Narrative:

While en route from syr to alb, as PF, we had a failure of the left engine. This was after we were level at 9000 ft proceeding direct to alb. This was evidence by a power surge and then zero torque. After this I asked the captain to confirm failure of the left engine and to set maximum power on the remaining engine, per company procedures. We then performed memory items of the checklist through bringing the power lever of the affected engine to flight idle. We discussed for approximately 30 seconds on whether we could effect a restart of the engine. We decided not to due to indications that it was not turning internally (no oil pressure and fuel pressure) and continued through to complete the memory items of the checklist. I asked the captain to and he informed griffiss approach of our situation. We were then turned left back to the syracuse airport. I then handed the aircraft over to the captain and then we completed the cleanup checklist. As we had a company pilot as a non-revenue passenger, the captain asked him to please brief the passenger. I then briefed syracuse approach on the number of passenger, fuel on board and aircraft condition. During the let down to syracuse the captain and I discussed our situation and options. We then proceeded to fly the ILS 28, complete the single engine landing checklist and land. As there were no indications to the contrary (e.g. Fire warning), we uneventfully taxied to our gate. Lessons learned. 1) no substitute for good training. As this was both mine and the captain's first in flight engine failure, our familiarity with company procedures and checklists helped to guide us into the correct actions. Additionally, as I had just been in the simulator 1 month ago, my procedures were current. 2) open communications between the captain and myself helped to foster understanding of what we were going to do. For example, when I queried the captain on whether we should go to the nearest airport (usc) or back to syracuse, we looked over the WX and found that the additional 12-15 min were well worth it when the WX was analyzed. 3) I believe that captain showed excellent cockpit resource management. When the engine first shut down he didn't grab the controls, but rather went with company procedures and permitted the flying pilot to stay with the airplane until the situation was stable. Additionally, he recognized the value of our non-revenue pilot, and used him to handle cabin responsibilities. As our aircraft has not flight attendant, this took a considerable amount of work off of us. Not much to say that was negative, but that's why I'm submitting this report. It shows that proper training and crew coordination does work to lead to successful completion of in-flight emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER HAS ENG FAILURE. SHUT DOWN, RETURN, LAND.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE FROM SYR TO ALB, AS PF, WE HAD A FAILURE OF THE L ENG. THIS WAS AFTER WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000 FT PROCEEDING DIRECT TO ALB. THIS WAS EVIDENCE BY A PWR SURGE AND THEN ZERO TORQUE. AFTER THIS I ASKED THE CAPT TO CONFIRM FAILURE OF THE L ENG AND TO SET MAX PWR ON THE REMAINING ENG, PER COMPANY PROCS. WE THEN PERFORMED MEMORY ITEMS OF THE CHKLIST THROUGH BRINGING THE PWR LEVER OF THE AFFECTED ENG TO FLT IDLE. WE DISCUSSED FOR APPROX 30 SECONDS ON WHETHER WE COULD EFFECT A RESTART OF THE ENG. WE DECIDED NOT TO DUE TO INDICATIONS THAT IT WAS NOT TURNING INTERNALLY (NO OIL PRESSURE AND FUEL PRESSURE) AND CONTINUED THROUGH TO COMPLETE THE MEMORY ITEMS OF THE CHKLIST. I ASKED THE CAPT TO AND HE INFORMED GRIFFISS APCH OF OUR SITUATION. WE WERE THEN TURNED L BACK TO THE SYRACUSE ARPT. I THEN HANDED THE ACFT OVER TO THE CAPT AND THEN WE COMPLETED THE CLEANUP CHKLIST. AS WE HAD A COMPANY PLT AS A NON-REVENUE PAX, THE CAPT ASKED HIM TO PLEASE BRIEF THE PAX. I THEN BRIEFED SYRACUSE APCH ON THE NUMBER OF PAX, FUEL ON BOARD AND ACFT CONDITION. DURING THE LET DOWN TO SYRACUSE THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED OUR SITUATION AND OPTIONS. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO FLY THE ILS 28, COMPLETE THE SINGLE ENG LNDG CHKLIST AND LAND. AS THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS TO THE CONTRARY (E.G. FIRE WARNING), WE UNEVENTFULLY TAXIED TO OUR GATE. LESSONS LEARNED. 1) NO SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD TRAINING. AS THIS WAS BOTH MINE AND THE CAPT'S FIRST IN FLT ENG FAILURE, OUR FAMILIARITY WITH COMPANY PROCS AND CHKLISTS HELPED TO GUIDE US INTO THE CORRECT ACTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, AS I HAD JUST BEEN IN THE SIMULATOR 1 MONTH AGO, MY PROCS WERE CURRENT. 2) OPEN COMS BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF HELPED TO FOSTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN I QUERIED THE CAPT ON WHETHER WE SHOULD GO TO THE NEAREST ARPT (USC) OR BACK TO SYRACUSE, WE LOOKED OVER THE WX AND FOUND THAT THE ADDITIONAL 12-15 MIN WERE WELL WORTH IT WHEN THE WX WAS ANALYZED. 3) I BELIEVE THAT CAPT SHOWED EXCELLENT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. WHEN THE ENG FIRST SHUT DOWN HE DIDN'T GRAB THE CTLS, BUT RATHER WENT WITH COMPANY PROCS AND PERMITTED THE FLYING PLT TO STAY WITH THE AIRPLANE UNTIL THE SITUATION WAS STABLE. ADDITIONALLY, HE RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF OUR NON-REVENUE PLT, AND USED HIM TO HANDLE CABIN RESPONSIBILITIES. AS OUR ACFT HAS NOT FLT ATTENDANT, THIS TOOK A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WORK OFF OF US. NOT MUCH TO SAY THAT WAS NEGATIVE, BUT THAT'S WHY I'M SUBMITTING THIS RPT. IT SHOWS THAT PROPER TRAINING AND CREW COORDINATION DOES WORK TO LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF INFLT EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.