Narrative:

We were in line (#5) for takeoff on runway 24L. To start all engines, and allow sufficient time for engine warm-up, completion of checklists, and yet be able to maximize fuel savings, one has to be totally aware of how departure flow is going. 2 commuter aircraft had been crossed to 24R, leaving 2 aircraft ahead of us. I directed the crew to commence starting #2 and #3 engines, when the lead aircraft was cleared into position on 24L. When the aircraft in front of us was told to taxi into position on runway 24L (an large transport) we were told to taxi up and hold short of 24L. I acknowledged this transmission from tower myself. I continued to taxi slowly toward the hold line, timing my taxi in such a manner that I would not have to stop, and then add breakaway power when cleared into position (I've been using this technique for yrs), thinking the tower would clear the large transport for takeoff, and then our flight into position. During this period, we were completing the delayed start checklist, so there was also some communication in the cockpit. The flight ahead of us was cleared for takeoff, and I heard our flight number and a transmission interrupted by my so's reading of the checklist, and my first officer respond to the tower. But, what I understood was what I had anticipated to be taxi into position. As I slowly crossed the hold line, my first officer said we are to hold short. I stopped the aircraft well short of the runway (I estimate about 30 ft), but approximately 10 ft past the 'hold line.' looking again toward the approach zone, an air carrier medium large transport came into view about 4 mi out, lined up for 24L. Up to that time I did not know the reason for our being held short, as runway 24R was the primary runway for lndgs. I directed the first officer to tell the tower we were beyond the line, and also personally added that we were about 10 ft past it. After a brief moment of silence, the tower directed the airliner to go around. Obviously, the fault in mine. Contributing factors were high workloads and a second directive from the tower that contained 'hold short' instructions that I misunderstood to be clearance into position and hold (either clearance having the word hold in it). Cockpit checklist communication was nil, not having the big picture. By that I mean no mention was made during either 'hold short' xmissions by tower as to why we were to be held. The end result was that the second transmission was a trap for me, in that what I anticipated, was what I heard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION, OR NEAR ENOUGH FOR LNDG ARR TFC TO HAVE TO PERFORM EVASIVE ACTION GAR. FLC ERROR ADMITTED.

Narrative: WE WERE IN LINE (#5) FOR TKOF ON RWY 24L. TO START ALL ENGS, AND ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ENG WARM-UP, COMPLETION OF CHKLISTS, AND YET BE ABLE TO MAXIMIZE FUEL SAVINGS, ONE HAS TO BE TOTALLY AWARE OF HOW DEP FLOW IS GOING. 2 COMMUTER ACFT HAD BEEN CROSSED TO 24R, LEAVING 2 ACFT AHEAD OF US. I DIRECTED THE CREW TO COMMENCE STARTING #2 AND #3 ENGS, WHEN THE LEAD ACFT WAS CLRED INTO POS ON 24L. WHEN THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US WAS TOLD TO TAXI INTO POS ON RWY 24L (AN LGT) WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI UP AND HOLD SHORT OF 24L. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS XMISSION FROM TWR MYSELF. I CONTINUED TO TAXI SLOWLY TOWARD THE HOLD LINE, TIMING MY TAXI IN SUCH A MANNER THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TO STOP, AND THEN ADD BREAKAWAY PWR WHEN CLRED INTO POS (I'VE BEEN USING THIS TECHNIQUE FOR YRS), THINKING THE TWR WOULD CLR THE LGT FOR TKOF, AND THEN OUR FLT INTO POS. DURING THIS PERIOD, WE WERE COMPLETING THE DELAYED START CHKLIST, SO THERE WAS ALSO SOME COM IN THE COCKPIT. THE FLT AHEAD OF US WAS CLRED FOR TKOF, AND I HEARD OUR FLT NUMBER AND A XMISSION INTERRUPTED BY MY SO'S READING OF THE CHKLIST, AND MY FO RESPOND TO THE TWR. BUT, WHAT I UNDERSTOOD WAS WHAT I HAD ANTICIPATED TO BE TAXI INTO POS. AS I SLOWLY CROSSED THE HOLD LINE, MY FO SAID WE ARE TO HOLD SHORT. I STOPPED THE ACFT WELL SHORT OF THE RWY (I ESTIMATE ABOUT 30 FT), BUT APPROX 10 FT PAST THE 'HOLD LINE.' LOOKING AGAIN TOWARD THE APCH ZONE, AN ACR MLG CAME INTO VIEW ABOUT 4 MI OUT, LINED UP FOR 24L. UP TO THAT TIME I DID NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR OUR BEING HELD SHORT, AS RWY 24R WAS THE PRIMARY RWY FOR LNDGS. I DIRECTED THE FO TO TELL THE TWR WE WERE BEYOND THE LINE, AND ALSO PERSONALLY ADDED THAT WE WERE ABOUT 10 FT PAST IT. AFTER A BRIEF MOMENT OF SILENCE, THE TWR DIRECTED THE AIRLINER TO GAR. OBVIOUSLY, THE FAULT IN MINE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE HIGH WORKLOADS AND A SECOND DIRECTIVE FROM THE TWR THAT CONTAINED 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS THAT I MISUNDERSTOOD TO BE CLRNC INTO POS AND HOLD (EITHER CLRNC HAVING THE WORD HOLD IN IT). COCKPIT CHKLIST COM WAS NIL, NOT HAVING THE BIG PICTURE. BY THAT I MEAN NO MENTION WAS MADE DURING EITHER 'HOLD SHORT' XMISSIONS BY TWR AS TO WHY WE WERE TO BE HELD. THE END RESULT WAS THAT THE SECOND XMISSION WAS A TRAP FOR ME, IN THAT WHAT I ANTICIPATED, WAS WHAT I HEARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.