Narrative:

Sign in afternoon EST scheduled final landing early morning apr/sat. Scheduled atl-ams, then ams-str for layover. Monitoring volume approximately 2 hours from scheduled landing found out ams was well below minimums of 150 mi for CAT IIIB. Began formulating plan. Updated alternate WX, severe clear. Upon arrival, marshalled into holding with RVR's of 100-125. After a couple turns, RVR went down to 75. Crew decided to divert to brussels. While en route, contacted company notifying them of our divert and need for redispatch upon arrival. None of crew had been to brussels before. Getting help was severely handicapped due to parking spaces assigned and despite 2 more high frequency phone patches directly to atl. While awaiting word, crew discussed options and duty time. Captain 'felt great.' this was a guy who had been up since early am EST apr/fri/93. I said that we should only fly 1 more leg either back to ams or back to str. Captain tried to spin it into a contract versus helping the company rather than a common sense thing. However, as our time on the ground in brussels dragged on he admitted 'the adrenaline rush was fading' and took tylenol. He said maybe it would be foolish to push on and notified atl flight control on high frequency phone patch. Leg to ams was highlighted by a stuck EPR gauge that the captain elected to beat on while rolling down the runway and some confusion about the navaids. Upon our arrival at the gate we were handed paper work for leg to str. Captain left cockpit determined to stop here. After consulting with chief pilot on phone he 'pressed us hard to continue' due to the 90 passenger on board, no hotels in ams, no transportation, costs to company. He said WX was 4500 scattered, light rain and runway 26 (not NDB runway 8 over high terrain). He felt good and said he would do it (fly) if we watched him. I was very upset and asked him if he really felt he could handle a V1 cut or another emergency or another divert (single runway at str). On yes (it was am EST apr/sat) I made it understood, that if we had another stuck gauge, or I felt uncomfortable that we would go around or I'd assume control of airplane. He agreed. Landing WX was 800 overcast 6 KM in rain/fog at am EST and cockpit resource management was great. But it doesn't do anything for a waffler who listens to a chief pilot who hasn't flown the line in 15 yrs, yet alone multiple leg international. We need FARS that take into account multiple leg flying and not just duty time. As a financially strapped airline, we must not put money over passenger safety and common sense. P.south. Captain, post-flight comment: 'thanks for your help. I know it was against your good judgement, but sometimes you have to go against it.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A WDB ACR CREW WAS 'SOLD' THE IDEA TO FLY ON TO TRIP COMPLETION THROUGH BAD WX AND LONG INTL HRS BY THEIR CHIEF PLT.

Narrative: SIGN IN AFTERNOON EST SCHEDULED FINAL LNDG EARLY MORNING APR/SAT. SCHEDULED ATL-AMS, THEN AMS-STR FOR LAYOVER. MONITORING VOLUME APPROX 2 HRS FROM SCHEDULED LNDG FOUND OUT AMS WAS WELL BELOW MINIMUMS OF 150 MI FOR CAT IIIB. BEGAN FORMULATING PLAN. UPDATED ALTERNATE WX, SEVERE CLR. UPON ARR, MARSHALLED INTO HOLDING WITH RVR'S OF 100-125. AFTER A COUPLE TURNS, RVR WENT DOWN TO 75. CREW DECIDED TO DIVERT TO BRUSSELS. WHILE ENRTE, CONTACTED COMPANY NOTIFYING THEM OF OUR DIVERT AND NEED FOR REDISPATCH UPON ARR. NONE OF CREW HAD BEEN TO BRUSSELS BEFORE. GETTING HELP WAS SEVERELY HANDICAPPED DUE TO PARKING SPACES ASSIGNED AND DESPITE 2 MORE HIGH FREQ PHONE PATCHES DIRECTLY TO ATL. WHILE AWAITING WORD, CREW DISCUSSED OPTIONS AND DUTY TIME. CAPT 'FELT GREAT.' THIS WAS A GUY WHO HAD BEEN UP SINCE EARLY AM EST APR/FRI/93. I SAID THAT WE SHOULD ONLY FLY 1 MORE LEG EITHER BACK TO AMS OR BACK TO STR. CAPT TRIED TO SPIN IT INTO A CONTRACT VERSUS HELPING THE COMPANY RATHER THAN A COMMON SENSE THING. HOWEVER, AS OUR TIME ON THE GND IN BRUSSELS DRAGGED ON HE ADMITTED 'THE ADRENALINE RUSH WAS FADING' AND TOOK TYLENOL. HE SAID MAYBE IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO PUSH ON AND NOTIFIED ATL FLT CTL ON HIGH FREQ PHONE PATCH. LEG TO AMS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A STUCK EPR GAUGE THAT THE CAPT ELECTED TO BEAT ON WHILE ROLLING DOWN THE RWY AND SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE NAVAIDS. UPON OUR ARR AT THE GATE WE WERE HANDED PAPER WORK FOR LEG TO STR. CAPT LEFT COCKPIT DETERMINED TO STOP HERE. AFTER CONSULTING WITH CHIEF PLT ON PHONE HE 'PRESSED US HARD TO CONTINUE' DUE TO THE 90 PAX ON BOARD, NO HOTELS IN AMS, NO TRANSPORTATION, COSTS TO COMPANY. HE SAID WX WAS 4500 SCATTERED, LIGHT RAIN AND RWY 26 (NOT NDB RWY 8 OVER HIGH TERRAIN). HE FELT GOOD AND SAID HE WOULD DO IT (FLY) IF WE WATCHED HIM. I WAS VERY UPSET AND ASKED HIM IF HE REALLY FELT HE COULD HANDLE A V1 CUT OR ANOTHER EMER OR ANOTHER DIVERT (SINGLE RWY AT STR). ON YES (IT WAS AM EST APR/SAT) I MADE IT UNDERSTOOD, THAT IF WE HAD ANOTHER STUCK GAUGE, OR I FELT UNCOMFORTABLE THAT WE WOULD GAR OR I'D ASSUME CTL OF AIRPLANE. HE AGREED. LNDG WX WAS 800 OVCST 6 KM IN RAIN/FOG AT AM EST AND COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT WAS GREAT. BUT IT DOESN'T DO ANYTHING FOR A WAFFLER WHO LISTENS TO A CHIEF PLT WHO HASN'T FLOWN THE LINE IN 15 YRS, YET ALONE MULTIPLE LEG INTL. WE NEED FARS THAT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MULTIPLE LEG FLYING AND NOT JUST DUTY TIME. AS A FINANCIALLY STRAPPED AIRLINE, WE MUST NOT PUT MONEY OVER PAX SAFETY AND COMMON SENSE. P.S. CAPT, POST-FLT COMMENT: 'THANKS FOR YOUR HELP. I KNOW IT WAS AGAINST YOUR GOOD JUDGEMENT, BUT SOMETIMES YOU HAVE TO GO AGAINST IT.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.