Narrative:

I was conducting far 135.244 IOE with a new captain. The new captain had been a first officer on the same type of aircraft for approximately 3 yrs. This individual could fly the airplane very well from takeoff to landing. The problems I was having with him were getting the aircraft from the gate to the takeoff roll. We had approximately 1/3 of the IOE complete (7-8) hours and I had informed the new captain that I felt he was not progressing well. We had debriefed each day at length the strengths and weaknesses of his performance as captain. The problems were attempting to start an engine without a clearance from the ramp agent, trying to taxi without ramp signals, and very poor cockpit communication. I had expressed my concerns about his performance and told him I needed to see great improvement on our last day which would have him approximately 2/3 complete. We taxied out for departure and had considerable trouble getting the taxi checklist completed. The first flight of the day for each aircraft requires additional systems checks that, after satisfactory results, are not done the rest of the day. These checks are not difficult but do require some concentration while at the same time taxi the aircraft and listen to ATC. We finally got all the checks complete and on our third attempt tried to challenge and respond the taxi check. This is the only place where the flaps are checked by both pilots and the response to the challenge of 'flaps,' is '3 set 15 degree checked.' in all the confusion of the taxi and poor cockpit coordination we both skipped over the flap challenge. The takeoff clearance was issued by the tower without delay due to aircraft on 2-3 mi final approach. The new captain was flying the aircraft and as he advanced the power for takeoff we got an aural takeoff warning. The warning came approximately 2-3 seconds after the power was being advanced and the captain retarded the power to idle and I informed the tower that we would like to cancel our takeoff clearance and clear the runway at intersection delta. The airspeed indication was not registering so speed was below 40 KTS. I would estimate that we only rolled about 100-200 yards into the takeoff. We were cleared to exit the runway at our requested point. This was less then 1/2 of the way down a 7200 ft runway. The tower asked if we needed assistance and we replied negative. We requested a clearance back to the active runway and discovered the flaps handle was not selected to 15 degree for takeoff. We selected flaps to 15 degree and complied with all checklists and company procedures. The tower asked for the reason for the aborted takeoff and I replied that I did not consider the incident aborted, but merely asked tower to cancel our takeoff clearance so we could solve a problem. There were no conflicts with any other airplanes to my knowledge. The tower said they had to file all aborted takeoffs with the FAA and that this was considered an aborted takeoff. The tower persisted for a reason for the abort and I told them we had gotten a takeoff confign warning. The aircraft was reconfigured and we took off and flew to destination without further incident. I believe the major factor for this incident was the poor CRM by the new captain, excessive distrs due to poor communication, and my own loss of concentration due to confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT FLC CONSISTING OF CKP AND CAPT UNDERGOING IOE ATTEMPT TKOF FROM ALB WITHOUT HAVING SET TKOF FLAPS. AURAL COCKPIT WARNING GOES OFF AND FLC ABORTS TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING FAR 135.244 IOE WITH A NEW CAPT. THE NEW CAPT HAD BEEN A FO ON THE SAME TYPE OF ACFT FOR APPROX 3 YRS. THIS INDIVIDUAL COULD FLY THE AIRPLANE VERY WELL FROM TKOF TO LNDG. THE PROBLEMS I WAS HAVING WITH HIM WERE GETTING THE ACFT FROM THE GATE TO THE TKOF ROLL. WE HAD APPROX 1/3 OF THE IOE COMPLETE (7-8) HRS AND I HAD INFORMED THE NEW CAPT THAT I FELT HE WAS NOT PROGRESSING WELL. WE HAD DEBRIEFED EACH DAY AT LENGTH THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF HIS PERFORMANCE AS CAPT. THE PROBLEMS WERE ATTEMPTING TO START AN ENG WITHOUT A CLRNC FROM THE RAMP AGENT, TRYING TO TAXI WITHOUT RAMP SIGNALS, AND VERY POOR COCKPIT COM. I HAD EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE AND TOLD HIM I NEEDED TO SEE GREAT IMPROVEMENT ON OUR LAST DAY WHICH WOULD HAVE HIM APPROX 2/3 COMPLETE. WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AND HAD CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE GETTING THE TAXI CHKLIST COMPLETED. THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY FOR EACH ACFT REQUIRES ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS CHKS THAT, AFTER SATISFACTORY RESULTS, ARE NOT DONE THE REST OF THE DAY. THESE CHKS ARE NOT DIFFICULT BUT DO REQUIRE SOME CONCENTRATION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TAXI THE ACFT AND LISTEN TO ATC. WE FINALLY GOT ALL THE CHKS COMPLETE AND ON OUR THIRD ATTEMPT TRIED TO CHALLENGE AND RESPOND THE TAXI CHK. THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE WHERE THE FLAPS ARE CHKED BY BOTH PLTS AND THE RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF 'FLAPS,' IS '3 SET 15 DEG CHKED.' IN ALL THE CONFUSION OF THE TAXI AND POOR COCKPIT COORD WE BOTH SKIPPED OVER THE FLAP CHALLENGE. THE TKOF CLRNC WAS ISSUED BY THE TWR WITHOUT DELAY DUE TO ACFT ON 2-3 MI FINAL APCH. THE NEW CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND AS HE ADVANCED THE PWR FOR TKOF WE GOT AN AURAL TKOF WARNING. THE WARNING CAME APPROX 2-3 SECONDS AFTER THE PWR WAS BEING ADVANCED AND THE CAPT RETARDED THE PWR TO IDLE AND I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO CANCEL OUR TKOF CLRNC AND CLR THE RWY AT INTXN DELTA. THE AIRSPD INDICATION WAS NOT REGISTERING SO SPD WAS BELOW 40 KTS. I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT WE ONLY ROLLED ABOUT 100-200 YARDS INTO THE TKOF. WE WERE CLRED TO EXIT THE RWY AT OUR REQUESTED POINT. THIS WAS LESS THEN 1/2 OF THE WAY DOWN A 7200 FT RWY. THE TWR ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND WE REPLIED NEGATIVE. WE REQUESTED A CLRNC BACK TO THE ACTIVE RWY AND DISCOVERED THE FLAPS HANDLE WAS NOT SELECTED TO 15 DEG FOR TKOF. WE SELECTED FLAPS TO 15 DEG AND COMPLIED WITH ALL CHKLISTS AND COMPANY PROCS. THE TWR ASKED FOR THE REASON FOR THE ABORTED TKOF AND I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT CONSIDER THE INCIDENT ABORTED, BUT MERELY ASKED TWR TO CANCEL OUR TKOF CLRNC SO WE COULD SOLVE A PROBLEM. THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS WITH ANY OTHER AIRPLANES TO MY KNOWLEDGE. THE TWR SAID THEY HAD TO FILE ALL ABORTED TKOFS WITH THE FAA AND THAT THIS WAS CONSIDERED AN ABORTED TKOF. THE TWR PERSISTED FOR A REASON FOR THE ABORT AND I TOLD THEM WE HAD GOTTEN A TKOF CONFIGN WARNING. THE ACFT WAS RECONFIGURED AND WE TOOK OFF AND FLEW TO DEST WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE MAJOR FACTOR FOR THIS INCIDENT WAS THE POOR CRM BY THE NEW CAPT, EXCESSIVE DISTRS DUE TO POOR COM, AND MY OWN LOSS OF CONCENTRATION DUE TO CONFUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.