Narrative:

After landing on runway 16R and a quick turnaround, we taxied for a runway 34R departure. I did not have an slc airport diagram because it was missing from my binder. I utilized the captain's airport diagram prior to taxi to review the taxi route and runway orientation. In retrospect I didn't notice the common threshold at 32/34R and didn't analyze runway 32 because it is not an acceptable runway for our operation. During taxi I agreed to accept a rolling takeoff and briefed the departure procedure per procedures. Approaching the threshold, I was distracted by 2 runway maintenance vehicles' lights. As the captain started his left turn to align the aircraft for takeoff, I noticed a disparity between the HSI heading and the runway heading bug (set for 340). As I accelerated the aircraft, I tried to reference the airport diagram (which I didn't have), felt uncertain and called 'we are on runway 32' as we passed the numbers on the displaced threshold. Since I could not confirm we were on the wrong runway, and received no response from the other crew members, I continued the takeoff. I noted a 3000 ft remaining marker as we passed about 80-100 KTS and continued the takeoff. After liftoff I flew heading 340 and once safely airborne we realized our error. Contributing factors: fatigue early show time XX30 am local mem show time, unrestful night. First day of trip sequence. I didn't have an airport diagram (first time in 5 yrs). Distracted by vehicle maintenance lights near runway threshold. I should have been more assertive in aborting the takeoff. Inactive runway was lighted for maintenance. Poor runway design. Corrective action recommended: issue verbal warning from tower in takeoff clearance. Physically change this airport confign. Issue written warning on departure plate and the airport diagram. I now have an airport diagram for slc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF ACR LGT ACFT INADVERTENTLY TAKE OFF ON THE WRONG RWY AT SLC, RESULTING IN THE WRONG INITIAL CLB TRACK.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 16R AND A QUICK TURNAROUND, WE TAXIED FOR A RWY 34R DEP. I DID NOT HAVE AN SLC ARPT DIAGRAM BECAUSE IT WAS MISSING FROM MY BINDER. I UTILIZED THE CAPT'S ARPT DIAGRAM PRIOR TO TAXI TO REVIEW THE TAXI RTE AND RWY ORIENTATION. IN RETROSPECT I DIDN'T NOTICE THE COMMON THRESHOLD AT 32/34R AND DIDN'T ANALYZE RWY 32 BECAUSE IT IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE RWY FOR OUR OP. DURING TAXI I AGREED TO ACCEPT A ROLLING TKOF AND BRIEFED THE DEP PROC PER PROCS. APCHING THE THRESHOLD, I WAS DISTRACTED BY 2 RWY MAINT VEHICLES' LIGHTS. AS THE CAPT STARTED HIS L TURN TO ALIGN THE ACFT FOR TKOF, I NOTICED A DISPARITY BTWN THE HSI HDG AND THE RWY HDG BUG (SET FOR 340). AS I ACCELERATED THE ACFT, I TRIED TO REF THE ARPT DIAGRAM (WHICH I DIDN'T HAVE), FELT UNCERTAIN AND CALLED 'WE ARE ON RWY 32' AS WE PASSED THE NUMBERS ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. SINCE I COULD NOT CONFIRM WE WERE ON THE WRONG RWY, AND RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS, I CONTINUED THE TKOF. I NOTED A 3000 FT REMAINING MARKER AS WE PASSED ABOUT 80-100 KTS AND CONTINUED THE TKOF. AFTER LIFTOFF I FLEW HDG 340 AND ONCE SAFELY AIRBORNE WE REALIZED OUR ERROR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE EARLY SHOW TIME XX30 AM LCL MEM SHOW TIME, UNRESTFUL NIGHT. FIRST DAY OF TRIP SEQUENCE. I DIDN'T HAVE AN ARPT DIAGRAM (FIRST TIME IN 5 YRS). DISTRACTED BY VEHICLE MAINT LIGHTS NEAR RWY THRESHOLD. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE IN ABORTING THE TKOF. INACTIVE RWY WAS LIGHTED FOR MAINT. POOR RWY DESIGN. CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDED: ISSUE VERBAL WARNING FROM TWR IN TKOF CLRNC. PHYSICALLY CHANGE THIS ARPT CONFIGN. ISSUE WRITTEN WARNING ON DEP PLATE AND THE ARPT DIAGRAM. I NOW HAVE AN ARPT DIAGRAM FOR SLC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.