Narrative:

I came in at PM55C for a PM00C dispatcher shift. During the turnover briefing, the off-going dispatcher closed by saying that our medium large transport on flight ont-phx (a PM15C departure) was released with a WX radar inoperative, and that phx was only forecast for a 'slight chance of light rainshowers.' I immediately mentioned to him that the radar was required on this model aircraft in 'known or forecast rain, hail, or sleet.' I questioned him on how we could do this with precipitation in the forecast, and he mentioned that the PIC was agreeable to operating, as PIREPS indicated there was no precipitation ont-phx, and that they felt the slight chance of rainshowers in the forecast was inapplicable as it was in the remarks section of the forecast, and not in the main body of it. I said that the air traffic area exemption on remarks was intended for alternate airport determinations, not MEL considerations, and the off-going dispatcher then told me that he had consulted the dispatch specialist on the matter. I spoke to the specialist (who publishes the internal MEL and acts a company liaison with the FAA on MEL-related matters), and he provided a copy of the current version of the ad on the aircraft which generated the need for the radar in our MEL. He pointed out a section in the middle of the page that said 'operation in moderate to heavy rain, hail, or sleet' and went on to say that from his discussions with the FAA, the intent of the ad was to keep the aircraft out of situations where it might encounter moderate or heavy rainfall, and that with the present situation, he'd have no problem allowing the aircraft to continue to phx. Based on his representation, and subsequent conversation with the PIC (who remained in concurrence) I did allow the aircraft to continue to phx, where after a precipitation-free flight, a simple right/T unit change solved the radar problem. It turns out later that, after reviewing the ad, the passage that I had been quoted was in reference to flight crew procedures once precipitation had been encountered, and didn't address pre-departure considerations. At the bottom of the page, the ad clearly had the same wording as our MEL with regard to 'known or forecast rain,' without qualification. The reverse side of the ad also specified procedures for special flight permits to operate aircraft to bases to comply with the requirements of the ad. As a dispatcher, I have occasionally had to refuse to release an aircraft because of a creative (but illegal) MEL interpretation by a PIC or maintenance controller, and I wasn't above doing so with this flight. In retrospect, this incident was a classic 'letter of the law versus the spirit of the law' situation, and whether by design or by accident, I was led to believe from company personnel that we had a legal operation. In retrospect, I don't think we did, and I will not subject the company nor myself to the potentials again in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT RELEASED ON FLT WITH LESS THAN SATISFACTORY MEL REQUIREMENT INTERP WHEN ACFT RADAR INOP.

Narrative: I CAME IN AT PM55C FOR A PM00C DISPATCHER SHIFT. DURING THE TURNOVER BRIEFING, THE OFF-GOING DISPATCHER CLOSED BY SAYING THAT OUR MLG ON FLT ONT-PHX (A PM15C DEP) WAS RELEASED WITH A WX RADAR INOP, AND THAT PHX WAS ONLY FORECAST FOR A 'SLIGHT CHANCE OF LIGHT RAINSHOWERS.' I IMMEDIATELY MENTIONED TO HIM THAT THE RADAR WAS REQUIRED ON THIS MODEL ACFT IN 'KNOWN OR FORECAST RAIN, HAIL, OR SLEET.' I QUESTIONED HIM ON HOW WE COULD DO THIS WITH PRECIPITATION IN THE FORECAST, AND HE MENTIONED THAT THE PIC WAS AGREEABLE TO OPERATING, AS PIREPS INDICATED THERE WAS NO PRECIP ONT-PHX, AND THAT THEY FELT THE SLIGHT CHANCE OF RAINSHOWERS IN THE FORECAST WAS INAPPLICABLE AS IT WAS IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF THE FORECAST, AND NOT IN THE MAIN BODY OF IT. I SAID THAT THE ATA EXEMPTION ON REMARKS WAS INTENDED FOR ALTERNATE ARPT DETERMINATIONS, NOT MEL CONSIDERATIONS, AND THE OFF-GOING DISPATCHER THEN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD CONSULTED THE DISPATCH SPECIALIST ON THE MATTER. I SPOKE TO THE SPECIALIST (WHO PUBLISHES THE INTERNAL MEL AND ACTS A COMPANY LIAISON WITH THE FAA ON MEL-RELATED MATTERS), AND HE PROVIDED A COPY OF THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE AD ON THE ACFT WHICH GENERATED THE NEED FOR THE RADAR IN OUR MEL. HE POINTED OUT A SECTION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PAGE THAT SAID 'OP IN MODERATE TO HVY RAIN, HAIL, OR SLEET' AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FAA, THE INTENT OF THE AD WAS TO KEEP THE ACFT OUT OF SITUATIONS WHERE IT MIGHT ENCOUNTER MODERATE OR HVY RAINFALL, AND THAT WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION, HE'D HAVE NO PROBLEM ALLOWING THE ACFT TO CONTINUE TO PHX. BASED ON HIS REPRESENTATION, AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE PIC (WHO REMAINED IN CONCURRENCE) I DID ALLOW THE ACFT TO CONTINUE TO PHX, WHERE AFTER A PRECIP-FREE FLT, A SIMPLE R/T UNIT CHANGE SOLVED THE RADAR PROBLEM. IT TURNS OUT LATER THAT, AFTER REVIEWING THE AD, THE PASSAGE THAT I HAD BEEN QUOTED WAS IN REF TO FLC PROCS ONCE PRECIP HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED, AND DIDN'T ADDRESS PRE-DEP CONSIDERATIONS. AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE, THE AD CLRLY HAD THE SAME WORDING AS OUR MEL WITH REGARD TO 'KNOWN OR FORECAST RAIN,' WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE AD ALSO SPECIFIED PROCS FOR SPECIAL FLT PERMITS TO OPERATE ACFT TO BASES TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AD. AS A DISPATCHER, I HAVE OCCASIONALLY HAD TO REFUSE TO RELEASE AN ACFT BECAUSE OF A CREATIVE (BUT ILLEGAL) MEL INTERPRETATION BY A PIC OR MAINT CTLR, AND I WASN'T ABOVE DOING SO WITH THIS FLT. IN RETROSPECT, THIS INCIDENT WAS A CLASSIC 'LETTER OF THE LAW VERSUS THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW' SITUATION, AND WHETHER BY DESIGN OR BY ACCIDENT, I WAS LED TO BELIEVE FROM COMPANY PERSONNEL THAT WE HAD A LEGAL OP. IN RETROSPECT, I DON'T THINK WE DID, AND I WILL NOT SUBJECT THE COMPANY NOR MYSELF TO THE POTENTIALS AGAIN IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.