Narrative:

Made 45 entry to runway 19R. The controller asked me to extend downwind. Later he told me to turn base and expedite my approach due to an arrival (of an airliner jet) behind me. I turned final. Lost sight of runway due to sun glare in the haze. I decided not to descend from pattern altitude (1000 ft AGL) before I see the runway. I saw the runway when I was almost above the threshold. I told the controller that I am too high and want to go around. The controller said that the runway is very long (5700 ft) and I could make it. I did not see the end of the runway due to the glare. Started a descent. Touched down about 400 ft before the end of runway, looked at the end of the runway and immediately applied full power and went around. The controller approved a right climb. Back on downwind, the controller instructed me to cross over midfield and follow an small aircraft X on the upwind runway 19L and change frequency to 119.9 (left runway). I started a right turn, acknowledged small aircraft X in sight and dialed new frequency. After about 10 seconds, I finished the acknowledge/dialing process and flipped the transceiver while turning right to the upwind direction. The controller on the new frequency was in the middle of a sentence. Then I heard him giving instructions to an small aircraft Y, which I then saw appearing 200 ft below me slightly to the left, apparently departing from runway 19L. Then the controller told me to turn left. I turned left, followed the pattern and landed without further incident. Later at the FBO I was told by the small aircraft Y pilot and his instructor that the controller told me 3 times to turn left. Apparently I was still at the other frequency while he called me the first 2 times. In this flight I was 2 times at an unsafe situation. First, the last min far, and then the traffic conflict with the small aircraft Y. The go around situation could be conducted more safely if I insisted on going around earlier. The traffic conflict could be avoided if I had switched frequency before crossing the airspace boundary of the 2 runways. I could also use better visual scanning, however it could be impossible to spot an airplane below me. The controllers should not assume radio contact before it is positively established, and should not instruct pilots to follow traffic in the upwind, because this is a dangerous point of entry. (Note: maybe he expected the second controller to direct me to the downwind). A safer entry would be to cross over midfield and turn left on downwind, resequencing the other small aircraft X in the upwind. The first controller should have also warned me of the small aircraft Y departure before switching frequencys. Contributing factors were: my lack of experience in landing toward the sun in haze, and my lack of familiarity with the airport. Local VFR pilots can make safe approachs without the runway in sight, by reference to many local buildings and streets that are visible. Furthermore, airport familiarity reduces the workload and leaves more time to look for traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR IN TFC PATTERN HAS NMAC WITH ANOTHER SMA WHO HAD TAKEN OFF AND WAS CLBING UNDER HIM. DUE TO HIS DELAY CHANGING FREQS, HE WAS VERY SLOW TO MAKE A TURN DIRECTED BY THE TWR TO GET OUT OF THE WAY OF THE OTHER SMA.

Narrative: MADE 45 ENTRY TO RWY 19R. THE CTLR ASKED ME TO EXTEND DOWNWIND. LATER HE TOLD ME TO TURN BASE AND EXPEDITE MY APCH DUE TO AN ARR (OF AN AIRLINER JET) BEHIND ME. I TURNED FINAL. LOST SIGHT OF RWY DUE TO SUN GLARE IN THE HAZE. I DECIDED NOT TO DSND FROM PATTERN ALT (1000 FT AGL) BEFORE I SEE THE RWY. I SAW THE RWY WHEN I WAS ALMOST ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT I AM TOO HIGH AND WANT TO GAR. THE CTLR SAID THAT THE RWY IS VERY LONG (5700 FT) AND I COULD MAKE IT. I DID NOT SEE THE END OF THE RWY DUE TO THE GLARE. STARTED A DSCNT. TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 400 FT BEFORE THE END OF RWY, LOOKED AT THE END OF THE RWY AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED FULL PWR AND WENT AROUND. THE CTLR APPROVED A R CLB. BACK ON DOWNWIND, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO CROSS OVER MIDFIELD AND FOLLOW AN SMA X ON THE UPWIND RWY 19L AND Change FREQ TO 119.9 (L RWY). I STARTED A R TURN, ACKNOWLEDGED SMA X IN SIGHT AND DIALED NEW FREQ. AFTER ABOUT 10 SECONDS, I FINISHED THE ACKNOWLEDGE/DIALING PROCESS AND FLIPPED THE TRANSCEIVER WHILE TURNING R TO THE UPWIND DIRECTION. THE CTLR ON THE NEW FREQ WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF A SENTENCE. THEN I HEARD HIM GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO AN SMA Y, WHICH I THEN SAW APPEARING 200 FT BELOW ME SLIGHTLY TO THE L, APPARENTLY DEPARTING FROM RWY 19L. THEN THE CTLR TOLD ME TO TURN L. I TURNED L, FOLLOWED THE PATTERN AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LATER AT THE FBO I WAS TOLD BY THE SMA Y PLT AND HIS INSTRUCTOR THAT THE CTLR TOLD ME 3 TIMES TO TURN L. APPARENTLY I WAS STILL AT THE OTHER FREQ WHILE HE CALLED ME THE FIRST 2 TIMES. IN THIS FLT I WAS 2 TIMES AT AN UNSAFE SITUATION. FIRST, THE LAST MIN FAR, AND THEN THE TFC CONFLICT WITH THE SMA Y. THE GAR SITUATION COULD BE CONDUCTED MORE SAFELY IF I INSISTED ON GOING AROUND EARLIER. THE TFC CONFLICT COULD BE AVOIDED IF I HAD SWITCHED FREQ BEFORE XING THE AIRSPACE BOUNDARY OF THE 2 RWYS. I COULD ALSO USE BETTER VISUAL SCANNING, HOWEVER IT COULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SPOT AN AIRPLANE BELOW ME. THE CTLRS SHOULD NOT ASSUME RADIO CONTACT BEFORE IT IS POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED, AND SHOULD NOT INSTRUCT PLTS TO FOLLOW TFC IN THE UPWIND, BECAUSE THIS IS A DANGEROUS POINT OF ENTRY. (NOTE: MAYBE HE EXPECTED THE SECOND CTLR TO DIRECT ME TO THE DOWNWIND). A SAFER ENTRY WOULD BE TO CROSS OVER MIDFIELD AND TURN L ON DOWNWIND, RESEQUENCING THE OTHER SMA X IN THE UPWIND. THE FIRST CTLR SHOULD HAVE ALSO WARNED ME OF THE SMA Y DEP BEFORE SWITCHING FREQS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN LNDG TOWARD THE SUN IN HAZE, AND MY LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT. LCL VFR PLTS CAN MAKE SAFE APCHS WITHOUT THE RWY IN SIGHT, BY REF TO MANY LCL BUILDINGS AND STREETS THAT ARE VISIBLE. FURTHERMORE, ARPT FAMILIARITY REDUCES THE WORKLOAD AND LEAVES MORE TIME TO LOOK FOR TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.