS SIT RIGHT OVER THE FRONT WHEELS.) ON THIS DAY WE DISCUSSED THE BUMPS AND THE CAPT SAID HE WOULD DO BETTER TODAY. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE MEANT, AND HE SAID HE WOULD USE A DIFFERENT RTE TO THE DEP END. NOW AS WE WERE WBOUND ON B WE PASSED CC. I THOUGHT THIS WAS ODD AND QUESTIONED THE CAPT. HE SAID GND CLRED US TO THE RWY WITH NO RESTRICTION WHICH MEANT WE COULD CROSS ALL RWYS. (HE STILL THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO 1L.) I LOOKED DOWN AT MY ARPT CHART TO MAKE SURE I WASN'T MISSING SOMETHING. WHEN I LOOKED UP WE WERE STILL ROLLING AND ABOUT TO CROSS 14/32. AT THAT POINT, OUT OF HABIT, I LOOKED TO MY R TO MAKE SURE NOTHING WAS COMING AND SAID 'CLR R.' AS WE CROSSED THE RWY, GND CALLED US AND SAID OUR CLRNC WAS TO 19R. THAT'S WHEN THE CAPT REALIZED HIS MISTAKE. BY THE TIME I SAW WHAT WAS HAPPENING IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP FROM XING THE RWY. THE OTHER FACTOR TO ALL THIS WAS TRYING TO KEEP ON SCHEDULE. WE WERE LATE GETTING THERE AND EVERYTHING WAS RUSHED TO GET US OUT ON TIME. IF I COULD SUGGEST ANYTHING TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, IT WOULD BE THIS. FLCS SHOULD GO OVER THE RTE THEY WILL TAKE FROM THE RAMP TO THE RWY, JUST AS THEY DISCUSS THE AIRBORNE RTES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR PARTICIPATED IN RWY INCURSION STRUCTURED CALLBACK STUDY. RPTR SAYS THAT HE HAS HAD SOME COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING AND SHOULD HAVE TOLD CAPT TO STOP TAXI UNTIL THEY COULD CLARIFY RWY ASSIGNMENT AND TAXI CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.