Narrative:

We had just completed the parking checklist after parking the aircraft at the gate when the lead flight attendant called on the interphone and informed me that they were having trouble with the door. I proceeded to the area of the main entry door and was informed that the aircraft was positioned too far forward for the jet way to connect to the aircraft properly and allow the door to be fully opened. The gate agent informed me that he had already decided to have the aircraft repositioned and taken steps to initiate that action. I made a PA announcement informing the passengers what needed to be done and instructing to take their seats in preparation of moving the aircraft. As I turned to reenter the cockpit, I advised my jumpseat rider who was standing behind me that this applied to him as well and then noticed some carry-on bags that had been left in the aisle. I advised the flight attendant that all the bags would have to be restowed. As I entered the cockpit, I told the first officer what was going on. He got back into his seat, and I proceeded to restow his and my suitcases. I took another look in the cabin and realized that the cabin appeared to be secure (the jumpseat rider having taken a seat in the cabin, the passengers all in their seats and the carry-on luggage all (apparently) stowed). I then was in the process of sitting down and getting ready to check with the flight attendants to verify that the aircraft was prepared to move when I realized that we were moving backward. By the time I was fully in my seat, the aircraft was fully stopped and the mechanic gave me the chocks signal. This caught me completely by surprise, since there had been no communication between the cockpit and the pushback crew either through the interphone or with hand signals. My concerns for potential injuries were at this point academic, however, since we were already stopped, so I informed the passengers that the process was completed and they could deplane. I had a discussion with the pushback crew afterward asking why they had repositioned the aircraft without any coordination with the cockpit. Apparently their only concern had been that all the servicing vehicles had been withdrawn and that the jetway was away from the aircraft. I explained that we also needed to prepare the cabin, insuring that all passengers are seated and with their carry-on items stowed before it is safe to move the aircraft. I stressed that they should never move the aircraft without coordination from the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER BEING PARKED, MLG ACFT HAD TO BE MOVED TO FIT JETWAY AND OPEN FORWARD DOOR. ACFT WAS MOVED BY GND PERSONNEL BEFORE CAPT HAD RESEATED EVERYONE AND ADVISED GND OK TO MOVE.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST COMPLETED THE PARKING CHKLIST AFTER PARKING THE ACFT AT THE GATE WHEN THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT CALLED ON THE INTERPHONE AND INFORMED ME THAT THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE DOOR. I PROCEEDED TO THE AREA OF THE MAIN ENTRY DOOR AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE ACFT WAS POSITIONED TOO FAR FORWARD FOR THE JET WAY TO CONNECT TO THE ACFT PROPERLY AND ALLOW THE DOOR TO BE FULLY OPENED. THE GATE AGENT INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO HAVE THE ACFT REPOSITIONED AND TAKEN STEPS TO INITIATE THAT ACTION. I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT INFORMING THE PAXS WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE AND INSTRUCTING TO TAKE THEIR SEATS IN PREPARATION OF MOVING THE ACFT. AS I TURNED TO REENTER THE COCKPIT, I ADVISED MY JUMPSEAT RIDER WHO WAS STANDING BEHIND ME THAT THIS APPLIED TO HIM AS WELL AND THEN NOTICED SOME CARRY-ON BAGS THAT HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE AISLE. I ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT ALL THE BAGS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESTOWED. AS I ENTERED THE COCKPIT, I TOLD THE FO WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE GOT BACK INTO HIS SEAT, AND I PROCEEDED TO RESTOW HIS AND MY SUITCASES. I TOOK ANOTHER LOOK IN THE CABIN AND REALIZED THAT THE CABIN APPEARED TO BE SECURE (THE JUMPSEAT RIDER HAVING TAKEN A SEAT IN THE CABIN, THE PAXS ALL IN THEIR SEATS AND THE CARRY-ON LUGGAGE ALL (APPARENTLY) STOWED). I THEN WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SITTING DOWN AND GETTING READY TO CHK WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO VERIFY THAT THE ACFT WAS PREPARED TO MOVE WHEN I REALIZED THAT WE WERE MOVING BACKWARD. BY THE TIME I WAS FULLY IN MY SEAT, THE ACFT WAS FULLY STOPPED AND THE MECH GAVE ME THE CHOCKS SIGNAL. THIS CAUGHT ME COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE, SINCE THERE HAD BEEN NO COM BTWN THE COCKPIT AND THE PUSHBACK CREW EITHER THROUGH THE INTERPHONE OR WITH HAND SIGNALS. MY CONCERNS FOR POTENTIAL INJURIES WERE AT THIS POINT ACADEMIC, HOWEVER, SINCE WE WERE ALREADY STOPPED, SO I INFORMED THE PAXS THAT THE PROCESS WAS COMPLETED AND THEY COULD DEPLANE. I HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE PUSHBACK CREW AFTERWARD ASKING WHY THEY HAD REPOSITIONED THE ACFT WITHOUT ANY COORD WITH THE COCKPIT. APPARENTLY THEIR ONLY CONCERN HAD BEEN THAT ALL THE SVCING VEHICLES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THAT THE JETWAY WAS AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I EXPLAINED THAT WE ALSO NEEDED TO PREPARE THE CABIN, INSURING THAT ALL PAXS ARE SEATED AND WITH THEIR CARRY-ON ITEMS STOWED BEFORE IT IS SAFE TO MOVE THE ACFT. I STRESSED THAT THEY SHOULD NEVER MOVE THE ACFT WITHOUT COORD FROM THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.