Narrative:

I was on an ILS approach into lewiston, identification. WX was reported as indefinite ceiling and 1/8 mi visibility in fog. The approach was normal. At decision ht I could see the runway ctrlines and the edge lights. I elected to land. At this point I relaxed and became a bit complacent, meaning I did not get the aircraft quickly on the ground but instead descended slowly and tried to 'grease' the aircraft on. Once on the ground I applied the brakes lightly and had the throttles back to the stops. I was mentally letting the aircraft rollout to the end of the runway. It was shortly thereafter that I could see the end of the runway looming upon me. I did not expect the end so soon. I did not realize how far down the runway I was. I then got hard on the brakes and pulled the propellers into reverse. I was unable to get stopped on the runway and ended up about 15 ft beyond the end of the runway. The right hand propeller tips struck some loose gravel but there was no other damage and no harm to anyone aboard. In retrospect I can see several errors that I made. I failed to monitor my airspeed indicator once on the ground but instead relied upon my visual perception of my speed. Because visibility was low and there was very little distance that I could see I feel I misjudged our speed on the ground which led to my allowing us to get into the situation of too much speed and too little runway. Also because of my mindset that I had plenty of runway I did not see the change in runway edge lights from white to amber, which would have given me an idea of my true position. Complacency and misperception on my part coupled with low visibility conditions were the main contributing factors to the above situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: I WAS ON AN ILS APCH INTO LEWISTON, ID. WX WAS RPTED AS INDEFINITE CEILING AND 1/8 MI VISIBILITY IN FOG. THE APCH WAS NORMAL. AT DECISION HT I COULD SEE THE RWY CTRLINES AND THE EDGE LIGHTS. I ELECTED TO LAND. AT THIS POINT I RELAXED AND BECAME A BIT COMPLACENT, MEANING I DID NOT GET THE ACFT QUICKLY ON THE GND BUT INSTEAD DSNDED SLOWLY AND TRIED TO 'GREASE' THE ACFT ON. ONCE ON THE GND I APPLIED THE BRAKES LIGHTLY AND HAD THE THROTTLES BACK TO THE STOPS. I WAS MENTALLY LETTING THE ACFT ROLLOUT TO THE END OF THE RWY. IT WAS SHORTLY THEREAFTER THAT I COULD SEE THE END OF THE RWY LOOMING UPON ME. I DID NOT EXPECT THE END SO SOON. I DID NOT REALIZE HOW FAR DOWN THE RWY I WAS. I THEN GOT HARD ON THE BRAKES AND PULLED THE PROPS INTO REVERSE. I WAS UNABLE TO GET STOPPED ON THE RWY AND ENDED UP ABOUT 15 FT BEYOND THE END OF THE RWY. THE R HAND PROP TIPS STRUCK SOME LOOSE GRAVEL BUT THERE WAS NO OTHER DAMAGE AND NO HARM TO ANYONE ABOARD. IN RETROSPECT I CAN SEE SEVERAL ERRORS THAT I MADE. I FAILED TO MONITOR MY AIRSPD INDICATOR ONCE ON THE GND BUT INSTEAD RELIED UPON MY VISUAL PERCEPTION OF MY SPD. BECAUSE VISIBILITY WAS LOW AND THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DISTANCE THAT I COULD SEE I FEEL I MISJUDGED OUR SPD ON THE GND WHICH LED TO MY ALLOWING US TO GET INTO THE SIT OF TOO MUCH SPD AND TOO LITTLE RWY. ALSO BECAUSE OF MY MINDSET THAT I HAD PLENTY OF RWY I DID NOT SEE THE CHANGE IN RWY EDGE LIGHTS FROM WHITE TO AMBER, WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME AN IDEA OF MY TRUE POS. COMPLACENCY AND MISPERCEPTION ON MY PART COUPLED WITH LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS WERE THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE ABOVE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.