Narrative:

On tue night, 6/X/92, I arrived at XA54 local time to work my shift in the trails area, ZKC. It was unlike any other night shift I had ever seen; many sectors were open that would normally be combined at other positions and the level of activity was high. The cdc and host systems were not operating due to testing, and a line of severe thunderstorms extended from swestern kansas to northern minnesota. Aircraft were not going through the line of storms; most traffic which is usually routed through the minneapolis ARTCC area was deviating south into kansas city airspace. Several people were attempting to staff each area's assistant controller position (normally staffed by one air traffic assistant or atcs developmental or co-operation), but they were not able to manually process flight plan information fast enough to keep up with the aircraft whose rtes were unpredictable. Flight progress strips were not reaching the controllers in a timely manner, if at all. I was very fortunate to have been working the trails low altitude sectors (5 sectors; airspace at and below FL230 encircling kansas city; roughly a 100 NM radius) which were all combined at one position and not very busy. I was not personally aware of any airspace violations happening at the time, but controllers working trails high altitude sectors and sectors in other areas said that radar handoffs and point-outs were not being accomplished as required by FAA ATC procedures. It is my opinion, shared by my colleagues, that air safety was severely compromised until the computer systems were started up again at XB55 local. The decision to allow the computer shutdown was foolish and imprudent given the WX situation. Luck, not the ATC system, prevented midair collisions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMPUTER SYS SHUT DOWN FOR TESTING DURING HVY TFC PERIOD CAUSES WORKLOAD PROBLEM FOR CTLRS.

Narrative: ON TUE NIGHT, 6/X/92, I ARRIVED AT XA54 LCL TIME TO WORK MY SHIFT IN THE TRAILS AREA, ZKC. IT WAS UNLIKE ANY OTHER NIGHT SHIFT I HAD EVER SEEN; MANY SECTORS WERE OPEN THAT WOULD NORMALLY BE COMBINED AT OTHER POSITIONS AND THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WAS HIGH. THE CDC AND HOST SYSTEMS WERE NOT OPERATING DUE TO TESTING, AND A LINE OF SEVERE TSTMS EXTENDED FROM SWESTERN KANSAS TO NORTHERN MINNESOTA. ACFT WERE NOT GOING THROUGH THE LINE OF STORMS; MOST TFC WHICH IS USUALLY ROUTED THROUGH THE MINNEAPOLIS ARTCC AREA WAS DEVIATING S INTO KANSAS CITY AIRSPACE. SEVERAL PEOPLE WERE ATTEMPTING TO STAFF EACH AREA'S ASSISTANT CTLR POS (NORMALLY STAFFED BY ONE AIR TFC ASSISTANT OR ATCS DEVELOPMENTAL OR CO-OP), BUT THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO MANUALLY PROCESS FLT PLAN INFO FAST ENOUGH TO KEEP UP WITH THE ACFT WHOSE RTES WERE UNPREDICTABLE. FLT PROGRESS STRIPS WERE NOT REACHING THE CTLRS IN A TIMELY MANNER, IF AT ALL. I WAS VERY FORTUNATE TO HAVE BEEN WORKING THE TRAILS LOW ALT SECTORS (5 SECTORS; AIRSPACE AT AND BELOW FL230 ENCIRCLING KANSAS CITY; ROUGHLY A 100 NM RADIUS) WHICH WERE ALL COMBINED AT ONE POS AND NOT VERY BUSY. I WAS NOT PERSONALLY AWARE OF ANY AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS HAPPENING AT THE TIME, BUT CTLRS WORKING TRAILS HIGH ALT SECTORS AND SECTORS IN OTHER AREAS SAID THAT RADAR HDOFS AND POINT-OUTS WERE NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED AS REQUIRED BY FAA ATC PROCS. IT IS MY OPINION, SHARED BY MY COLLEAGUES, THAT AIR SAFETY WAS SEVERELY COMPROMISED UNTIL THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS WERE STARTED UP AGAIN AT XB55 LCL. THE DECISION TO ALLOW THE COMPUTER SHUTDOWN WAS FOOLISH AND IMPRUDENT GIVEN THE WX SITUATION. LUCK, NOT THE ATC SYS, PREVENTED MIDAIR COLLISIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.