Narrative:

When nearing C35 (reedsburg, wi) to land, entry to a runway 18 upwind was made flying over FBO hangar to observe windsock (wind northwest-west-southwest, variable). Unicom was 'favoring' runway 18. The wind sock did not favor runway 18 or runway 36. Initially a call to land was given 8 mi nnw. After entering 18 upwing an small aircraft reported 5.3 southeast, aircraft Y. I suspected a conflict on the downwind runway 18 so I replied I would extend to the south. Another small aircraft Z reported he was entering downwind runway 18 but as I proceeded south the blue and white Z crossed in front of me, aircraft Z. I continued south. The 2 small aircraft's continued downwind runway 18, I believe. I heard aircraft X report final but did not hear the blue and white Z report. Meanwhile I had turned crosswind and decided to abort land runway 18 and change to runway 36, winds were favorable and I was now 4 mi south C35. I proceeded to turn final and reported final runway 18 at 2 mi from airport. I also heard an small aircraft report clear runway 18 at this point. I continued. At 1 mi I spotted aircraft Y about 7/8 down (south runway 18). At about the end of the runway he spotted me. He was still on the runway moving. I yielded by leveling off, turning left and flying a left pattern to runway 18 and landing. I was at 600 AGL when I leveled. The 18/36 runway is about 5000 ft. On landing the pilot (I think) of aircraft Y was upset, an apology for inadvertently reporting final runway 18 instead of final runway 36 did not satisfy him. I feel there are several contributing factors: 1) blue and white small aircraft Z was difficult to follow because of position reports. 2) although airplane traffic at C35 was light (3 aircraft) 122.8 communication was heavy, many reports were 'stepped on.' for example: baraboo, winona, watertown and reedsburg were active 122.8. 3) pilot of aircraft Y felt that runway 18 was only active runway I believe, and that other runways should not be used. This is an uncontrolled field. 4) unicom report of favoring runway 18 was probably incorrect, winds actually favored runway 25. Unicom personnel are not always aviation alert. The wind sock on the FBO hangar is usually more accurate, the wind indicator at midfield is not always useful (snow, ice, etc). On departure that day at about XA30 pm local time, an small transport had similar problems on 122.8 communications. His reply was 'you were stepped on but I think I heard 18.' I believe that these factors contributed to the distraction that caused a report of final runway 18 instead of final runway 36, a suggestion of a more discrete frequency might help.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT HAS HIS OWN THOUGHTS ON RWY IN USE SELECTION CRITERION AND BECOMES INVOLVED WITH OPPOSITE DIRECTION LNDG TFC DURING HIS ATTEMPT TO LAND, ON OCCUPIED RWY.

Narrative: WHEN NEARING C35 (REEDSBURG, WI) TO LAND, ENTRY TO A RWY 18 UPWIND WAS MADE FLYING OVER FBO HANGAR TO OBSERVE WINDSOCK (WIND NW-W-SW, VARIABLE). UNICOM WAS 'FAVORING' RWY 18. THE WIND SOCK DID NOT FAVOR RWY 18 OR RWY 36. INITIALLY A CALL TO LAND WAS GIVEN 8 MI NNW. AFTER ENTERING 18 UPWING AN SMA RPTED 5.3 SE, ACFT Y. I SUSPECTED A CONFLICT ON THE DOWNWIND RWY 18 SO I REPLIED I WOULD EXTEND TO THE S. ANOTHER SMA Z RPTED HE WAS ENTERING DOWNWIND RWY 18 BUT AS I PROCEEDED S THE BLUE AND WHITE Z CROSSED IN FRONT OF ME, ACFT Z. I CONTINUED S. THE 2 SMA'S CONTINUED DOWNWIND RWY 18, I BELIEVE. I HEARD ACFT X RPT FINAL BUT DID NOT HEAR THE BLUE AND WHITE Z RPT. MEANWHILE I HAD TURNED XWIND AND DECIDED TO ABORT LAND RWY 18 AND CHANGE TO RWY 36, WINDS WERE FAVORABLE AND I WAS NOW 4 MI S C35. I PROCEEDED TO TURN FINAL AND RPTED FINAL RWY 18 AT 2 MI FROM ARPT. I ALSO HEARD AN SMA RPT CLR RWY 18 AT THIS POINT. I CONTINUED. AT 1 MI I SPOTTED ACFT Y ABOUT 7/8 DOWN (S RWY 18). AT ABOUT THE END OF THE RWY HE SPOTTED ME. HE WAS STILL ON THE RWY MOVING. I YIELDED BY LEVELING OFF, TURNING L AND FLYING A L PATTERN TO RWY 18 AND LNDG. I WAS AT 600 AGL WHEN I LEVELED. THE 18/36 RWY IS ABOUT 5000 FT. ON LNDG THE PLT (I THINK) OF ACFT Y WAS UPSET, AN APOLOGY FOR INADVERTENTLY RPTING FINAL RWY 18 INSTEAD OF FINAL RWY 36 DID NOT SATISFY HIM. I FEEL THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) BLUE AND WHITE SMA Z WAS DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW BECAUSE OF POS RPTS. 2) ALTHOUGH AIRPLANE TFC AT C35 WAS LIGHT (3 ACFT) 122.8 COM WAS HVY, MANY RPTS WERE 'STEPPED ON.' FOR EXAMPLE: BARABOO, WINONA, WATERTOWN AND REEDSBURG WERE ACTIVE 122.8. 3) PLT OF ACFT Y FELT THAT RWY 18 WAS ONLY ACTIVE RWY I BELIEVE, AND THAT OTHER RWYS SHOULD NOT BE USED. THIS IS AN UNCTLED FIELD. 4) UNICOM RPT OF FAVORING RWY 18 WAS PROBABLY INCORRECT, WINDS ACTUALLY FAVORED RWY 25. UNICOM PERSONNEL ARE NOT ALWAYS AVIATION ALERT. THE WIND SOCK ON THE FBO HANGAR IS USUALLY MORE ACCURATE, THE WIND INDICATOR AT MIDFIELD IS NOT ALWAYS USEFUL (SNOW, ICE, ETC). ON DEP THAT DAY AT ABOUT XA30 PM LCL TIME, AN SMT HAD SIMILAR PROBS ON 122.8 COMS. HIS REPLY WAS 'YOU WERE STEPPED ON BUT I THINK I HEARD 18.' I BELIEVE THAT THESE FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTR THAT CAUSED A RPT OF FINAL RWY 18 INSTEAD OF FINAL RWY 36, A SUGGESTION OF A MORE DISCRETE FREQ MIGHT HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.