Narrative:

(Air carrier medium large transport flight number) sfo-ord XA45 pm. Reserve trip for me, the captain, copilot was line holder, his 4TH time doing this trip sequence. Level FL240 inbound, flying the janesville 2 arrival with chicago approach control. Copilot flying leg. Given clearance to cross teddy intersection at 10000 ft. We both confirmed this around bribe intersection. We were restr to 260 KIAS for spacing. Chicago approach very busy. After clearance I got ATIS again 'cause first officer wanted me to verify landing runways. Approximately 15 mi west of janesville VOR I questioned first officer on when he was going to start descent to meet clearance as we had a 48 KT tailwind and was speed restr. He assured me no problem and would let (medium large transport aircraft) performance management system do it. (He had entered date (restriction) while I was getting ATIS the second time.) ord approach control asked about meeting restriction. I replied no problem with 22 mi to go to teddy intersection. The airplane hadn't started down by this time and the first officer and I engaged in rapid discussion on where the fix was, eating up time and distance as we argued. I told the first officer with a very concerned voice to let's get this airplane down. He asked if I didn't like the way he was flying it, if I wanted to take over and fly the rest of the leg. I was caught completely by surprise by this. But it was too late with 4 mi to teddy intersection, we were going through FL180 at 6000 FPM descent. Asked approach control for relief, as we were not going to make crossing restriction. Chicago approach control vectored us a left turn out of the flow control line, new clearance to descend to 11000 ft, slow to 210 KTS. Approach control asked why we didn't make it. I told him the truth. He then vectored us back in line for landing at ord. The sequence of events could have been avoided if I (new captain, less than 6 months on the medium large transport) had asserted positive directions to first officer and discussed his thoughts while descending to make restriction, to assert why or how, why we weren't going to make this ATC clearance. This was a very good lesson to me in effective communication in good cockpit management. Supplemental information from acn 235295: I was flying with a new captain who was on reserve, who was good but not quite up to speed, i.e., missing altitude, intersection, airspeed clrncs resulting more of my attention being given to the PNF duties on my leg as the PF. We were given a clearance to cross teddy intersection at 10000 ft several mi west of bribe. We were at FL240 and I calculated a descent started at bribe would give me a 15 mi pad (including the tailwind). The captain was reading back something about lincoln intersection of which I did not understand and in trying to watch out for him, I confused bribe intersection and jvl VOR resulting in asking altitude relief at teddy intersection. ATC gave us a 90 degree turn north and 11000 ft as a new altitude. While the error was on my part due to split concentration, I think that it would be much better to have 'new captain lines' allowing them to fly at least 60 hours per month. For their first 6 months as a line pilot to become more competent with more exposure out of training instead of sitting at home on reserve when all this new information is fresh in their heads.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF ACR MLG ACFT FAILED TO MAKE A DSCNT XING RESTRICTION DUE TO RELYING ON THE ACFT FMS.

Narrative: (ACR MLG FLT NUMBER) SFO-ORD XA45 PM. RESERVE TRIP FOR ME, THE CAPT, COPLT WAS LINE HOLDER, HIS 4TH TIME DOING THIS TRIP SEQUENCE. LEVEL FL240 INBOUND, FLYING THE JANESVILLE 2 ARR WITH CHICAGO APCH CTL. COPLT FLYING LEG. GIVEN CLRNC TO CROSS TEDDY INTXN AT 10000 FT. WE BOTH CONFIRMED THIS AROUND BRIBE INTXN. WE WERE RESTR TO 260 KIAS FOR SPACING. CHICAGO APCH VERY BUSY. AFTER CLRNC I GOT ATIS AGAIN 'CAUSE FO WANTED ME TO VERIFY LNDG RWYS. APPROX 15 MI W OF JANESVILLE VOR I QUESTIONED FO ON WHEN HE WAS GOING TO START DSCNT TO MEET CLRNC AS WE HAD A 48 KT TAILWIND AND WAS SPD RESTR. HE ASSURED ME NO PROB AND WOULD LET (MLG ACFT) PERFORMANCE MGMNT SYS DO IT. (HE HAD ENTERED DATE (RESTRICTION) WHILE I WAS GETTING ATIS THE SECOND TIME.) ORD APCH CTL ASKED ABOUT MEETING RESTRICTION. I REPLIED NO PROB WITH 22 MI TO GO TO TEDDY INTXN. THE AIRPLANE HADN'T STARTED DOWN BY THIS TIME AND THE FO AND I ENGAGED IN RAPID DISCUSSION ON WHERE THE FIX WAS, EATING UP TIME AND DISTANCE AS WE ARGUED. I TOLD THE FO WITH A VERY CONCERNED VOICE TO LET'S GET THIS AIRPLANE DOWN. HE ASKED IF I DIDN'T LIKE THE WAY HE WAS FLYING IT, IF I WANTED TO TAKE OVER AND FLY THE REST OF THE LEG. I WAS CAUGHT COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE BY THIS. BUT IT WAS TOO LATE WITH 4 MI TO TEDDY INTXN, WE WERE GOING THROUGH FL180 AT 6000 FPM DSCNT. ASKED APCH CTL FOR RELIEF, AS WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE XING RESTRICTION. CHICAGO APCH CTL VECTORED US A L TURN OUT OF THE FLOW CTL LINE, NEW CLRNC TO DSND TO 11000 FT, SLOW TO 210 KTS. APCH CTL ASKED WHY WE DIDN'T MAKE IT. I TOLD HIM THE TRUTH. HE THEN VECTORED US BACK IN LINE FOR LNDG AT ORD. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I (NEW CAPT, LESS THAN 6 MONTHS ON THE MLG) HAD ASSERTED POSITIVE DIRECTIONS TO FO AND DISCUSSED HIS THOUGHTS WHILE DSNDING TO MAKE RESTRICTION, TO ASSERT WHY OR HOW, WHY WE WEREN'T GOING TO MAKE THIS ATC CLRNC. THIS WAS A VERY GOOD LESSON TO ME IN EFFECTIVE COM IN GOOD COCKPIT MGMNT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 235295: I WAS FLYING WITH A NEW CAPT WHO WAS ON RESERVE, WHO WAS GOOD BUT NOT QUITE UP TO SPD, I.E., MISSING ALT, INTXN, AIRSPD CLRNCS RESULTING MORE OF MY ATTN BEING GIVEN TO THE PNF DUTIES ON MY LEG AS THE PF. WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS TEDDY INTXN AT 10000 FT SEVERAL MI W OF BRIBE. WE WERE AT FL240 AND I CALCULATED A DSCNT STARTED AT BRIBE WOULD GIVE ME A 15 MI PAD (INCLUDING THE TAILWIND). THE CAPT WAS READING BACK SOMETHING ABOUT LINCOLN INTXN OF WHICH I DID NOT UNDERSTAND AND IN TRYING TO WATCH OUT FOR HIM, I CONFUSED BRIBE INTXN AND JVL VOR RESULTING IN ASKING ALT RELIEF AT TEDDY INTXN. ATC GAVE US A 90 DEG TURN N AND 11000 FT AS A NEW ALT. WHILE THE ERROR WAS ON MY PART DUE TO SPLIT CONCENTRATION, I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER TO HAVE 'NEW CAPT LINES' ALLOWING THEM TO FLY AT LEAST 60 HRS PER MONTH. FOR THEIR FIRST 6 MONTHS AS A LINE PLT TO BECOME MORE COMPETENT WITH MORE EXPOSURE OUT OF TRAINING INSTEAD OF SITTING AT HOME ON RESERVE WHEN ALL THIS NEW INFO IS FRESH IN THEIR HEADS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.