Narrative:

Prior to this flight I had completed a thorough preflight of the aircraft with nothing unusual noted. The flight to my destination was without incident. I arrived at the hartford/brainard airport just before xyam with about 1 plus 30 fuel on board. The WX was excellent with some scattered clouds at about 3000 ft and 20 mi of visibility. The tower had cleared me to land on runway 02 so I extended approach flaps and then lowered the landing gear. As the gear went down I noticed quite a bit of banging and knocking under the floorboard as it went down. After the gear motor stopped the left main, nose, and gear unsafe lights were illuminated. The right main was not illuminated, so I checked the press-to-test feature to confirm that the light bulb was still good. I informed the tower of my problem and on a fly-by they informed me that the right gear was still up. The nose and left main appeared normally extended. I then attempted to engage emergency gear lowering handcrank without any results. I could not feel a positive engagement of the gear train as compared to past experience I had during a gear extension with the handcrank. I tried yawing the aircraft and pulling some 'G' load with no apparent success. The next thing I did was to recycle the gear. When I completed that, the tower reported the right main was now down and, after another fly- by, they said it appeared to be within about 20 degrees of full down. I tried some more yawing and pulling 'G' load without any further extension being apparent to the tower. After a short discussion with the tower I decided my best option would be to go to bradley international since they were better equipped to handle my problem, they then turned me over to approach control and I was vectored to runway 33 at bradley international. I still had 1 red and 2 green lights illuminated when turned over to bradley tower. They also took a look at my gear as I came across the field. I advised them that I wanted to make 1 touch-and-go hoping to jar the right main a little further down. After doing this, the tower said the right main gear still appeared to be in the same position. The next landing would be full stop. I told them if I were to veer off the runway at all, it would be to the right side. The tower suggested I would have the least number of obstacles on the right side of the runway past the intersection of runway 19. When asked if I wanted the runway foamed, I declined, feeling this would make my left brake useless for directional control. I did keep my passenger informed as we went and made a final briefing about tying down any loose equipment, making sure his seat belt and shoulder harness was all hooked up. I also reminded him of the 2 evacuate/evacuation rtes through the cabin door or emergency hatch and how they operated. I completed the briefing just as I turned on to a long final approach to runway 33. I made a normal approach to runway 33 using full flaps, after crossing the fence, I feathered the right engine, at just about touchdown, I shutdown the left engine. Touchdown was just short of the runway 19 intersection. I rolled approximately 500 ft before I noticed the right wing starting to settle, using full left aileron, I delayed contact as long as I could with only enough braking to maintain directional control. After the wingtip contacted the pavement, the drag became so great that it was soon evident I would ground loop no matter how much brake I used. At this point, I reduced the brake pressure hoping to reduce the sideload on the left main gear as much as possible. After stopping, we ended up almost 180 degrees to the direction of landing. I then followed my passenger out the door as soon as he got it open. I spent nearly an hour in the air with this problem and at the time of landing I had about 30 mins of fuel left on board. In rethinking the whole situation over in my mind, I don't think I would have changed anything I did. I believe I exhausted all my options before committing to land. I knew that with this system being mechanical, the whole system was tied together and everything had to come down together unless there was a mechanical disconnection. The cause of this incident is still a mystery to me and I have no idea what could have called thisproblem, as the aircraft had been operating normal for as long as I had been flying it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR SMT PERFORMS A GEAR-UP LNDG AFTER R GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND.

