Narrative:

Flight was an medium large transport jul/sat/92, jan-dfw. Departed jan at AM40, captain flying. Cleared via scurry arrival, landing on runways 17L and 18R at dfw. Crossed scurry at approximately AM40, descending to 11000 ft. Aircraft was level at 11000 ft about 15 DME on the 296 radial of scurry. We were in the clouds, although the WX was VFR below with about a 2500 ft scattered layer and a broken layer about 10000 ft. At about 20 DME out of scurry, the TCASII gave a 'traffic' warning, and the display showed an aircraft about 2000 ft below us, climbing. Next came a 'climb, climb' RA with the vsi commanding a high rate of climb. I chose to maintain level flight, knowing that the aircraft approaching was an outbound departure with a 10000 ft assigned altitude. I told the copilot to report that RA to dfw approach control, and he did so. The approach controller reported that it was an aircraft leveling at 10000 ft. The RA then shifted to a 'monitor vertical speed,' then immediately back to 'climb, climb,' then to 'clear of conflict.' we were about 32 DME, just about to slow to 210 KIAS when the approach controller gave us a vector and a descent to 6000 ft, assigned us runway 17L, and informed us it would be a short approach. The usual procedure takes us to 35 DME where the arrival dictates a right turn to 350 degrees, then a descent clearance is issued. We were asked to expedite, and we did so. We were vectored onto the 17L localizer and cleared for the ILS, and the approach controller asked us to call the runway in sight. We could see the approach end of the runway, but a layer of clouds prevented our seeing the entire runway. Nevertheless, I told the copilot to tell him we had the runway in sight and he did so. The controller then cleared us for a visual approach to 17L. We landed at AM50, and as we turned off the runway, I saw that the radio was still on 119.4, the approach control frequency. We had landed without having heard or acknowledged the clearance to land! 32 yrs in the cockpit for me, and I can't come up with any excuse that sounds even halfway acceptable. PNF failed to complete the checklist? Sure, but that's no excuse. Approach controller failed to tell us to contact tower? Sure, but that's no excuse, either. Distraction because of TCASII encounter? Maybe, but I know what I'd think if one of my flying buddies tried to tell me that's what caused him to forget to switch to tower. Fatigue? Not a chance, we'd had an all day layover and had flown only 1 leg prior to this one. WX? Not really. Could it happen to someone else? You bet it could, and, with the traffic density continuing to increase and the controller and pilot workload continuing to increase, it will happen again. I'll certainly work hard to ensure it never happens to my crew, but is that enough? I don't know.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG CREW LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC. UNAUTHORIZED LNDG. UNCOORD RWY OP.

Narrative: FLT WAS AN MLG JUL/SAT/92, JAN-DFW. DEPARTED JAN AT AM40, CAPT FLYING. CLRED VIA SCURRY ARR, LNDG ON RWYS 17L AND 18R AT DFW. CROSSED SCURRY AT APPROX AM40, DSNDING TO 11000 FT. ACFT WAS LEVEL AT 11000 FT ABOUT 15 DME ON THE 296 RADIAL OF SCURRY. WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS, ALTHOUGH THE WX WAS VFR BELOW WITH ABOUT A 2500 FT SCATTERED LAYER AND A BROKEN LAYER ABOUT 10000 FT. AT ABOUT 20 DME OUT OF SCURRY, THE TCASII GAVE A 'TFC' WARNING, AND THE DISPLAY SHOWED AN ACFT ABOUT 2000 FT BELOW US, CLBING. NEXT CAME A 'CLB, CLB' RA WITH THE VSI COMMANDING A HIGH RATE OF CLB. I CHOSE TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT, KNOWING THAT THE ACFT APCHING WAS AN OUTBOUND DEP WITH A 10000 FT ASSIGNED ALT. I TOLD THE COPLT TO RPT THAT RA TO DFW APCH CTL, AND HE DID SO. THE APCH CTLR RPTED THAT IT WAS AN ACFT LEVELING AT 10000 FT. THE RA THEN SHIFTED TO A 'MONITOR VERT SPD,' THEN IMMEDIATELY BACK TO 'CLB, CLB,' THEN TO 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' WE WERE ABOUT 32 DME, JUST ABOUT TO SLOW TO 210 KIAS WHEN THE APCH CTLR GAVE US A VECTOR AND A DSCNT TO 6000 FT, ASSIGNED US RWY 17L, AND INFORMED US IT WOULD BE A SHORT APCH. THE USUAL PROC TAKES US TO 35 DME WHERE THE ARR DICTATES A R TURN TO 350 DEGS, THEN A DSCNT CLRNC IS ISSUED. WE WERE ASKED TO EXPEDITE, AND WE DID SO. WE WERE VECTORED ONTO THE 17L LOC AND CLRED FOR THE ILS, AND THE APCH CTLR ASKED US TO CALL THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE COULD SEE THE APCH END OF THE RWY, BUT A LAYER OF CLOUDS PREVENTED OUR SEEING THE ENTIRE RWY. NEVERTHELESS, I TOLD THE COPLT TO TELL HIM WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AND HE DID SO. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO 17L. WE LANDED AT AM50, AND AS WE TURNED OFF THE RWY, I SAW THAT THE RADIO WAS STILL ON 119.4, THE APCH CTL FREQ. WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT HAVING HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC TO LAND! 32 YRS IN THE COCKPIT FOR ME, AND I CAN'T COME UP WITH ANY EXCUSE THAT SOUNDS EVEN HALFWAY ACCEPTABLE. PNF FAILED TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST? SURE, BUT THAT'S NO EXCUSE. APCH CTLR FAILED TO TELL US TO CONTACT TWR? SURE, BUT THAT'S NO EXCUSE, EITHER. DISTR BECAUSE OF TCASII ENCOUNTER? MAYBE, BUT I KNOW WHAT I'D THINK IF ONE OF MY FLYING BUDDIES TRIED TO TELL ME THAT'S WHAT CAUSED HIM TO FORGET TO SWITCH TO TWR. FATIGUE? NOT A CHANCE, WE'D HAD AN ALL DAY LAYOVER AND HAD FLOWN ONLY 1 LEG PRIOR TO THIS ONE. WX? NOT REALLY. COULD IT HAPPEN TO SOMEONE ELSE? YOU BET IT COULD, AND, WITH THE TFC DENSITY CONTINUING TO INCREASE AND THE CTLR AND PLT WORKLOAD CONTINUING TO INCREASE, IT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN. I'LL CERTAINLY WORK HARD TO ENSURE IT NEVER HAPPENS TO MY CREW, BUT IS THAT ENOUGH? I DON'T KNOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.