Narrative:

Pushback and start were normal from gate. We called ramp tower for taxi and told him we would need deicing. Ramp tower instructed us to taxi up behind the medium large transport that was at spot 'left' on the pad and to please square it up as much as possible behind the medium large transport. We did as instructed and parked in line and approximately 20 ft behind the tail of the medium large transport. We sat in this position for about 10-15 mins with the brakes set, the APU and the #1 engine running. Shortly after setting brakes a ground person plugged into the interphone and said 'we will deice you after the medium large transport and start on the right side.' he then unplugged from the interphone and left. We then watched as 1 glycol truck sprayed the left side of the medium large transport and then drove back around the nose of the medium large transport to spray the right side of the medium large transport. When the glycol truck was finished, he moved to a point past our right wing on the ramp. The medium large transport was cleared to taxi and contact ground at 1E. Ramp tower then told us to taxi up to spot 'left.' I then turned on the taxi light and both runway turnoff lights. I asked my copilot if the glycol truck on the right was clear. He looked and said yes, it was standing well clear to the right. I looked to the left and saw nothing. I turned off the lights and looked for the ground guide personnel. I saw him ahead of me with both wands, lights on, held at his side. I released the parking brakes and advanced the #1 throttle to 2000 pounds fuel flow. As the engine speed came up, I felt several small bumps. I immediately retarded the throttle to idle and set the brakes. I at first suspected compressor stall, but since it was #1 engine and not #2, I thought it could possibly have been something else. I asked the first officer to call ramp tower and have someone come out to the aircraft. Ramp tower again told us to taxi forward. The first officer then told ramp tower we could not as we thought we may have hit something, however, the ramp guide was still standing in front of us with his wands at his side. It was 2 to 3 mins later before we talked to anyone on the interphone. It was then that we were told that we had hit a glycol truck with our left wing, but no one was hurt. (I still could not see the truck out the left side.) maintenance hooked up a tug to the aircraft and pushed us back free of the glycol truck. Stairs were brought up to the aircraft and an agent came on board. I talked to the agent when he boarded the aircraft and he told me the glycol truck driver had said he had run into us. I told the agent I was not sure if the aircraft was moving or not. I was looking ahead for taxi instructions and would not have been able to discern a movement of only several ft. Normally, movement of the aircraft would not have started until several seconds after the engine had come up to speed. The passenger and crew were deplaned and taken to the terminal via busses. After returning to the terminal and pilot's lounge, I attempted to call the chief pilot, but was unable to reach him. I then called crew scheduling and was referred to the chief scheduler, who, in turn, connected me with an assistant chief pilot. I related the story to him and he said in his opinion that it would be all right to continue on our rotation. After boarding our passenger on a new aircraft, we departed 3 hours and 13 mins late. There were several factors contributing to this incident: obscured vision from the glycol on our windshield from the deicing of the medium large transport, lack of a definite procedure for a 'car-wash operation,' lack of communication with the deicing personnel (hand-held radio would solve this). We never saw the truck we hit. It had not been used on the medium large transport and we feel it had approached us from the rear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE TAXIING INTO THE DEICING PAD, LGT STRIKES A DEICING TRUCK WITH WINGTIP.

