Narrative:

Writer was not present. Information obtained from controller statements. Military X requested progressive taxi instructions for takeoff. The assigned runway was 26. The ground controller provided several specific instructions to military X, which include a restriction to 'hold short of runway 35 at delta.' when the ground controller saw military X at the intersection of runway 35 and delta taxiway, she then cleared military X to cross runway 35 (she had earlier told military X to plan using 'delta' all the way to the approach end of runway 30, at which time she would have instructed him with further directions to runway 26). The ground controller momentarily looked away from military X, then returned her attention to military X and saw that he had entered runway 30. The local controller, in the meantime, had cleared small aircraft Y for takeoff on runway 30. The ground controller alerted local control (who got small aircraft Y to stop his takeoff) and also told military X to make a 180 off runway 30 (which the pilot was totally unaware of). The pilot of military X was cited for a pilot deviation. As the local safety officer, I believe the real culprit is lack of visual cues at the point(south) of incursion, sufficient to allow pilots to discriminate between taxiways and runways. See my report filed 2 weeks ago. Same recommendation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL X NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY IN FRONT OF SMA Y WHO WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. PLTDEV. ARPT MARKINGS AND SIGNS CONFUSING AT TAXIWAY B, C, D, AND RWYS 30, 35.

Narrative: WRITER WAS NOT PRESENT. INFO OBTAINED FROM CTLR STATEMENTS. MIL X REQUESTED PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FOR TKOF. THE ASSIGNED RWY WAS 26. THE GND CTLR PROVIDED SEVERAL SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO MIL X, WHICH INCLUDE A RESTRICTION TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35 AT DELTA.' WHEN THE GND CTLR SAW MIL X AT THE INTXN OF RWY 35 AND DELTA TAXIWAY, SHE THEN CLRED MIL X TO CROSS RWY 35 (SHE HAD EARLIER TOLD MIL X TO PLAN USING 'DELTA' ALL THE WAY TO THE APCH END OF RWY 30, AT WHICH TIME SHE WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM WITH FURTHER DIRECTIONS TO RWY 26). THE GND CTLR MOMENTARILY LOOKED AWAY FROM MIL X, THEN RETURNED HER ATTN TO MIL X AND SAW THAT HE HAD ENTERED RWY 30. THE LCL CTLR, IN THE MEANTIME, HAD CLRED SMA Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 30. THE GND CTLR ALERTED LCL CTL (WHO GOT SMA Y TO STOP HIS TKOF) AND ALSO TOLD MIL X TO MAKE A 180 OFF RWY 30 (WHICH THE PLT WAS TOTALLY UNAWARE OF). THE PLT OF MIL X WAS CITED FOR A PLTDEV. AS THE LCL SAFETY OFFICER, I BELIEVE THE REAL CULPRIT IS LACK OF VISUAL CUES AT THE POINT(S) OF INCURSION, SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW PLTS TO DISCRIMINATE BTWN TAXIWAYS AND RWYS. SEE MY RPT FILED 2 WKS AGO. SAME RECOMMENDATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.