Narrative:

Flight: brussels to jfk via north atlantic track system at FL330 (2000 ft below flight planned altitude of FL350). Uneventful until vicinity of 30W when 'turbine case cooling' light illuminated. Procedure informed us we could expect higher fuel consumption. At 40 west, fuel consumption was more than 2000 pounds greater than flight planned estimate. We suspected: 1) incorrect tank gauge readings, 2) fuel consumption greater than fuel flow would indicate, or 3) fuel leak. We spoke with our company over gander, nf, advised them of our status and concerns and determined that WX in jfk, bos, and bgr was excellent. We elected to continue to jfk, feeling that, if we had a leak, it was at a fixed rate and sufficient fuel would remain at arrival to cover a go around if necessary. Upon arrival in the jfk area, we advised approach control that we suspected a fuel leak, requested runway 22R for landing due to its length, and asked that a fire truck meet us on turning off the runway to advise us of any leakage. An emergency was not declared! The landing was uneventful. However, once off the runway, tower advised us of smoke and fuel leaking from #1 engine. We shut the engine down, had it examined by the fire department personnel, and then taxied to the gate. Subsequent examination revealed a small fuel line separated from a fitting in #1 engine. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this aircraft was acquired from a now 'retired air carrier.' the warning light in question only warned the crew that a valve in the fuel system was not in the position that it should have been and to expect a 0.2 percent higher fuel burn. The air carrier that now has this aircraft has since removed the 0.2 percent remark from the 'screen' information for the sake of fleet standardization. Crew was never convinced of a fuel leak and stated that this was the reason for not declaring an emergency. PIC said that, if he had possessed more information on the possibility of this he might have landed at an intermediate point or at least have declared an emergency. There is no pilot action required when this warning is presented to the crew. The fuel use went from minus 300 pounds under flight plan to above plus 600 pounds over flight plan after one-way point. Fuel forecast for arrival jfk on the FMS screen was 15000 pounds after climb to FL390. Fuel on arrival was probably less than required by regulations due to the ever-changing fuel picture. The smoke as noted in report was actually vapor that was seen by tower. Fire chief eventually plugged into aircraft to assure PIC that aircraft was ok after engine shutdown. Reporter would like more information to crews reference the possibility of a fuel leak, a discrete communication frequency for crash fire rescue vehicles.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROBLEM EVIDENT IN THAT FUEL REMAINING REDUCED AT A GREATER RATE THAN FUEL BURN.

Narrative: FLT: BRUSSELS TO JFK VIA N ATLANTIC TRACK SYS AT FL330 (2000 FT BELOW FLT PLANNED ALT OF FL350). UNEVENTFUL UNTIL VICINITY OF 30W WHEN 'TURBINE CASE COOLING' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. PROC INFORMED US WE COULD EXPECT HIGHER FUEL CONSUMPTION. AT 40 W, FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS MORE THAN 2000 POUNDS GREATER THAN FLT PLANNED ESTIMATE. WE SUSPECTED: 1) INCORRECT TANK GAUGE READINGS, 2) FUEL CONSUMPTION GREATER THAN FUEL FLOW WOULD INDICATE, OR 3) FUEL LEAK. WE SPOKE WITH OUR COMPANY OVER GANDER, NF, ADVISED THEM OF OUR STATUS AND CONCERNS AND DETERMINED THAT WX IN JFK, BOS, AND BGR WAS EXCELLENT. WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO JFK, FEELING THAT, IF WE HAD A LEAK, IT WAS AT A FIXED RATE AND SUFFICIENT FUEL WOULD REMAIN AT ARR TO COVER A GAR IF NECESSARY. UPON ARR IN THE JFK AREA, WE ADVISED APCH CTL THAT WE SUSPECTED A FUEL LEAK, REQUESTED RWY 22R FOR LNDG DUE TO ITS LENGTH, AND ASKED THAT A FIRE TRUCK MEET US ON TURNING OFF THE RWY TO ADVISE US OF ANY LEAKAGE. AN EMER WAS NOT DECLARED! THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. HOWEVER, ONCE OFF THE RWY, TWR ADVISED US OF SMOKE AND FUEL LEAKING FROM #1 ENG. WE SHUT THE ENG DOWN, HAD IT EXAMINED BY THE FIRE DEPT PERSONNEL, AND THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION REVEALED A SMALL FUEL LINE SEPARATED FROM A FITTING IN #1 ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS ACFT WAS ACQUIRED FROM A NOW 'RETIRED ACR.' THE WARNING LIGHT IN QUESTION ONLY WARNED THE CREW THAT A VALVE IN THE FUEL SYS WAS NOT IN THE POS THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AND TO EXPECT A 0.2 PERCENT HIGHER FUEL BURN. THE ACR THAT NOW HAS THIS ACFT HAS SINCE REMOVED THE 0.2 PERCENT REMARK FROM THE 'SCREEN' INFO FOR THE SAKE OF FLEET STANDARDIZATION. CREW WAS NEVER CONVINCED OF A FUEL LEAK AND STATED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR NOT DECLARING AN EMER. PIC SAID THAT, IF HE HAD POSSESSED MORE INFO ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS HE MIGHT HAVE LANDED AT AN INTERMEDIATE POINT OR AT LEAST HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. THERE IS NO PLT ACTION REQUIRED WHEN THIS WARNING IS PRESENTED TO THE CREW. THE FUEL USE WENT FROM MINUS 300 POUNDS UNDER FLT PLAN TO ABOVE PLUS 600 POUNDS OVER FLT PLAN AFTER ONE-WAY POINT. FUEL FORECAST FOR ARR JFK ON THE FMS SCREEN WAS 15000 POUNDS AFTER CLB TO FL390. FUEL ON ARR WAS PROBABLY LESS THAN REQUIRED BY REGS DUE TO THE EVER-CHANGING FUEL PICTURE. THE SMOKE AS NOTED IN RPT WAS ACTUALLY VAPOR THAT WAS SEEN BY TWR. FIRE CHIEF EVENTUALLY PLUGGED INTO ACFT TO ASSURE PIC THAT ACFT WAS OK AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN. RPTR WOULD LIKE MORE INFO TO CREWS REF THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUEL LEAK, A DISCRETE COM FREQ FOR CRASH FIRE RESCUE VEHICLES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.