Narrative: PRIOR TO THIS FLT I HAD COMPLETED A THOROUGH PREFLT OF THE ACFT WITH NOTHING UNUSUAL NOTED. THE FLT TO MY DEST WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. I ARRIVED AT THE HARTFORD/BRAINARD ARPT JUST BEFORE XYAM WITH ABOUT 1 PLUS 30 FUEL ON BOARD. THE WX WAS EXCELLENT WITH SOME SCATTERED CLOUDS AT ABOUT 3000 FT AND 20 MI OF VISIBILITY. THE TWR HAD CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 02 SO I EXTENDED APCH FLAPS AND THEN LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR. AS THE GEAR WENT DOWN I NOTICED QUITE A BIT OF BANGING AND KNOCKING UNDER THE FLOORBOARD AS IT WENT DOWN. AFTER THE GEAR MOTOR STOPPED THE L MAIN, NOSE, AND GEAR UNSAFE LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. THE R MAIN WAS NOT ILLUMINATED, SO I CHECKED THE PRESS-TO-TEST FEATURE TO CONFIRM THAT THE LIGHT BULB WAS STILL GOOD. I INFORMED THE TWR OF MY PROBLEM AND ON A FLY-BY THEY INFORMED ME THAT THE R GEAR WAS STILL UP. THE NOSE AND L MAIN APPEARED NORMALLY EXTENDED. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE EMER GEAR LOWERING HANDCRANK WITHOUT ANY RESULTS. I COULD NOT FEEL A POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT OF THE GEAR TRAIN AS COMPARED TO PAST EXPERIENCE I HAD DURING A GEAR EXTENSION WITH THE HANDCRANK. I TRIED YAWING THE ACFT AND PULLING SOME 'G' LOAD WITH NO APPARENT SUCCESS. THE NEXT THING I DID WAS TO RECYCLE THE GEAR. WHEN I COMPLETED THAT, THE TWR RPTED THE R MAIN WAS NOW DOWN AND, AFTER ANOTHER FLY- BY, THEY SAID IT APPEARED TO BE WITHIN ABOUT 20 DEGS OF FULL DOWN. I TRIED SOME MORE YAWING AND PULLING 'G' LOAD WITHOUT ANY FURTHER EXTENSION BEING APPARENT TO THE TWR. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION WITH THE TWR I DECIDED MY BEST OPTION WOULD BE TO GO TO BRADLEY INTL SINCE THEY WERE BETTER EQUIPPED TO HANDLE MY PROBLEM, THEY THEN TURNED ME OVER TO APCH CTL AND I WAS VECTORED TO RWY 33 AT BRADLEY INTL. I STILL HAD 1 RED AND 2 GREEN LIGHTS ILLUMINATED WHEN TURNED OVER TO BRADLEY TWR. THEY ALSO TOOK A LOOK AT MY GEAR AS I CAME ACROSS THE FIELD. I ADVISED THEM THAT I WANTED TO MAKE 1 TOUCH-AND-GO HOPING TO JAR THE R MAIN A LITTLE FURTHER DOWN. AFTER DOING THIS, THE TWR SAID THE R MAIN GEAR STILL APPEARED TO BE IN THE SAME POS. THE NEXT LNDG WOULD BE FULL STOP. I TOLD THEM IF I WERE TO VEER OFF THE RWY AT ALL, IT WOULD BE TO THE R SIDE. THE TWR SUGGESTED I WOULD HAVE THE LEAST NUMBER OF OBSTACLES ON THE R SIDE OF THE RWY PAST THE INTXN OF RWY 19. WHEN ASKED IF I WANTED THE RWY FOAMED, I DECLINED, FEELING THIS WOULD MAKE MY L BRAKE USELESS FOR DIRECTIONAL CTL. I DID KEEP MY PAX INFORMED AS WE WENT AND MADE A FINAL BRIEFING ABOUT TYING DOWN ANY LOOSE EQUIP, MAKING SURE HIS SEAT BELT AND SHOULDER HARNESS WAS ALL HOOKED UP. I ALSO REMINDED HIM OF THE 2 EVAC RTES THROUGH THE CABIN DOOR OR EMER HATCH AND HOW THEY OPERATED. I COMPLETED THE BRIEFING JUST AS I TURNED ON TO A LONG FINAL APCH TO RWY 33. I MADE A NORMAL APCH TO RWY 33 USING FULL FLAPS, AFTER XING THE FENCE, I FEATHERED THE R ENG, AT JUST ABOUT TOUCHDOWN, I SHUTDOWN THE L ENG. TOUCHDOWN WAS JUST SHORT OF THE RWY 19 INTXN. I ROLLED APPROX 500 FT BEFORE I NOTICED THE R WING STARTING TO SETTLE, USING FULL L AILERON, I DELAYED CONTACT AS LONG AS I COULD WITH ONLY ENOUGH BRAKING TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. AFTER THE WINGTIP CONTACTED THE PAVEMENT, THE DRAG BECAME SO GREAT THAT IT WAS SOON EVIDENT I WOULD GND LOOP NO MATTER HOW MUCH BRAKE I USED. AT THIS POINT, I REDUCED THE BRAKE PRESSURE HOPING TO REDUCE THE SIDELOAD ON THE L MAIN GEAR AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. AFTER STOPPING, WE ENDED UP ALMOST 180 DEGS TO THE DIRECTION OF LNDG. I THEN FOLLOWED MY PAX OUT THE DOOR AS SOON AS HE GOT IT OPEN. I SPENT NEARLY AN HR IN THE AIR WITH THIS PROBLEM AND AT THE TIME OF LNDG I HAD ABOUT 30 MINS OF FUEL LEFT ON BOARD. IN RETHINKING THE WHOLE SITUATION OVER IN MY MIND, I DON'T THINK I WOULD HAVE CHANGED ANYTHING I DID. I BELIEVE I EXHAUSTED ALL MY OPTIONS BEFORE COMMITTING TO LAND. I KNEW THAT WITH THIS SYS BEING MECHANICAL, THE WHOLE SYS WAS TIED TOGETHER AND EVERYTHING HAD TO COME DOWN TOGETHER UNLESS THERE WAS A MECHANICAL DISCONNECTION. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT IS STILL A MYSTERY TO ME AND I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT COULD HAVE CALLED THISPROBLEM, AS THE ACFT HAD BEEN OPERATING NORMAL FOR AS LONG AS I HAD BEEN FLYING IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.