Narrative:

As I closed on the airport traffic pattern, I had to request the change to tower frequency, as I was quickly crowding the airport traffic pattern. I was given a quick clearance for the visual approach to runway 1L and told to contact rvs tower on 120.30 MHZ. At this point I was 3.6 NM ssw of the airport, still on the 90 degree intercept to a 2 mi final. I called tower and reported my position as '3.3 NM sse of the field, on the visual approach for 1L.' the call was partially blocked, and the tower called back, requesting my position. It was obvious that approach control notwithstanding, this was the first the tower knew of me. I restated my position and I was told follow traffic that was south of the field, on straight-in to 1L. It immediately became apparent to me (and the pilot sitting in the right seat) that spacing was inadequate, and that the tower had neither a good picture of the relative position of our 2 aircraft, nor an understanding of the speed differential existing between us. As I turned final and reported doing so, checking my progress relative to the aircraft ahead, now on short (3/4 mi final), I was about to question the spacing when tower instructed me to change my runway to (the parallel) 1R. I acknowledged and widened smoothly for the new runway passing close behind and then along side, and then overtaking the conflicting traffic. In anticipation of the need to do just this, we (the right seat pilot and myself) had continuously assured ourselves that the pattern for that runway was clear. I had been ready to go around, and had delayed deploying landing flaps in anticipation of doing so. Because of the sudden stream of instructions to various aircraft as the tower controller worked to sort out her problem, and the developing immediate need to either land or go around, I elected not to block the frequency or further divert the obviously harried tower controller by verifying clearance to land, instead taking the last min change of runways as implicit permission (and instruction) to do so. Additionally, they were apparently using a different frequency for the other runway, and there would not have been time to dial the other frequency, much less request permission to land. Also, the frequency is not published and I was not certain I could remember it correctly. As this was unfolding, at the last possible moment, the tower controller for runway 1R apparently cleared an airplane for immediate departure from 1R, our newly assigned runway. I could see that this aircraft was going to make a very quick rolling departure. I instantly decided that as long as this aircraft continued his progress down the runway, I was committed to landing, and would not accept a go around. I would (and easily could) land in the runway available. In a go around, I would have been unable to keep visual contact with this aircraft, who immediately upon becoming airborne, commenced a rapid turn to the right at very low level, apparently in an attempt to clear the way for just such an event. Then a different voice (the supervisor?) came on and gave routine instructions for taxi to the hangar. Nothing further was said. I pointed out to the pilot in the right seat that we had just landed without benefit of clearance. He understood what was unfolding the entire time. We wondered if the tower was going to make something of it, or what response a call by me to them would provoke. Since this sort of thing happens very frequently at this field, it appears that the tower would rather let it drop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC FLC LANDED WITHOUT TWR CLRNC.

