Narrative:

I was working sector 38 at ZAB, which is a phx departure sector. Airways facilities decided to take down the humbolt radar site and did not notify the controllers working the sectors that would be impacted. When humbolt radar goes down, sector 38 loses radar contact with virtually all aircraft below FL200. If the radar went down earlier, when I was extremely busy, I believe I would have lost separation with approximately 10 aircraft. This was a voluntary loss of radar, planned by airways facilities. The controllers involved might have had enough notice had airways facilities decided to call the impacted sectors. Instead, they decided to type a message into the computer, hoping (I guess) that the information would reach the controller in enough time for him to take appropriate action. In any case, I wonder why this type of planned maintenance could not be done on the midnight shift? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said that the shutdown of the radar site was not a scheduled shutdown, but rather a random shutdown for routine maintenance. It had been coordinated with the control room. However, for some reason, the reporter was not advised of the outage until it occurred. A message was issued by someone in the control room, probably a flight data person. It was not generated by the technician. Reporter doesn't think that a ucr was filed, nor was the facility controller representative advised. Reporter also stated that the shutdown was supposed to be for 2 mins, but it lasted longer than that. The humbolt radar site is located about 40 mi north of phx. Analyst mentioned that if this was an ongoing situation, then maybe contacting the facility controller representative would be in order. However, since this appears to be an isolated case, probably nothing else needs to be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR COMPLAINS ABOUT MAINT POLICY OF SHUTTING DOWN THE RADAR WITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTIFICATION FOR CTLRS TO MAKE ALTERNATE PLANS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING SECTOR 38 AT ZAB, WHICH IS A PHX DEP SECTOR. AIRWAYS FACILITIES DECIDED TO TAKE DOWN THE HUMBOLT RADAR SITE AND DID NOT NOTIFY THE CTLRS WORKING THE SECTORS THAT WOULD BE IMPACTED. WHEN HUMBOLT RADAR GOES DOWN, SECTOR 38 LOSES RADAR CONTACT WITH VIRTUALLY ALL ACFT BELOW FL200. IF THE RADAR WENT DOWN EARLIER, WHEN I WAS EXTREMELY BUSY, I BELIEVE I WOULD HAVE LOST SEPARATION WITH APPROX 10 ACFT. THIS WAS A VOLUNTARY LOSS OF RADAR, PLANNED BY AIRWAYS FACILITIES. THE CTLRS INVOLVED MIGHT HAVE HAD ENOUGH NOTICE HAD AIRWAYS FACILITIES DECIDED TO CALL THE IMPACTED SECTORS. INSTEAD, THEY DECIDED TO TYPE A MESSAGE INTO THE COMPUTER, HOPING (I GUESS) THAT THE INFO WOULD REACH THE CTLR IN ENOUGH TIME FOR HIM TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. IN ANY CASE, I WONDER WHY THIS TYPE OF PLANNED MAINT COULD NOT BE DONE ON THE MIDNIGHT SHIFT? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID THAT THE SHUTDOWN OF THE RADAR SITE WAS NOT A SCHEDULED SHUTDOWN, BUT RATHER A RANDOM SHUTDOWN FOR ROUTINE MAINT. IT HAD BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE CTL ROOM. HOWEVER, FOR SOME REASON, THE RPTR WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE OUTAGE UNTIL IT OCCURRED. A MESSAGE WAS ISSUED BY SOMEONE IN THE CTL ROOM, PROBABLY A FLT DATA PERSON. IT WAS NOT GENERATED BY THE TECHNICIAN. RPTR DOESN'T THINK THAT A UCR WAS FILED, NOR WAS THE FACILITY CTLR REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED. RPTR ALSO STATED THAT THE SHUTDOWN WAS SUPPOSED TO BE FOR 2 MINS, BUT IT LASTED LONGER THAN THAT. THE HUMBOLT RADAR SITE IS LOCATED ABOUT 40 MI N OF PHX. ANALYST MENTIONED THAT IF THIS WAS AN ONGOING SIT, THEN MAYBE CONTACTING THE FACILITY CTLR REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE IN ORDER. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS APPEARS TO BE AN ISOLATED CASE, PROBABLY NOTHING ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.