Narrative:

We departed iah on runway 9 (a last min change) and, in accord with our pre departure clearance, made a climbing right turn to 250 degrees, leveling at 4000 ft. This heading appeared to be reasonably favorable for avoiding a thunderstorm cell. Departure control advised us to turn right to 310 and intercept J86. He then asked our altitude. When we responded he expressed surprise and said to climb to 5000 ft and turn right to 300. I read back the clearance and we complied. I was concerned that the heading would make it difficult to clear the cell; however I was unable to transmit on a frequency that was saturated with intense communication between deviating aircraft and controllers who were swamped. Heavy rain pelted the aircraft out of the downwind side of the thunderstorm. I put our ignitors to 'flight' and 'both' for maximum flameout protection. We then encountered moderate turbulence with an upward lifting action. The TCASII then overrode the radar to indicate traffic approaching from the left. We had been in the clear but now the cockpit became darkened as we entered the east edge of the cell. The noise level in the cockpit from the heavy rain blocked out the TCASII warning and the altitude alert. The first officer, who was flying at this time, had elected to hand fly the aircraft during all of this activity. He later explained that he was getting ready for a proficiency check. I only noticed this fact as he sailed up through 5000 ft to 5240 ft. While his deviation was perhaps not flagrant, he initially did nothing and sat there at that altitude even after I called the deviation and had told him to '...get it down to 5000!' still he did not descend. I repeated 'get it down to 5000' and added 'he's got us at 5000 ft for a reason. The reason is on the TCASII!' we finally reached our assigned altitude. A moment later we emerged from the edge of the cell. A few seconds after that I pointed out the white fuselage of an aircraft passing 1000 ft above us (as the TCASII gave us an erroneous RA). The problem arose by not anticipating the radio communication problems from past experience. With scattered thunderstorms surrounding our departure route, an early warning to departure control of our need to deviation at the time we checked in would have assisted them. Even apprising tower prior to brake release for coordination could have better prepared departure for our needs. They seldom have a clear picture of the WX on their equipment. Anticipating and briefing on the possible problem of noise blocking out warnings in the cockpit due to the proximity of cells in all quadrants would also be advisable. Finally, after the first officer apologized profusely, I suggested that from such an experience (where the airplane was flying him) we step back and try to see what could be learned: frequent hand flying is desired, but when the demands of ATC and adverse WX create a conflict, the autoplt is a great device to allow us both to be in a more favorable position to monitor what is occurring. In addition, if you were to pick only 3 instruments you could have, what would they be? I felt that you could safely fly in our previous situation with airspeed, altitude and heading. Integrate the rest as your demands allow. But do what is assigned, or declare an emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ILS NOTAMED OTS IS TURNED BACK ON DURING IMC TO ACCOMMODATE ARR TFC WITHOUT CANCELING NOTAM.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED IAH ON RWY 9 (A LAST MIN CHANGE) AND, IN ACCORD WITH OUR PDC, MADE A CLBING R TURN TO 250 DEGS, LEVELING AT 4000 FT. THIS HDG APPEARED TO BE REASONABLY FAVORABLE FOR AVOIDING A TSTM CELL. DEP CTL ADVISED US TO TURN R TO 310 AND INTERCEPT J86. HE THEN ASKED OUR ALT. WHEN WE RESPONDED HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND SAID TO CLB TO 5000 FT AND TURN R TO 300. I READ BACK THE CLRNC AND WE COMPLIED. I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE HDG WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CLR THE CELL; HOWEVER I WAS UNABLE TO XMIT ON A FREQ THAT WAS SATURATED WITH INTENSE COM BTWN DEVIATING ACFT AND CTLRS WHO WERE SWAMPED. HVY RAIN PELTED THE ACFT OUT OF THE DOWNWIND SIDE OF THE TSTM. I PUT OUR IGNITORS TO 'FLT' AND 'BOTH' FOR MAX FLAMEOUT PROTECTION. WE THEN ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TURB WITH AN UPWARD LIFTING ACTION. THE TCASII THEN OVERRODE THE RADAR TO INDICATE TFC APCHING FROM THE L. WE HAD BEEN IN THE CLR BUT NOW THE COCKPIT BECAME DARKENED AS WE ENTERED THE E EDGE OF THE CELL. THE NOISE LEVEL IN THE COCKPIT FROM THE HVY RAIN BLOCKED OUT THE TCASII WARNING AND THE ALT ALERT. THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING AT THIS TIME, HAD ELECTED TO HAND FLY THE ACFT DURING ALL OF THIS ACTIVITY. HE LATER EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS GETTING READY FOR A PROFICIENCY CHK. I ONLY NOTICED THIS FACT AS HE SAILED UP THROUGH 5000 FT TO 5240 FT. WHILE HIS DEV WAS PERHAPS NOT FLAGRANT, HE INITIALLY DID NOTHING AND SAT THERE AT THAT ALT EVEN AFTER I CALLED THE DEV AND HAD TOLD HIM TO '...GET IT DOWN TO 5000!' STILL HE DID NOT DSND. I REPEATED 'GET IT DOWN TO 5000' AND ADDED 'HE'S GOT US AT 5000 FT FOR A REASON. THE REASON IS ON THE TCASII!' WE FINALLY REACHED OUR ASSIGNED ALT. A MOMENT LATER WE EMERGED FROM THE EDGE OF THE CELL. A FEW SECONDS AFTER THAT I POINTED OUT THE WHITE FUSELAGE OF AN ACFT PASSING 1000 FT ABOVE US (AS THE TCASII GAVE US AN ERRONEOUS RA). THE PROBLEM AROSE BY NOT ANTICIPATING THE RADIO COM PROBLEMS FROM PAST EXPERIENCE. WITH SCATTERED TSTMS SURROUNDING OUR DEP RTE, AN EARLY WARNING TO DEP CTL OF OUR NEED TO DEV AT THE TIME WE CHKED IN WOULD HAVE ASSISTED THEM. EVEN APPRISING TWR PRIOR TO BRAKE RELEASE FOR COORD COULD HAVE BETTER PREPARED DEP FOR OUR NEEDS. THEY SELDOM HAVE A CLR PICTURE OF THE WX ON THEIR EQUIP. ANTICIPATING AND BRIEFING ON THE POSSIBLE PROBLEM OF NOISE BLOCKING OUT WARNINGS IN THE COCKPIT DUE TO THE PROX OF CELLS IN ALL QUADRANTS WOULD ALSO BE ADVISABLE. FINALLY, AFTER THE FO APOLOGIZED PROFUSELY, I SUGGESTED THAT FROM SUCH AN EXPERIENCE (WHERE THE AIRPLANE WAS FLYING HIM) WE STEP BACK AND TRY TO SEE WHAT COULD BE LEARNED: FREQUENT HAND FLYING IS DESIRED, BUT WHEN THE DEMANDS OF ATC AND ADVERSE WX CREATE A CONFLICT, THE AUTOPLT IS A GREAT DEVICE TO ALLOW US BOTH TO BE IN A MORE FAVORABLE POS TO MONITOR WHAT IS OCCURRING. IN ADDITION, IF YOU WERE TO PICK ONLY 3 INSTS YOU COULD HAVE, WHAT WOULD THEY BE? I FELT THAT YOU COULD SAFELY FLY IN OUR PREVIOUS SITUATION WITH AIRSPD, ALT AND HDG. INTEGRATE THE REST AS YOUR DEMANDS ALLOW. BUT DO WHAT IS ASSIGNED, OR DECLARE AN EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.