Narrative: AS I CLOSED ON THE ARPT TFC PATTERN, I HAD TO REQUEST THE CHANGE TO TWR FREQ, AS I WAS QUICKLY CROWDING THE ARPT TFC PATTERN. I WAS GIVEN A QUICK CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 1L AND TOLD TO CONTACT RVS TWR ON 120.30 MHZ. AT THIS POINT I WAS 3.6 NM SSW OF THE ARPT, STILL ON THE 90 DEG INTERCEPT TO A 2 MI FINAL. I CALLED TWR AND RPTED MY POS AS '3.3 NM SSE OF THE FIELD, ON THE VISUAL APCH FOR 1L.' THE CALL WAS PARTIALLY BLOCKED, AND THE TWR CALLED BACK, REQUESTING MY POS. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT APCH CTL NOTWITHSTANDING, THIS WAS THE FIRST THE TWR KNEW OF ME. I RESTATED MY POS AND I WAS TOLD FOLLOW TFC THAT WAS S OF THE FIELD, ON STRAIGHT-IN TO 1L. IT IMMEDIATELY BECAME APPARENT TO ME (AND THE PLT SITTING IN THE R SEAT) THAT SPACING WAS INADEQUATE, AND THAT THE TWR HAD NEITHER A GOOD PICTURE OF THE RELATIVE POS OF OUR 2 ACFT, NOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPD DIFFERENTIAL EXISTING BTWN US. AS I TURNED FINAL AND RPTED DOING SO, CHKING MY PROGRESS RELATIVE TO THE ACFT AHEAD, NOW ON SHORT (3/4 MI FINAL), I WAS ABOUT TO QUESTION THE SPACING WHEN TWR INSTRUCTED ME TO CHANGE MY RWY TO (THE PARALLEL) 1R. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND WIDENED SMOOTHLY FOR THE NEW RWY PASSING CLOSE BEHIND AND THEN ALONG SIDE, AND THEN OVERTAKING THE CONFLICTING TFC. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE NEED TO DO JUST THIS, WE (THE R SEAT PLT AND MYSELF) HAD CONTINUOUSLY ASSURED OURSELVES THAT THE PATTERN FOR THAT RWY WAS CLR. I HAD BEEN READY TO GAR, AND HAD DELAYED DEPLOYING LNDG FLAPS IN ANTICIPATION OF DOING SO. BECAUSE OF THE SUDDEN STREAM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO VARIOUS ACFT AS THE TWR CTLR WORKED TO SORT OUT HER PROBLEM, AND THE DEVELOPING IMMEDIATE NEED TO EITHER LAND OR GAR, I ELECTED NOT TO BLOCK THE FREQ OR FURTHER DIVERT THE OBVIOUSLY HARRIED TWR CTLR BY VERIFYING CLRNC TO LAND, INSTEAD TAKING THE LAST MIN CHANGE OF RWYS AS IMPLICIT PERMISSION (AND INSTRUCTION) TO DO SO. ADDITIONALLY, THEY WERE APPARENTLY USING A DIFFERENT FREQ FOR THE OTHER RWY, AND THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TIME TO DIAL THE OTHER FREQ, MUCH LESS REQUEST PERMISSION TO LAND. ALSO, THE FREQ IS NOT PUBLISHED AND I WAS NOT CERTAIN I COULD REMEMBER IT CORRECTLY. AS THIS WAS UNFOLDING, AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT, THE TWR CTLR FOR RWY 1R APPARENTLY CLRED AN AIRPLANE FOR IMMEDIATE DEP FROM 1R, OUR NEWLY ASSIGNED RWY. I COULD SEE THAT THIS ACFT WAS GOING TO MAKE A VERY QUICK ROLLING DEP. I INSTANTLY DECIDED THAT AS LONG AS THIS ACFT CONTINUED HIS PROGRESS DOWN THE RWY, I WAS COMMITTED TO LNDG, AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT A GAR. I WOULD (AND EASILY COULD) LAND IN THE RWY AVAILABLE. IN A GAR, I WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO KEEP VISUAL CONTACT WITH THIS ACFT, WHO IMMEDIATELY UPON BECOMING AIRBORNE, COMMENCED A RAPID TURN TO THE R AT VERY LOW LEVEL, APPARENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLR THE WAY FOR JUST SUCH AN EVENT. THEN A DIFFERENT VOICE (THE SUPVR?) CAME ON AND GAVE ROUTINE INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAXI TO THE HANGAR. NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID. I POINTED OUT TO THE PLT IN THE R SEAT THAT WE HAD JUST LANDED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF CLRNC. HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS UNFOLDING THE ENTIRE TIME. WE WONDERED IF THE TWR WAS GOING TO MAKE SOMETHING OF IT, OR WHAT RESPONSE A CALL BY ME TO THEM WOULD PROVOKE. SINCE THIS SORT OF THING HAPPENS VERY FREQUENTLY AT THIS FIELD, IT APPEARS THAT THE TWR WOULD RATHER LET IT DROP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.