Narrative: PUSHBACK AND START WERE NORMAL FROM GATE. WE CALLED RAMP TWR FOR TAXI AND TOLD HIM WE WOULD NEED DEICING. RAMP TWR INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI UP BEHIND THE MLG THAT WAS AT SPOT 'L' ON THE PAD AND TO PLEASE SQUARE IT UP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE MLG. WE DID AS INSTRUCTED AND PARKED IN LINE AND APPROX 20 FT BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE MLG. WE SAT IN THIS POS FOR ABOUT 10-15 MINS WITH THE BRAKES SET, THE APU AND THE #1 ENG RUNNING. SHORTLY AFTER SETTING BRAKES A GND PERSON PLUGGED INTO THE INTERPHONE AND SAID 'WE WILL DEICE YOU AFTER THE MLG AND START ON THE R SIDE.' HE THEN UNPLUGGED FROM THE INTERPHONE AND LEFT. WE THEN WATCHED AS 1 GLYCOL TRUCK SPRAYED THE L SIDE OF THE MLG AND THEN DROVE BACK AROUND THE NOSE OF THE MLG TO SPRAY THE R SIDE OF THE MLG. WHEN THE GLYCOL TRUCK WAS FINISHED, HE MOVED TO A POINT PAST OUR R WING ON THE RAMP. THE MLG WAS CLRED TO TAXI AND CONTACT GND AT 1E. RAMP TWR THEN TOLD US TO TAXI UP TO SPOT 'L.' I THEN TURNED ON THE TAXI LIGHT AND BOTH RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS. I ASKED MY COPLT IF THE GLYCOL TRUCK ON THE R WAS CLR. HE LOOKED AND SAID YES, IT WAS STANDING WELL CLR TO THE R. I LOOKED TO THE L AND SAW NOTHING. I TURNED OFF THE LIGHTS AND LOOKED FOR THE GND GUIDE PERSONNEL. I SAW HIM AHEAD OF ME WITH BOTH WANDS, LIGHTS ON, HELD AT HIS SIDE. I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKES AND ADVANCED THE #1 THROTTLE TO 2000 LBS FUEL FLOW. AS THE ENG SPD CAME UP, I FELT SEVERAL SMALL BUMPS. I IMMEDIATELY RETARDED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE AND SET THE BRAKES. I AT FIRST SUSPECTED COMPRESSOR STALL, BUT SINCE IT WAS #1 ENG AND NOT #2, I THOUGHT IT COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN SOMETHING ELSE. I ASKED THE FO TO CALL RAMP TWR AND HAVE SOMEONE COME OUT TO THE ACFT. RAMP TWR AGAIN TOLD US TO TAXI FORWARD. THE FO THEN TOLD RAMP TWR WE COULD NOT AS WE THOUGHT WE MAY HAVE HIT SOMETHING, HOWEVER, THE RAMP GUIDE WAS STILL STANDING IN FRONT OF US WITH HIS WANDS AT HIS SIDE. IT WAS 2 TO 3 MINS LATER BEFORE WE TALKED TO ANYONE ON THE INTERPHONE. IT WAS THEN THAT WE WERE TOLD THAT WE HAD HIT A GLYCOL TRUCK WITH OUR L WING, BUT NO ONE WAS HURT. (I STILL COULD NOT SEE THE TRUCK OUT THE L SIDE.) MAINT HOOKED UP A TUG TO THE ACFT AND PUSHED US BACK FREE OF THE GLYCOL TRUCK. STAIRS WERE BROUGHT UP TO THE ACFT AND AN AGENT CAME ON BOARD. I TALKED TO THE AGENT WHEN HE BOARDED THE ACFT AND HE TOLD ME THE GLYCOL TRUCK DRIVER HAD SAID HE HAD RUN INTO US. I TOLD THE AGENT I WAS NOT SURE IF THE ACFT WAS MOVING OR NOT. I WAS LOOKING AHEAD FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCERN A MOVEMENT OF ONLY SEVERAL FT. NORMALLY, MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT WOULD NOT HAVE STARTED UNTIL SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER THE ENG HAD COME UP TO SPD. THE PAX AND CREW WERE DEPLANED AND TAKEN TO THE TERMINAL VIA BUSSES. AFTER RETURNING TO THE TERMINAL AND PLT'S LOUNGE, I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE CHIEF PLT, BUT WAS UNABLE TO REACH HIM. I THEN CALLED CREW SCHEDULING AND WAS REFERRED TO THE CHIEF SCHEDULER, WHO, IN TURN, CONNECTED ME WITH AN ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT. I RELATED THE STORY TO HIM AND HE SAID IN HIS OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT TO CONTINUE ON OUR ROTATION. AFTER BOARDING OUR PAX ON A NEW ACFT, WE DEPARTED 3 HRS AND 13 MINS LATE. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT: OBSCURED VISION FROM THE GLYCOL ON OUR WINDSHIELD FROM THE DEICING OF THE MLG, LACK OF A DEFINITE PROC FOR A 'CAR-WASH OP,' LACK OF COM WITH THE DEICING PERSONNEL (HAND-HELD RADIO WOULD SOLVE THIS). WE NEVER SAW THE TRUCK WE HIT. IT HAD NOT BEEN USED ON THE MLG AND WE FEEL IT HAD APCHED US FROM THE REAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.