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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 195777 |
Time | |
Date | 199111 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 50 agl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sea |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial climbout : intermediate altitude climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 105 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 1500 |
ASRS Report | 195777 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Departing R34L, sea, runway heading procedure. Takeoff roll normal. Approaching V1, caution lights illuminated for right wing body overheat. After positive rate/gear up, the captain took control of the aircraft. While continuing the takeoff/climb as per procedure for a warning/caution anytime above 80 KTS, taking control of the aircraft just after gear up is not per procedure. In fact, the captain had previously briefed me to the contrary. 'The PF should remain flying the aircraft to a safe altitude and time', the captain (as well as the manual) so stated. This is precisely my point. As a result of their actions, and the timing, the captain was 'behind' the airplane, and overloaded. Confusion began when I had already handled the procedure, and I was attempting to assist him in flying the aircraft. I didn't feel that this was a safe departure. In fact I only felt better when the captain engaged the autoplt, 'caught up' to the airplane, and delegated the abnormal procedure. For future resolution, I feel that in training and line flying, that it be stressed that whomever is flying the aircraft continue flying the aircraft until a safe altitude/time has been reached. This is simple -- and most importantly, safer.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR MLG GOT A BODY OVERHEAT WARNING AT ROTATION. TKOF CONTINUED.
Narrative: DEPARTING R34L, SEA, RWY HDG PROC. TKOF ROLL NORMAL. APCHING V1, CAUTION LIGHTS ILLUMINATED FOR R WING BODY OVERHEAT. AFTER POSITIVE RATE/GEAR UP, THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. WHILE CONTINUING THE TKOF/CLB AS PER PROC FOR A WARNING/CAUTION ANYTIME ABOVE 80 KTS, TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT JUST AFTER GEAR UP IS NOT PER PROC. IN FACT, THE CAPT HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED ME TO THE CONTRARY. 'THE PF SHOULD REMAIN FLYING THE ACFT TO A SAFE ALT AND TIME', THE CAPT (AS WELL AS THE MANUAL) SO STATED. THIS IS PRECISELY MY POINT. AS A RESULT OF THEIR ACTIONS, AND THE TIMING, THE CAPT WAS 'BEHIND' THE AIRPLANE, AND OVERLOADED. CONFUSION BEGAN WHEN I HAD ALREADY HANDLED THE PROC, AND I WAS ATTEMPTING TO ASSIST HIM IN FLYING THE ACFT. I DIDN'T FEEL THAT THIS WAS A SAFE DEP. IN FACT I ONLY FELT BETTER WHEN THE CAPT ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, 'CAUGHT UP' TO THE AIRPLANE, AND DELEGATED THE ABNORMAL PROC. FOR FUTURE RESOLUTION, I FEEL THAT IN TRAINING AND LINE FLYING, THAT IT BE STRESSED THAT WHOMEVER IS FLYING THE ACFT CONTINUE FLYING THE ACFT UNTIL A SAFE ALT/TIME HAS BEEN REACHED. THIS IS SIMPLE -- AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, SAFER.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.