Narrative:

En route from nrt to ord. 1 hour 15 mins after takeoff, purser reported suspicious object on aft galley. Inspection revealed an airsick bag on counter next to a clipping from newspaper with word 'bombing' on it. Tabs on the bag were partially bent over, but flap was not rolled down allowing limited view inside. Thorough inspection revealed no evidence of any wires, components, etc, on exterior or interior of bag. Tabs were bent back to allow insertion of fingers into what appeared to be water which was confirmed. Company communication initiated immediately after report of object resulted in advisory that all agencies concurred no threat existed and concurrence to continue to ord was agreed to by all parties. A very high level of anxiety existed among many flight attendants prior to and after decision to continue. Unable to reduce anxiety. Having one relieved of duties during incident by management on board, and others not fully functional, I determined it best to land at anc. Discussion with a bomb expert at anc revealed that he would have treated any suspicious object as a 'bomb,' would not touch, move, and leave where found, landing at nearest suitable airport. Our flight operations manual has 2 pages dealing with inspection, description, timers, clocks, anti-lift switch, movement to least risk location, etc. An expert advises otherwise. I believe there may be cause for a reassessment by industry reference course of action in flight with a suspicious object, possible bomb on board. After inspection at anc, aircraft, passenger, and crew continued to ord.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR WDB FOUND A FAKE BOMB ON THE ACFT WHILE AIRBORNE.

Narrative: ENRTE FROM NRT TO ORD. 1 HR 15 MINS AFTER TKOF, PURSER RPTED SUSPICIOUS OBJECT ON AFT GALLEY. INSPECTION REVEALED AN AIRSICK BAG ON COUNTER NEXT TO A CLIPPING FROM NEWSPAPER WITH WORD 'BOMBING' ON IT. TABS ON THE BAG WERE PARTIALLY BENT OVER, BUT FLAP WAS NOT ROLLED DOWN ALLOWING LIMITED VIEW INSIDE. THOROUGH INSPECTION REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WIRES, COMPONENTS, ETC, ON EXTERIOR OR INTERIOR OF BAG. TABS WERE BENT BACK TO ALLOW INSERTION OF FINGERS INTO WHAT APPEARED TO BE WATER WHICH WAS CONFIRMED. COMPANY COM INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER RPT OF OBJECT RESULTED IN ADVISORY THAT ALL AGENCIES CONCURRED NO THREAT EXISTED AND CONCURRENCE TO CONTINUE TO ORD WAS AGREED TO BY ALL PARTIES. A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF ANXIETY EXISTED AMONG MANY FLT ATTENDANTS PRIOR TO AND AFTER DECISION TO CONTINUE. UNABLE TO REDUCE ANXIETY. HAVING ONE RELIEVED OF DUTIES DURING INCIDENT BY MGMNT ON BOARD, AND OTHERS NOT FULLY FUNCTIONAL, I DETERMINED IT BEST TO LAND AT ANC. DISCUSSION WITH A BOMB EXPERT AT ANC REVEALED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TREATED ANY SUSPICIOUS OBJECT AS A 'BOMB,' WOULD NOT TOUCH, MOVE, AND LEAVE WHERE FOUND, LNDG AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. OUR FLT OPS MANUAL HAS 2 PAGES DEALING WITH INSPECTION, DESCRIPTION, TIMERS, CLOCKS, ANTI-LIFT SWITCH, MOVEMENT TO LEAST RISK LOCATION, ETC. AN EXPERT ADVISES OTHERWISE. I BELIEVE THERE MAY BE CAUSE FOR A REASSESSMENT BY INDUSTRY REF COURSE OF ACTION IN FLT WITH A SUSPICIOUS OBJECT, POSSIBLE BOMB ON BOARD. AFTER INSPECTION AT ANC, ACFT, PAX, AND CREW CONTINUED TO ORD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.