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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 226342 |
Time | |
Date | 199211 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cle |
State Reference | OH |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cle |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : straight in |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : second officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 2100 |
ASRS Report | 226342 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 226348 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude inflight encounter : weather inflight encounter other non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The captain was shooting the ILS 23L with the VASI and GS out. He descended too early and at too high of rate. I thought he was low, so I checked my notes that made off the capts approach plate. Flight engineer's don't carry approach plates at air carrier. My notes said that he was low, so I checked the captain's approach plate to make sure that I was right. By this time, the first officer had informed the captain that he was too low. He immediately corrected. The rest of the approach was a bit sloppy. I believe contributing factors were as follows: the WX was much worse than the ATIS had called for. It was changed as soon as we landed. The crew was too concerned about the lower WX and therefore we were looking for the runway when more attention should have been given to flying the airplane. I also believe the ILS 28 should have been in use since it was totally operational. Cleveland did begin using it after we landed. I should have spoken up sooner without looking at the captain's approach plate and trusted my handwritten notes of the approach. I'm not sure, but air carrier's altimeter procedure may have been confusing. (We set the altimeters with the conversion altimeter except for the standby altimeter which is MLS). Supplemental information from acn 226348. 'Pull up' warning from GPWS sounded. GPWS sounded for 2300 FPM descent. Captain descended excessively, resulting in GPWS warning and drifted 1 1/2 to 2 dots left of localizer centerline. The approach brief was short and not very complete owing to the fact that we expected to see the airport much earlier. WX was significantly lower than ATIS reported and, in my opinion, the captain misread the step down fixes because the NDB and OM are not co-located.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN LGT MADE A POOR APCH IN IMC. THE ACTUAL WX WAS MUCH LOWER THAN THE RPTED ATIS WX.
Narrative: THE CAPT WAS SHOOTING THE ILS 23L WITH THE VASI AND GS OUT. HE DSNDED TOO EARLY AND AT TOO HIGH OF RATE. I THOUGHT HE WAS LOW, SO I CHKED MY NOTES THAT MADE OFF THE CAPTS APCH PLATE. FE'S DON'T CARRY APCH PLATES AT ACR. MY NOTES SAID THAT HE WAS LOW, SO I CHKED THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE TO MAKE SURE THAT I WAS RIGHT. BY THIS TIME, THE FO HAD INFORMED THE CAPT THAT HE WAS TOO LOW. HE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS A BIT SLOPPY. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AS FOLLOWS: THE WX WAS MUCH WORSE THAN THE ATIS HAD CALLED FOR. IT WAS CHANGED AS SOON AS WE LANDED. THE CREW WAS TOO CONCERNED ABOUT THE LOWER WX AND THEREFORE WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE RWY WHEN MORE ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FLYING THE AIRPLANE. I ALSO BELIEVE THE ILS 28 SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN USE SINCE IT WAS TOTALLY OPERATIONAL. CLEVELAND DID BEGIN USING IT AFTER WE LANDED. I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP SOONER WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE AND TRUSTED MY HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF THE APCH. I'M NOT SURE, BUT ACR'S ALTIMETER PROC MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING. (WE SET THE ALTIMETERS WITH THE CONVERSION ALTIMETER EXCEPT FOR THE STANDBY ALTIMETER WHICH IS MLS). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 226348. 'PULL UP' WARNING FROM GPWS SOUNDED. GPWS SOUNDED FOR 2300 FPM DSCNT. CAPT DSNDED EXCESSIVELY, RESULTING IN GPWS WARNING AND DRIFTED 1 1/2 TO 2 DOTS L OF LOC CTRLINE. THE APCH BRIEF WAS SHORT AND NOT VERY COMPLETE OWING TO THE FACT THAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE THE ARPT MUCH EARLIER. WX WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN ATIS RPTED AND, IN MY OPINION, THE CAPT MISREAD THE STEP DOWN FIXES BECAUSE THE NDB AND OM ARE NOT CO-LOCATED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.