Narrative:

Departing miami there was a delay in receiving our weight and balance information. When #1 for departure the information came over ACARS. Maximum takeoff weight was 117000 pounds and our weight was 117159 pounds. After subtracting taxi fuel the aircraft weight was under 117000 pounds. Because of the high weight we elected to make a bleeds off takeoff. Due to the delay in weight and balance, takeoff clearance and a change in initial altitude from 5000 ft to 2000 ft from tower, and configuring the bleed switches, we did not notice the APU had already been shut down. Since the APU was shut down we were also making an unpressurized takeoff. On the initial takeoff roll to approximately 70 KTS there was a master caution and service door light. The captain rejected the takeoff without incidence. The lead flight attendant informed us that as we were beginning the takeoff they noticed the door did not appear in the completely closed position. With the loss of pressurization after turning the bleeds off, the door was allowed to open enough to illuminate the service door light. After returning to the gate, and maintenance checking for proper operation and closure of the service door, the flight continued. Supplemental information from acn 234705: while quickly accomplishing the before takeoff checklist the first officer mentioned that the takeoff weight shown on ACARS was '159 pounds over the maximum takeoff weight.' I assumed that he meant we were 159 pounds over the performance limited weight (not the structural limit weight) so I asked him to configure the air conditioning system for a bleeds off takeoff to get the extra performance I thought was needed. Because the APU was already shut down we began the takeoff roll with the aircraft unpressurized. I rejected the takeoff immediately (at approximately 70 KTS) with no problems, taxied back to the gate and wrote up the door light. Maintenance personnel inspected the door, found debris on the proximity switch, cleaned it, operated and verified normal operation. In my opinion, a combination of factors, both human and mechanical, came together simultaneously to cause the rejected takeoff. To help preclude further occurrences of this type I will not hurry checklists and brief flight attendants to insure that door handles are in their proper position for takeoff.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CABIN SVC DOOR LIGHT COMES ON DURING INITIAL PHASE OF TKOF. TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: DEPARTING MIAMI THERE WAS A DELAY IN RECEIVING OUR WT AND BAL INFO. WHEN #1 FOR DEP THE INFO CAME OVER ACARS. MAX TKOF WT WAS 117000 LBS AND OUR WT WAS 117159 LBS. AFTER SUBTRACTING TAXI FUEL THE ACFT WT WAS UNDER 117000 LBS. BECAUSE OF THE HIGH WT WE ELECTED TO MAKE A BLEEDS OFF TKOF. DUE TO THE DELAY IN WT AND BAL, TKOF CLRNC AND A CHANGE IN INITIAL ALT FROM 5000 FT TO 2000 FT FROM TWR, AND CONFIGURING THE BLEED SWITCHES, WE DID NOT NOTICE THE APU HAD ALREADY BEEN SHUT DOWN. SINCE THE APU WAS SHUT DOWN WE WERE ALSO MAKING AN UNPRESSURIZED TKOF. ON THE INITIAL TKOF ROLL TO APPROX 70 KTS THERE WAS A MASTER CAUTION AND SVC DOOR LIGHT. THE CAPT REJECTED THE TKOF WITHOUT INCIDENCE. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT INFORMED US THAT AS WE WERE BEGINNING THE TKOF THEY NOTICED THE DOOR DID NOT APPEAR IN THE COMPLETELY CLOSED POS. WITH THE LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION AFTER TURNING THE BLEEDS OFF, THE DOOR WAS ALLOWED TO OPEN ENOUGH TO ILLUMINATE THE SVC DOOR LIGHT. AFTER RETURNING TO THE GATE, AND MAINT CHKING FOR PROPER OP AND CLOSURE OF THE SVC DOOR, THE FLT CONTINUED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 234705: WHILE QUICKLY ACCOMPLISHING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST THE FO MENTIONED THAT THE TKOF WT SHOWN ON ACARS WAS '159 LBS OVER THE MAX TKOF WT.' I ASSUMED THAT HE MEANT WE WERE 159 LBS OVER THE PERFORMANCE LIMITED WT (NOT THE STRUCTURAL LIMIT WT) SO I ASKED HIM TO CONFIGURE THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS FOR A BLEEDS OFF TKOF TO GET THE EXTRA PERFORMANCE I THOUGHT WAS NEEDED. BECAUSE THE APU WAS ALREADY SHUT DOWN WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL WITH THE ACFT UNPRESSURIZED. I REJECTED THE TKOF IMMEDIATELY (AT APPROX 70 KTS) WITH NO PROBS, TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE AND WROTE UP THE DOOR LIGHT. MAINT PERSONNEL INSPECTED THE DOOR, FOUND DEBRIS ON THE PROX SWITCH, CLEANED IT, OPERATED AND VERIFIED NORMAL OP. IN MY OPINION, A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, BOTH HUMAN AND MECHANICAL, CAME TOGETHER SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CAUSE THE REJECTED TKOF. TO HELP PRECLUDE FURTHER OCCURRENCES OF THIS TYPE I WILL NOT HURRY CHKLISTS AND BRIEF FLT ATTENDANTS TO INSURE THAT DOOR HANDLES ARE IN THEIR PROPER POS FOR TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.