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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 196621 |
Time | |
Date | 199112 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : bil |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 196621 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | other other : other |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
This situation was not a problem on this flight but it well could have been! Among the 8 deferred items for this flight was an inoperative cockpit to cabin flight interphone. Sfo line maintenance stated that this was a legal deferral per the MEL. Our annual security tapes make a point that discrete conversation between the cockpit and cabin is very important in a hijacking situation. The tape also advises to keep the hijacker out of the cockpit. If this flight had been that unlucky one-in-a-million flight I would have had no choice but to invite the hijacker to the cockpit because the flight attendants and I were unable to talk except by them entering the cockpit. My recommendation is that if company and the FAA truly wish to maximize its preparations for hijacking that the MEL be reviewed with an eye toward security as well as safety. As a side note this aircraft had set overnight and could easily have been fixed before this departure.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPTR PROTESTS COMPANY POLICY AND MEL ALLOWING COCKPIT TO CABIN INTERPHONE TO BE INOP FOR FLT.
Narrative: THIS SITUATION WAS NOT A PROBLEM ON THIS FLT BUT IT WELL COULD HAVE BEEN! AMONG THE 8 DEFERRED ITEMS FOR THIS FLT WAS AN INOP COCKPIT TO CABIN FLT INTERPHONE. SFO LINE MAINT STATED THAT THIS WAS A LEGAL DEFERRAL PER THE MEL. OUR ANNUAL SECURITY TAPES MAKE A POINT THAT DISCRETE CONVERSATION BTWN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN IS VERY IMPORTANT IN A HIJACKING SITUATION. THE TAPE ALSO ADVISES TO KEEP THE HIJACKER OUT OF THE COCKPIT. IF THIS FLT HAD BEEN THAT UNLUCKY ONE-IN-A-MILLION FLT I WOULD HAVE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO INVITE THE HIJACKER TO THE COCKPIT BECAUSE THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND I WERE UNABLE TO TALK EXCEPT BY THEM ENTERING THE COCKPIT. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT IF COMPANY AND THE FAA TRULY WISH TO MAXIMIZE ITS PREPARATIONS FOR HIJACKING THAT THE MEL BE REVIEWED WITH AN EYE TOWARD SECURITY AS WELL AS SAFETY. AS A SIDE NOTE THIS ACFT HAD SET OVERNIGHT AND COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN FIXED BEFORE THIS DEP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.