Narrative:

The first officer was hand flying the departure from ewr. At 2500 ft, heading 280 degrees, the controller gave us a multi-part clearance to 'climb to 6000 ft, heading 220 degrees, and intercept the 350 degree radial of colts neck.' I set the 6000 ft in the MCP altitude window, 220 degrees in the MCP heading window. The first officer apparently did not hear the 'climb to 6000 ft' part of the multi-part clearance and continued to maintain 2500 ft. During this time TCASII issued a TA. The traffic was displayed on the HSI 1000 ft below us. While we were still setting up the navigation system to comply with the clearance, TCASII issued an aural RA to 'reduce descent' followed closely by 'monitor vertical speed.' since I was setting up the 'intercept leg to' colts neck, I was not completely in the airplanes' vertical situation loop and thought we were climbing since I did not yet realize the first officer had not heard the clearance to climb. Because in my mind we were climbing and my attention was divided between talking to the controller and setting up the navigation system, I mistakenly interpreted the TCASII warning as meaning 'level off.' in response to the controller's clearance to climb, I told him we were receiving a TCASII RA which indicated not to climb. At the same time, I was checking the ADI for verification of the aural warning. It took me a few seconds to correctly analyze the ADI and realize the traffic was below us. The ADI showed the airplane symbol above the red trapezoid. As soon as I correctly understood the situation, I advised the controller we could and would climb and urged the first officer to climb to 6000 ft. The next controller advised me that the previous controller was filing a pilot deviation report. In talking to the ewr TRACON manager later from west palm beach, I was told that ATC is obliged to file a deviation when TCASII is invoked for not following the controller's clearance. She also indicated the closest point of approach was approximately 1.5 mi and 700 ft. Supplemental information from acn 222898: a contributing cause may have been we were cleared initially newark 4 departure, after takeoff we were given a vector to intercept a radial (and maybe a climb clearance I didn't hear). We were extremely busy with confign changes and retuning radios. Every effort to comply with clearance was performed. Significant deviations to initial clrncs while in critical phase of flight with high workload as well as multiple directive clearance is a recipe for trouble. Also, note if a climb clearance was issued in the initial multiple directive clearance. No urgency in the clearance was indicated as is common with potential conflicts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG CREW FAILED TO CLB WHEN CLRED. THIS CAUSED LTSS WITH AN ITINERANT ACFT.

Narrative: THE FO WAS HAND FLYING THE DEP FROM EWR. AT 2500 FT, HDG 280 DEGS, THE CTLR GAVE US A MULTI-PART CLRNC TO 'CLB TO 6000 FT, HDG 220 DEGS, AND INTERCEPT THE 350 DEG RADIAL OF COLTS NECK.' I SET THE 6000 FT IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW, 220 DEGS IN THE MCP HDG WINDOW. THE FO APPARENTLY DID NOT HEAR THE 'CLB TO 6000 FT' PART OF THE MULTI-PART CLRNC AND CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT. DURING THIS TIME TCASII ISSUED A TA. THE TFC WAS DISPLAYED ON THE HSI 1000 FT BELOW US. WHILE WE WERE STILL SETTING UP THE NAV SYS TO COMPLY WITH THE CLRNC, TCASII ISSUED AN AURAL RA TO 'REDUCE DSCNT' FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' SINCE I WAS SETTING UP THE 'INTERCEPT LEG TO' COLTS NECK, I WAS NOT COMPLETELY IN THE AIRPLANES' VERT SITUATION LOOP AND THOUGHT WE WERE CLBING SINCE I DID NOT YET REALIZE THE FO HAD NOT HEARD THE CLRNC TO CLB. BECAUSE IN MY MIND WE WERE CLBING AND MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN TALKING TO THE CTLR AND SETTING UP THE NAV SYS, I MISTAKENLY INTERPRETED THE TCASII WARNING AS MEANING 'LEVEL OFF.' IN RESPONSE TO THE CTLR'S CLRNC TO CLB, I TOLD HIM WE WERE RECEIVING A TCASII RA WHICH INDICATED NOT TO CLB. AT THE SAME TIME, I WAS CHKING THE ADI FOR VERIFICATION OF THE AURAL WARNING. IT TOOK ME A FEW SECONDS TO CORRECTLY ANALYZE THE ADI AND REALIZE THE TFC WAS BELOW US. THE ADI SHOWED THE AIRPLANE SYMBOL ABOVE THE RED TRAPEZOID. AS SOON AS I CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION, I ADVISED THE CTLR WE COULD AND WOULD CLB AND URGED THE FO TO CLB TO 6000 FT. THE NEXT CTLR ADVISED ME THAT THE PREVIOUS CTLR WAS FILING A PLTDEV RPT. IN TALKING TO THE EWR TRACON MGR LATER FROM W PALM BEACH, I WAS TOLD THAT ATC IS OBLIGED TO FILE A DEV WHEN TCASII IS INVOKED FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE CTLR'S CLRNC. SHE ALSO INDICATED THE CLOSEST POINT OF APCH WAS APPROX 1.5 MI AND 700 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 222898: A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE MAY HAVE BEEN WE WERE CLRED INITIALLY NEWARK 4 DEP, AFTER TKOF WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL (AND MAYBE A CLB CLRNC I DIDN'T HEAR). WE WERE EXTREMELY BUSY WITH CONFIGN CHANGES AND RETUNING RADIOS. EVERY EFFORT TO COMPLY WITH CLRNC WAS PERFORMED. SIGNIFICANT DEVS TO INITIAL CLRNCS WHILE IN CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT WITH HIGH WORKLOAD AS WELL AS MULTIPLE DIRECTIVE CLRNC IS A RECIPE FOR TROUBLE. ALSO, NOTE IF A CLB CLRNC WAS ISSUED IN THE INITIAL MULTIPLE DIRECTIVE CLRNC. NO URGENCY IN THE CLRNC WAS INDICATED AS IS COMMON WITH POTENTIAL CONFLICTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.