Narrative:

We were air carrier X arrival from the south for landing on runway 11L. There were thunderstorms in the area, however, they were not a factor in this problem. There was considerable military traffic in the tucson area at our arrival time. We were vectored for a 15 mi final to follow fgt traffic. On ILS approach to 11L in visual conditions, we were told to follow one fgt ahead which would be landing and fgt Y was downwind to follow us. We had both fgt's in sight. Inside the OM we observed fgt Y downwind start a steep left turn to base towards us (he was at 4000 ft MSL). The tower told us he had us in sight. Fgt Y continued his turn appearing to be turning directly toward us. He was going fast. At approximately 3800 ft MSL we received a TCASII RA to 'descend, descend, descend.' next we received a TCASII RA to 'monitor vertical speed.' at this point we decided to abandon the approach, continue descending, and turn right out of the final and away from fgt Y. We observed no other traffic either visually on the TCASII for the parallel runway 11R. At about this same time we received another TCASII RA to 'descend now.' right after that we received a TCASII RA to 'monitor vertical speed.' after establishing a heading of approximately 150 degrees and at approximately 3300 ft MSL (700 ft AGL) the TCASII said 'clear of conflict.' we advised the tower of our actions (missed approach, turning right). He was very argumentative and uncooperative. He stated at least twice 'fgt Y had us visually' and questioned why we were doing this. On the third or fourth transmission I finally told him I did not have time to argue with him. As fgt Y passed directly over us (I saw clearly his bottom side out the overhead #4 window) he was still in a highspd steep bank and was 400-500 ft above us. I wondered out loud how in the world he could see us. I would like to add that with or without the TCASII system we would have done the same type missed approach because of fgt Y's steep turn directly at us at very near our altitude. After landing, I called the tower supervisor and expressed our concern over how our arrival and fgt Y's practice was handled. Notes, concerns, judgements: 1) all 3 in my crew agreed the descending right turn out was our safest course of action. It was not abrupt and there were no passenger complaints. 2) the local tower operator was a hindrance rather than a help. Once you start what you feel is the safest thing to do (see and avoid, miss the approach) you need support -- not argument. You need headings, altitudes, TA's. You also need concentration! Having to argue your case takes away from concentration.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X TCASII TA RA DSCNT TURN EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN FROM FGT Y WHILE ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE ACR X ARR FROM THE S FOR LNDG ON RWY 11L. THERE WERE TSTMS IN THE AREA, HOWEVER, THEY WERE NOT A FACTOR IN THIS PROBLEM. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE MIL TFC IN THE TUCSON AREA AT OUR ARR TIME. WE WERE VECTORED FOR A 15 MI FINAL TO FOLLOW FGT TFC. ON ILS APCH TO 11L IN VISUAL CONDITIONS, WE WERE TOLD TO FOLLOW ONE FGT AHEAD WHICH WOULD BE LNDG AND FGT Y WAS DOWNWIND TO FOLLOW US. WE HAD BOTH FGT'S IN SIGHT. INSIDE THE OM WE OBSERVED FGT Y DOWNWIND START A STEEP L TURN TO BASE TOWARDS US (HE WAS AT 4000 FT MSL). THE TWR TOLD US HE HAD US IN SIGHT. FGT Y CONTINUED HIS TURN APPEARING TO BE TURNING DIRECTLY TOWARD US. HE WAS GOING FAST. AT APPROX 3800 FT MSL WE RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO 'DSND, DSND, DSND.' NEXT WE RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' AT THIS POINT WE DECIDED TO ABANDON THE APCH, CONTINUE DSNDING, AND TURN R OUT OF THE FINAL AND AWAY FROM FGT Y. WE OBSERVED NO OTHER TFC EITHER VISUALLY ON THE TCASII FOR THE PARALLEL RWY 11R. AT ABOUT THIS SAME TIME WE RECEIVED ANOTHER TCASII RA TO 'DSND NOW.' RIGHT AFTER THAT WE RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' AFTER ESTABLISHING A HDG OF APPROX 150 DEGS AND AT APPROX 3300 FT MSL (700 FT AGL) THE TCASII SAID 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' WE ADVISED THE TWR OF OUR ACTIONS (MISSED APCH, TURNING R). HE WAS VERY ARGUMENTATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE. HE STATED AT LEAST TWICE 'FGT Y HAD US VISUALLY' AND QUESTIONED WHY WE WERE DOING THIS. ON THE THIRD OR FOURTH XMISSION I FINALLY TOLD HIM I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO ARGUE WITH HIM. AS FGT Y PASSED DIRECTLY OVER US (I SAW CLRLY HIS BOTTOM SIDE OUT THE OVERHEAD #4 WINDOW) HE WAS STILL IN A HIGHSPD STEEP BANK AND WAS 400-500 FT ABOVE US. I WONDERED OUT LOUD HOW IN THE WORLD HE COULD SEE US. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WITH OR WITHOUT THE TCASII SYS WE WOULD HAVE DONE THE SAME TYPE MISSED APCH BECAUSE OF FGT Y'S STEEP TURN DIRECTLY AT US AT VERY NEAR OUR ALT. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN OVER HOW OUR ARR AND FGT Y'S PRACTICE WAS HANDLED. NOTES, CONCERNS, JUDGEMENTS: 1) ALL 3 IN MY CREW AGREED THE DSNDING R TURN OUT WAS OUR SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. IT WAS NOT ABRUPT AND THERE WERE NO PAX COMPLAINTS. 2) THE LCL TWR OPERATOR WAS A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN A HELP. ONCE YOU START WHAT YOU FEEL IS THE SAFEST THING TO DO (SEE AND AVOID, MISS THE APCH) YOU NEED SUPPORT -- NOT ARGUMENT. YOU NEED HDGS, ALTS, TA'S. YOU ALSO NEED CONCENTRATION! HAVING TO ARGUE YOUR CASE TAKES AWAY FROM CONCENTRATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.