Narrative:

The next 2 legs, atl-stl-msp, looked like a piece of cake, with stl at 1400 overcast/5 mi, and msp clear. We were given a blanket release to msp, and I mentally relaxed. The fuel load to stl was approximately 30000 pounds since an alternate was necessary, and approximately 20000 to msp. After conferring on the fuel, I okayed it. I then looked at the fuel to msp in case I needed to change it in stl. It too was good. The first mistake occurred when the load control agent inadvertently put the fuel to msp (20000 pounds) on the load sheet, and the fueler then loaded our aircraft with the wrong fuel load. I read the before start checklist to the first officer and flight engineer. When the flight engineer responded to fuel with 20000 pounds, that sounded right to me, as I had most recently been thinking about the fuel to msp. The leg to stl was approximately 1 hour 18 mins, and we leveled off about 10000 ft lower than planned due to turbulence above. I made a time and fuel check, and was astounded to find that we were over 10000 pounds short. We quickly determined where the error occurred. The flight engineer calculated the fuel burn to stl and determined that we would land with approximately 6000 pounds (FAA reserve with no alternate fuel). Since stl was as close as any other of our regular airports, we decided to continue. We asked stl approach control for an expedited approach due to low fuel, and he complied. We landed with approximately 5800 pounds. Contributing factors to this incident were the load control agent's error, my complacency in not double checking the release with the actual fuel load (I had not seen this type of error happen in 26 yrs) and failure of the other crew members to catch the error. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have learned a valuable lesson without a catastrophe occurring. From now on, I will always triple check the fuel (release, load slip, and fuel gauges).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT TOOK OFF WITH LESS FUEL THAN WAS LEGALLY REQUIRED.

Narrative: THE NEXT 2 LEGS, ATL-STL-MSP, LOOKED LIKE A PIECE OF CAKE, WITH STL AT 1400 OVCST/5 MI, AND MSP CLR. WE WERE GIVEN A BLANKET RELEASE TO MSP, AND I MENTALLY RELAXED. THE FUEL LOAD TO STL WAS APPROX 30000 LBS SINCE AN ALTERNATE WAS NECESSARY, AND APPROX 20000 TO MSP. AFTER CONFERRING ON THE FUEL, I OKAYED IT. I THEN LOOKED AT THE FUEL TO MSP IN CASE I NEEDED TO CHANGE IT IN STL. IT TOO WAS GOOD. THE FIRST MISTAKE OCCURRED WHEN THE LOAD CTL AGENT INADVERTENTLY PUT THE FUEL TO MSP (20000 LBS) ON THE LOAD SHEET, AND THE FUELER THEN LOADED OUR ACFT WITH THE WRONG FUEL LOAD. I READ THE BEFORE START CHKLIST TO THE FO AND FE. WHEN THE FE RESPONDED TO FUEL WITH 20000 LBS, THAT SOUNDED RIGHT TO ME, AS I HAD MOST RECENTLY BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE FUEL TO MSP. THE LEG TO STL WAS APPROX 1 HR 18 MINS, AND WE LEVELED OFF ABOUT 10000 FT LOWER THAN PLANNED DUE TO TURB ABOVE. I MADE A TIME AND FUEL CHK, AND WAS ASTOUNDED TO FIND THAT WE WERE OVER 10000 LBS SHORT. WE QUICKLY DETERMINED WHERE THE ERROR OCCURRED. THE FE CALCULATED THE FUEL BURN TO STL AND DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD LAND WITH APPROX 6000 LBS (FAA RESERVE WITH NO ALTERNATE FUEL). SINCE STL WAS AS CLOSE AS ANY OTHER OF OUR REGULAR ARPTS, WE DECIDED TO CONTINUE. WE ASKED STL APCH CTL FOR AN EXPEDITED APCH DUE TO LOW FUEL, AND HE COMPLIED. WE LANDED WITH APPROX 5800 LBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE THE LOAD CTL AGENT'S ERROR, MY COMPLACENCY IN NOT DOUBLE CHKING THE RELEASE WITH THE ACTUAL FUEL LOAD (I HAD NOT SEEN THIS TYPE OF ERROR HAPPEN IN 26 YRS) AND FAILURE OF THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS TO CATCH THE ERROR. I CONSIDER MYSELF EXTREMELY FORTUNATE TO HAVE LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON WITHOUT A CATASTROPHE OCCURRING. FROM NOW ON, I WILL ALWAYS TRIPLE CHK THE FUEL (RELEASE, LOAD SLIP, AND FUEL GAUGES).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.