Narrative:

I made the approach to den runway 26L. We were cleared for a visual and approach control called out traffic landing on 26R. We saw the traffic and I slowed slightly to let him gain some distance on us. I flew the ILS to 26L and all checklists were completed normally. At 500 ft I called '30 flaps, final setting (normal SOP) cleared to land?' the first officer and so verified 30 degree flaps and said nothing more. I thought I had heard a clearance to land so did not question the first officer again. I landed and cleared the runway. The first officer told tower (he thought) that we were clearing the runway. Approach control answered and we realized that the first officer had not switched to the tower at the OM. No aircraft were ahead or behind us (on runway 26L) so no traffic conflict occurred. I called the tower and was told that there was no problem created by the incident (other than our embarrassment). I believe my assumption that we had been cleared to land was caused by my recollection of approach control saying 'cleared for approach.' the first officer was engrossed in watching the parallel traffic ahead of us to the extent that he forgot to switch to tower. I should have questioned him a second time as to 'cleared to land' when he failed to verify it the first time I said it, at the final flap check. Switching to the tower at the marker is so routine it never dawned on me that the first officer may not have done it. Also, I was a little preoccupied with a crosswind which I knew would become a tailwind on landing. The failure of the first officer to verify landing clearance immediately when I queried him should have been a clue that something was wrong. Also, in the future I will say, 'are we cleared to land,' instead of merely saying, 'cleared to land?' had I said, 'are we cleared to land,' I believe the first officer would have realized that we were not cleared. Callouts which leave no doubt in anyone's mind must be used to prevent incidents such as this. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter participated in structured callback for runway incursion survey. Reiterated concerns reference parallel traffic and says he was preoccupied with wind conditions. Tower controllers were not at all concerned about them not being on frequency. Since incident company has added a 'cleared to land' check on the 1000 ft callout. Also company has put out a reminder that there are a lot of lndgs without clearance incidents and cited den runway 26L in particular. Reporter says he should have insisted on answer from PNF when he tried to verify landing clearance.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: I MADE THE APCH TO DEN RWY 26L. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL AND APCH CTL CALLED OUT TFC LNDG ON 26R. WE SAW THE TFC AND I SLOWED SLIGHTLY TO LET HIM GAIN SOME DISTANCE ON US. I FLEW THE ILS TO 26L AND ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED NORMALLY. AT 500 FT I CALLED '30 FLAPS, FINAL SETTING (NORMAL SOP) CLRED TO LAND?' THE FO AND SO VERIFIED 30 DEG FLAPS AND SAID NOTHING MORE. I THOUGHT I HAD HEARD A CLRNC TO LAND SO DID NOT QUESTION THE FO AGAIN. I LANDED AND CLRED THE RWY. THE FO TOLD TWR (HE THOUGHT) THAT WE WERE CLRING THE RWY. APCH CTL ANSWERED AND WE REALIZED THAT THE FO HAD NOT SWITCHED TO THE TWR AT THE OM. NO ACFT WERE AHEAD OR BEHIND US (ON RWY 26L) SO NO TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED. I CALLED THE TWR AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM CREATED BY THE INCIDENT (OTHER THAN OUR EMBARRASSMENT). I BELIEVE MY ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND WAS CAUSED BY MY RECOLLECTION OF APCH CTL SAYING 'CLRED FOR APCH.' THE FO WAS ENGROSSED IN WATCHING THE PARALLEL TFC AHEAD OF US TO THE EXTENT THAT HE FORGOT TO SWITCH TO TWR. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED HIM A SECOND TIME AS TO 'CLRED TO LAND' WHEN HE FAILED TO VERIFY IT THE FIRST TIME I SAID IT, AT THE FINAL FLAP CHK. SWITCHING TO THE TWR AT THE MARKER IS SO ROUTINE IT NEVER DAWNED ON ME THAT THE FO MAY NOT HAVE DONE IT. ALSO, I WAS A LITTLE PREOCCUPIED WITH A XWIND WHICH I KNEW WOULD BECOME A TAILWIND ON LNDG. THE FAILURE OF THE FO TO VERIFY LNDG CLRNC IMMEDIATELY WHEN I QUERIED HIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN A CLUE THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. ALSO, IN THE FUTURE I WILL SAY, 'ARE WE CLRED TO LAND,' INSTEAD OF MERELY SAYING, 'CLRED TO LAND?' HAD I SAID, 'ARE WE CLRED TO LAND,' I BELIEVE THE FO WOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT CLRED. CALLOUTS WHICH LEAVE NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND MUST BE USED TO PREVENT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR PARTICIPATED IN STRUCTURED CALLBACK FOR RWY INCURSION SURVEY. REITERATED CONCERNS REF PARALLEL TFC AND SAYS HE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH WIND CONDITIONS. TWR CTLRS WERE NOT AT ALL CONCERNED ABOUT THEM NOT BEING ON FREQ. SINCE INCIDENT COMPANY HAS ADDED A 'CLRED TO LAND' CHK ON THE 1000 FT CALLOUT. ALSO COMPANY HAS PUT OUT A REMINDER THAT THERE ARE A LOT OF LNDGS WITHOUT CLRNC INCIDENTS AND CITED DEN RWY 26L IN PARTICULAR. RPTR SAYS HE SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON ANSWER FROM PNF WHEN HE TRIED TO VERIFY LNDG CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.